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Summary 
 This thesis focuses on the influence of younger siblings on firstborns’ understanding 
of minds in middle childhood. This topic was investigated in the context of the Cardiff Child 
Development Study (CCDS): a prospective longitudinal study of firstborn children and their 
families living in Wales, UK. As reported in Chapter 3, presence of a younger sibling resulted 
in an advantage on a second-order false belief task at 7 years of age. However, this advantage 
was only true for firstborns who experienced the birth of a sibling after their second birthday. 
It was hypothesised that the positive contribution of a younger sibling is mediated by changes 
to features of mother-firstborn conversation in dyadic interactions. 
 To test this hypothesis, in Chapter 4 I described an expanded internal state language 
coding scheme for analysing mothers’ speech at 6 months, 21 months and 7 years. Mothers’ 
references to their 7-year-olds’ cognitive states positively predicted understanding of second-
order false belief. As reported in Chapter 5, mothers who had a second child referred to 
cognitive states more than those with one child in middle childhood. Mothers’ variety of 
references to cognitive states partially mediated the association between presence of a sibling 
and firstborns’ understanding of second-order false belief. 
 In Chapter 6, I investigated the families who experienced the birth of an early arrival 
younger sibling. Early arrival siblings were predicted by mothers’ symptoms of conduct 
disorder. Mothers who had an early arrival sibling present by 21 months referred to cognitive 
states less than mothers who did not. 
 The findings in this thesis contribute to knowledge about the influence of younger 
siblings on the child’s development of theory of mind. The findings demonstrate the 
importance of examining how the arrival, and timing of arrival, of a younger sibling affects 
the dynamics of children’s other close relationships that influence children’s developing 
understanding of minds. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction to the Thesis 
Most children in the UK grow up with at least one brother or sister; 80% of children 
in Western families have a sibling (Volling, 2012). Siblings provide children with a unique 
opportunity to learn about themselves and about others; it has been suggested that siblings 
provide an important context for the development of theory of mind (Dunn, Brown, 
Slomkowski, Tesla, & Youngblade, 1991). While there is mounting evidence that older 
siblings positively foster children’s understanding of minds, it is unclear if children with 
younger siblings experience the same advantage (Ruffman, Perner, Naito, Parkin, & 
Clements, 1998). The first aim of this thesis is to explore the influence of younger siblings on 
measures of firstborns’ theory of mind, with the view to then investigate processes by which 
younger sibling influence may occur. This will be addressed in the context of the Cardiff 
Child Development Study (CCDS); a prospective longitudinal study of firstborn children 
from a community sample living in South Wales, United Kingdom. 
This introductory chapter will review what is known about the influence of siblings 
on theory of mind in the literature thus far. I will consider early research, predominantly 
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conducted by Judy Dunn and her colleagues in the 1980s and early 1990s that explored 
processes by which siblings may foster children’s understanding of minds. I will consider 
how these processes may be dependent on aspects of sibling relationship structure, such as 
gender composition, birth interval and birth order. 
1.2. Theory of Mind 
1.2.1 Defining ‘theory of mind’ 
Navigation through the complexities of our social worlds requires understanding of 
our own inner states and those of other people. As children develop, they increasingly 
understand others as beings with minds: with beliefs, desires, intentions and emotions. Such 
understanding is essential for children to successfully comprehend, interpret, predict and 
manipulate the behaviour of those around them. The ability to understand the psychological 
world has been coined theory of mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978), which is defined as the 
“…understanding of mental states, what we know or believe about thoughts, desires, 
emotions, and other psychological entities both in ourselves and in others” (Miller, 2009, p. 
749). Theory of mind is also referred to as belief-desire psychology (Wellman & Banerjee, 
1991), folk psychology (Stitch & Nichols, 1995), commonsense psychology (Forguson & 
Gopnick, 1988) mindreading (Whiten, 1991) and more broadly within social cognition (Hala, 
1997) and social understanding (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004). 
1.2.2 Measuring developments in children’s theory of mind  
 Theory of mind has been demonstrated to be a multifaceted construct, characterised 
by a series of multiple concepts that develop over time (Wellman & Liu, 2004). As such, a 
number of measures have been designed to tap different aspects of theory of mind at each 
phase in development. Sharp, Fonagy and Goodyer (2008) provide an overview of the social 
cognitive constructs typically measured from infancy to adolescence (Figure 1.1).  
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Figure 1.1 Sharp and colleagues’ (2008) map of social cognitive constructs most commonly 
examined in relation to children’s normative development1. 
 
Of these constructs, children’s ability to understand beliefs to be changeable, fallible, 
and possibly contradictory to their own has been amongst the most intensively studied 
attainments within the theory of mind literature (Hughes, 2016). Such understanding of belief 
has been exemplified by philosopher Dennett (1978), who highlighted children’s 
understanding of fallibility of belief by their reactions to a traditional Punch and Judy show. 
Children will laugh and squeal while Punch throws a box off a cliff; to Punch’s knowledge, 
Judy is inside the box; however unbeknownst to Punch, Judy already escaped. Children’s 
joyous reactions to this show, Dennett wrote, is “…overwhelmingly good evidence that they 
understand… that Punch is acting on a mistaken belief” (p.4, Figure 1.2).  
 
                                                 
1 Figure 1.1 shows social cognitive constructs commonly measured at each phase of development. This does 
not represent the sequence of development of these constructs, nor is this list exhaustive of all constructs that 
have been measured in relation to theory of mind. For more information regarding sequences of development, 
see Wellman (2002) and Wellman & Liu (2004). 
Attitudes, prejudice, intergroup relations, judgemental heuristics 
Self-esteem, self-concept 
Causal attributions 
Trait understanding 
Interpretive theory of mind, second-order theory of mind, mentalizing 
Self-understanding, self-awareness, self-regulation 
Empathy, emotional understanding 
Moral development 
Face processing, perspective taking 
Attachment representation 
Joint attention 
Intersubjectivity 
Social referencing 
False belief/desire 
Trust, cooperation 
Social problem-solving 
Autobio memory 
INFANCY 2-4 YEARS 4-8 YEARS 8-12 YEARS 12-18 YEARS 
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Figure 1.2 Punch and Judy illustration from The Nursery Rhymes of England. 
 
 Children’s understanding of such mistaken beliefs, or false beliefs, is widely used as 
an indicator of theory of mind. The false belief task (also known as unexpected transfer or 
unexpected location task) was introduced by Wimmer and Perner (1983) as a simpler 
alternative to Premack and Woodruff’s (1978) deception task used to investigate 
understanding of mind in chimpanzees. In a typical story for a false belief task, a protagonist 
places an object in a specific location, only to have it moved by another character to another 
location in their absence. Following the story, children are asked questions to ascertain 
whether they have a representation of a mistaken belief; in their attribution of the 
protagonist’s belief, or in their prediction of the protagonist’s behaviour. The most common 
variation of the unexpected transfer or unexpected location false belief task is depicted in 
Figure 1.3, the Sally-Anne task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985).  
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Figure 1.3 Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) illustration of Sally-Anne false belief task.  
 
 The false belief task is not without its criticisms as a fairly narrow measure that, due 
to its linguistic complexity, may somewhat underestimate children’s understanding of minds 
(for a review, see Bloom & German, 2000). However, in a meta-analysis by Wellman, Cross 
and Watson, (2001), the false belief task was demonstrated to be a robust measure of theory 
of mind. Despite variations in task, the developmental trajectory of this attainment remained 
the same. Additionally, children’s responses had a consistency of 84% from first to second 
responses. The reliability and validity of the false belief task is demonstrated further in a 
review by Devine and Hughes (2016). Indeed, the classic false belief task is still commonly 
used in recent work (for example see Devine, White, Ensor & Hughes, 2016). 
1.2.3 Individual differences in theory of mind 
Although numerous studies have demonstrated that the majority of children succeed 
in such false belief tasks by the fourth year of life (Astington & Gopnick, 1991; Perner, 
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Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987), it has been indicated that there are marked individual differences 
in the age at which children succeed in the false belief task, ranging from 3 to 5 years 
(Jenkins & Astington, 1996). As such, a considerable body of research has accumulated 
exploring individual differences in typical development of theory of mind, and three 
contributing factors have been identified (Slaughter & Repacholi, 2003). Firstly, research 
investigating cognitive constructs have identified language (Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 
2007) and executive function (Carlson & Moses, 2001) as particularly important sources of 
individual difference in children’s false belief understanding.  Secondly, a sophisticated 
understanding of mental states has been linked to various social outcome measures, including 
more positive interactions among peers (Cutting & Dunn, 1999), improved conversations 
(Dunn, 1994) and improved teacher ratings of social competence (Lalonde & Chandler, 1995; 
Watson, Nixon, Wilson, & Capage, 1999). The third and final factor most relevant to this 
thesis is family influence.  
1.3 Family Influences on Theory of Mind 
The examination of family influence in relation to theory of mind has been pivotal in 
the long-standing debate regarding how children develop understanding of the minds of 
themselves and of others. Most broadly, this debate concerns whether understanding of minds 
results from individual cognitive growth, or from socialisation (for a review, see Carpendale 
& Lewis, 2004). While some theorists have proposed that theory of mind is essentially a 
maturational process (Leslie, 1994), there is a growing body of research that has 
demonstrated the importance of children’s social worlds on their understanding of minds. 
Prominent accounts such as the ‘theory theory’ (Wellman, 1990) and ‘simulation theory’ 
(Harris, 1991) propose that children’s social environments have a triggering role in children’s 
theory of mind development. Yet research showing associations between children’s 
understanding of minds and various aspects of their socialisation history has emphasised that 
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children’s emerging understanding of minds must be understood within the context of social 
interaction (Dunn, 1994). Indeed, features of children’s relationships with their mothers and 
fathers (Miller, 2016), other kin (Lewis, Freeman, Kyriakidou, Maridaki‐Kassotaki, & 
Berridge, 1996) and peers (Slaughter, Dennis, & Pritchard, 2002) have all been found to 
influence children’s developing theories of mind. Such research has led to increasing 
consensus that understanding of minds develops within triadic interactions between children, 
interactional partners and the environment (for a review see Carpendale & Lewis, 2006).  
1.3.1 The influence of siblings on theory of mind 
 The influence of siblings on children’s understanding of minds is of particular interest 
in the theory of mind literature. Not only did research identifying that siblings may foster 
children’s understanding of minds initiate the flurry of work examining social influences on 
theory of mind, but sibling relationships are of particular interest in terms of their universality 
and uniqueness. Most children in the UK grow up with at least one brother or sister (Office 
for National Statistics, 2013a), and for many the sibling relationship is the most long-term of 
relationships in the lifespan. The sibling relationship can be characterised by enduring 
closeness, play and cooperation, as well as extreme conflict and rivalry, and as such provides 
a unique opportunity for children to learn about themselves and about others (Dunn, 1994; 
Hughes, 2011).  
 The influence of siblings on the development of theory of mind has predominantly 
been explored in terms of sibling relationship factors, such as sibling presence, number, 
gender and timing of arrival. Another branch of research has focused on the relationship 
between theory of mind and characteristics of the sibling relationship itself. Interestingly, it 
was the latter association that was first explored, in a forward-thinking body of work by Judy 
Dunn and colleagues, who noted a positive relationship between sibling cooperation at 33 
months and performance on a false belief task 7 months later (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, et 
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al., 1991). This was followed by a pivotal study by Perner, Ruffman and Leekam (1994), who 
demonstrated that both older and younger siblings foster children’s false belief 
understanding, reporting that every addition of a sibling in the home provided the same 
advantage as 6 months of development.  
1.3.2. How might a sibling foster a child’s theory of mind? 
These pivotal studies by Judy Dunn and Josef Perner and their colleagues (1991; 
1994) support the suggestion by Piaget (1959) that siblings facilitate cognitive change 
through discussion and reflection. This position was expanded by Dunn (1994), in her 
proposal that siblings may influence theory of mind through a) talk about causality and 
internal states; b) management of conflict; c) joint play; d) shared jokes; and e) reasoning 
about moral issues. The subsequent sections will briefly summarise each of these processes. 
1.3.2.1 Talk about causality and internal states. Over the second and third years of 
life, children talk increasingly about the causes of individuals’ behaviour (Dunn & Brown, 
1993), and such conversations are positively associated with children’s understanding of false 
belief (Dunn, Brown, Slomskowski, et al., 1991). Talk about causality refers to two events or 
states that have a conditional relationship, such as, “Don’t jump – you’ll hurt yourself!” 
(Dunn, Brown, Slomskowski, et al., 1991, p. 450). From the ages of 33 to 40 months, talk 
about causality becomes equally common with both mother and sibling, and additionally 
increasingly shifts focus from overt behaviour to internal states.  
References to inner states, such as feelings, desires and cognitions, have also been 
observed in children as early as the end of the second year of life (Bretherton, McNew, & 
Beeghly-Smith, 1981). Children’s production of, and exposure to, internal state language 
with various interlocutors has been associated with children’s false belief understanding 
(Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, et al., 1991; Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002; see also Chapter 4 
for a review). The sibling relationship has been shown to become an increasingly rich context 
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for children to have conversations about their own inner states and the inner states of others. 
In Brown and Dunn’s early research (1991, 1992), it was found that as children develop, they 
increasingly discuss internal states with their siblings, and by 47 months of age, children 
discuss inner states with their siblings and friends more so than they do with their mothers 
(Brown, Donelan-McCall, & Dunn, 1996). Additionally, children’s discussions about internal 
states with siblings concern the inner states of both children, rather than the inner states of the 
child only; which tends to be the focus within mother-child interactions (Dunn & Kendrick, 
1982a). Therefore, in the context of sibling interactions, children are more likely to hear 
about the internal states of others. 
Children’s discussion of internal states with their siblings is positively related to 
measures of theory of mind; including emotion understanding (Dunn, Brown, & Beardsall, 
1991), perspective taking (Howe & Ross, 1990) and false belief understanding (Brown et al., 
1996). It has been found, however, that children’s use of internal state language is dependent 
on context; namely, that such conversations occur most often during conflict and play (Howe, 
1991).   
1.3.2.2 Management of conflict. Children’s mind-understanding has been 
demonstrated to be fostered by positive sibling interactions (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, et 
al., 1991; Howe & Ross, 1990). However, family conflict may also provide an important 
context for the development of theory of mind. Family disputes involving young children 
have been found to be extremely common (Dunn, 1994), and the sibling relationship is one 
that is often characterised by intense conflict. Unlike relationships with peers, the 
permanence and intimacy of sibling relationships affords children the opportunity to test the 
boundaries of conflict without jeopardizing the relationship (Hughes, 2011). 
Episodes of sibling conflict may foster theory of mind as they tend to be rich in talk 
about causality and internal states (Dunn & Brown, 1993; Dunn & Brown, 1994; Howe, 
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1991) which, as previously discussed, is related to children’s understanding of false belief. 
Within sibling conflict, children are more likely to talk about feeling states, such as, “… you 
drive me mad! I’m really angry! Leave me alone!” (Howe, 1991, p. 1506), bringing 
children’s attention to their own thoughts, feelings and intentions. In addition, children’s 
arguments may also highlight how their own inner states contrast with the states of their 
interactional partner. This is demonstrated again, in an example from Howe (1991), in an 
example of one child’s references to contrasting inner states as a younger sibling attempts to 
knock down a tower of blocks, “Don’t do that! I want to make it higher.” (p. 1506). 
Within their arguments, children have the opportunity to discuss their contrasting 
points of view, and may also attempt to reconcile their differences. The nature of how 
children reconcile or negotiate their disputes with their siblings has been found to be related 
their false belief understanding (Foote & Holmes-Lonergan, 2003). Namely, children’s use of 
other-oriented arguments (Dunn, 1994) take into account the inner states of the interactional 
partner, such as “She said we have to play together. Let’s finish the building, then we’ll play 
with that.” (Foote & Holmes-Lonergan, 2003, p. 58). Such negotiation strategies have been 
found to foster children’s false belief understanding, over use of self-oriented arguments, 
which focus on the child’s self-interest, for example, “I chose the horse first.” (Foote & 
Holmes-Lonergan, 2003, p. 57). Indeed, sibling dyads who do not argue have been found to 
score lower on false belief tasks (Foote & Holmes-Lonergan, 2003), suggesting that 
negotiating conflict is an important context for the development of theory of mind. 
1.3.2.3 Joint play. Leslie (1987) argued that pretend play requires similar 
understanding as that required for understanding of minds. In a pretend play scenario, an 
alternate reality is separated, or decoupled, from literal reality itself. An example of this could 
be a child playing with a toy banana, not as a food object, its primary representation, but a 
telephone, its secondary representation. This metarepresentational ability required for 
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pretend play is thought to mirror that required for the understanding of minds, in the 
understanding that the inner states can contradict reality and one’s own inner states, and thus 
may be an indicator of a child’s social understanding (Leslie, 1988).  
Children’s propensity to pretend play generally, and with siblings, is associated with 
measures of children’s theory of mind (Youngblade & Dunn, 1995). Children’s sibling 
relationships are of particular interest in the pretend play literature, as it has been 
demonstrated that siblings tend to be children’s preferred partners for engaging in pretend 
play (Farver & Wimbarti, 1995; Youngblade & Dunn, 1995). This may be due to their shared 
experiences of family life and the intimacy of the sibling relationship giving freedom to 
express themselves (Hughes, 2011). Additionally, the nature of siblings’ participation in 
pretend play tends to differ from that of the caregiver, in that siblings participate beyond 
commentary, but as actors themselves within the pretend play scenario (Dunn & Dale, 1984).  
There are many aspects of pretend play with siblings that may be important for 
children’s developing understanding of minds. Pretend play, like conflict, is another context 
rich in internal state language. Children refer to internal states in their invitations to 
commence play, in their construction of shared meaning, negotiation of roles and enactments 
in the play scenario, in addition to managing their disputes when faced with conflicting ideas. 
These references to inner states during pretend play are well illustrated in an excerpt of a play 
session with a female sibling dyad from Hughes (2011, p. 109, names removed, italics 
added). In this play scenario, one child attempts to imprison her sister behind a pot plant: 
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Child: Boba, pretend you are a baddy and I’ll catch you. Come on Boba. 
You are a baddy and you fight me and I catch you up. 
Child: Boba, don’t. Do this. 
Child: Will you just put that on there? [Putting a handcuff on sibling’s 
wrist]. Make a fist. OK you need to [speech unintelligible] and I’ll 
take you into prison. Now stay in there for the night. Get in Boba. 
Get into that little space. 
Sibling: Getting in it. 
 
1.3.2.4 Shared jokes. Children’s jokes and shared humour with their interactional 
partners may also reveal a great deal about what children understand about their social 
world. From as early as 14 months, children have been observed to laugh at discrepant 
events, if people or objects behave in unusual or unexpected ways. In the second year of 
life, children increasingly laugh at behaviour that is considered forbidden, as well as 
people’s mistakes and misfortunes. Children’s emerging verbal ability also leads to play 
with language, by joking, teasing and stating deliberate falsehoods (Dunn, 1988). 
Children’s laughter at such events demonstrates children’s emerging understanding of the 
world; in that the source of humour often results from events that violate what is known 
about reality.  
Joking between siblings is particularly important in this context, given that the 
sources of laughter within sibling interactions often differ from that they share with their 
caregiver (Dunn, 1994). Children’s jokes with their siblings often focus on what is forbidden, 
insulting or disgusting, often in repetitive conversational turns, exemplified by Dunn (1988, 
p. 157): 
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Sibling: Piggyface! 
Child: Piggyface! 
Sibling to observer: I’m not allowed to say Piggyface at school. 
Child to observer: My mum doesn’t let me say 
Piggyface. 
Child to sibling Mr. Piggyface! Mr. Piggyface! 
Sibling: No, not Piggyface. 
Child: Mr. Piggyface! 
Sibling: You said Piggyface! 
Child: Mr. Piggyface! 
 
 The differences in the nature of shared jokes within mother-child interaction and 
sibling-child interaction demonstrates that children come to know what specific individuals 
may (and may not) find amusing (Dunn, 1994), which may foster children’s developing 
theory of mind. Indeed, children who are frequent jokers within interactions have been found 
to have an advantage on false belief tasks (Woodworth, 1993, as cited in Dunn, 1994).  
1.3.2.5 Reasoning about moral issues. Understanding feelings and intentions of 
others is thought to be fostered by children’s experiences of moral transgressions (Carpendale 
& Lewis, 2006). Indeed, children’s appropriate responses to moral transgressions is positively 
correlated with children’s false belief understanding (Baird & Astington, 2004). Like 
children’s theory of mind, children’s understanding of issues such as rule-breaking, harming 
others and teasing, as well as events that highlight responsibility, justice and kindness to 
others, are thought to be fostered within children’s social interactions (for a review, see 
Dunn, 2013). This reflects Piaget’s (1932) original argument that children’s experiences with 
other children, namely their cooperation and conflict, are particularly important for moral 
development.  
Children’s causal talk concerning social norms and rules with their siblings increases 
in frequency as they develop (Dunn, 1994), and most sibling conflicts concern moral issues 
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(Recchia & Howe, 2009), with 50% of young children’s disputes being centred on issues 
such as rights and possession (Dunn & Munn, 1987). Children’s arguments concerning social 
rules can lead to justifications for their actions, and within these types of disputes, children 
often refer to feeling states (Dunn & Munn, 1987). In addition to episodes of conflict, is it 
also possible that theory of mind is fostered within children’s exploration of moral issues 
within pretend play. For example, their construction of dramatic narratives may include moral 
transgressions (Dunn, Cutting, & Demetriou, 2000). 
1.3.3 Might siblings indirectly facilitate theory of mind?  
It is also argued that children may benefit from a sibling by observing their 
interactions with their caregiver (Hughes & Leekam, 2004). Children have been found to 
closely monitor conversation and expression between their mother and sibling (Dunn & 
Kendrick, 1982a; Dunn & Shatz, 1989), and as such, children have more opportunity to make 
sense of interactions between others. For example, mothers’ styles of interacting with 
siblings, such as frequent controlling behaviour, have been associated with children’s 
understanding of minds (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, et al., 1991). Additionally, children with 
siblings are more likely to hear more internal state language within the home (Jenkins, 
Turrell, Kogushi, Lollis, & Ross, 2003). Such mother-sibling conversations expose children 
to conversations regarding other individuals’ internal states, as prior to siblinghood, mothers’ 
utterances regarding internal states focus predominantly on those of the child (Dunn & 
Kendrick, 1982a). Indeed, children who grow up in families where talk about feelings is 
frequent do well in measures of theory of mind (Dunn, Brown, & Beardsall, 1991).  
In addition to eavesdropping on mother-sibling interactions, children may also 
experience sibling influence on theory of mind indirectly via maternal involvement in 
interactions between siblings. One possibility is that theory of mind is fostered in caregivers’ 
efforts to manage conflict between siblings. Mothers become involved in over half of 
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children’s episodes of conflict with their siblings, and such interventions often include 
references to rules and internal states (Dunn & Munn, 1986), such as, “She didn’t know I had 
promised it to you.” (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, et al., 1991, p. 1363, italics added). 
Although maternal intervention in sibling conflicts has been linked with longer duration of 
conflict between siblings and more physical aggression, it has also been linked with more 
mature conflict management and moral sensibility by children (Dunn & Munn, 1986; Dunn, 
Brown, & Maguire, 1995).  
Though previous work has focused on how the arrival of a sibling may change 
children’s conversational climates, in the conversations that they overhear (Hughes & 
Leekam, 2004), and in the triadic interactions they take part in with their caregiver (Dunn, 
Brown, Slomkowski, et al., 1991; Dunn & Kendrick, 1982a), few studies have explored 
changes in dyadic mother-child interactions before and after the arrival of a sibling. In order 
to examine the processes by which siblings indirectly influence children’s theory of mind via 
the caregiver, more research must examine the changes in mother-child dyadic interactions 
(Carpendale & Lewis, 2004). This therefore, will be the focus in the examination of processes 
within this thesis.  
1.3.4 Quality of sibling relationship 
 It is suggested that the processes by which siblings may influence children’s 
developing theories of mind, described in sections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3, may be moderated by the 
quality of the sibling relationship. Cooperative sibling interactions have been associated with 
children’s false belief performance (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, et al., 1991) and sibling 
relationships that are characterised by harmonious, warm, friendly interactions have been 
found to be conducive to more frequent conversations about internal states and pretend play, 
as well as more constructive styles of conflict and mature moral sensibility (Brown et al., 
1996; Cutting & Dunn, 2006; Dunn, et al., 1995; Foote & Holmes-Lonergan, 2003). 
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Conversely, destructive sibling relationships, characterised by high emotional intensity, 
aggression and antagonism are associated with poor performance on measures of theory of 
mind (Song, Volling, Lane, & Wellman, 2016).  
 Additionally, evidence suggests that the influence of caregivers’ interventions within 
children’s sibling interactions may also be explained by sibling relationship quality.   
For example, Recchia and Howe (2009) showed that when sibling relationship quality is 
high, mothers’ intervention strategies such as encouraging joint perspective-taking was linked 
to corresponding use of such strategies by children, but this association was weaker when 
sibling relationship quality was poor. It is possible that when in positive sibling relationships, 
children are more motivated to resolve their conflicts in positive ways, which in turn may 
foster their understanding of minds.  
1.3.5 The importance of relationship structure 
The processes summarised in the preceding sections represent an important step in 
understanding how siblings may foster children’s understanding of minds. However, a 
disproportionate number of studies investigating such processes focus on the influence of an 
older sibling, and often do not specify other important factors such as other positions in birth-
order, age-spacing and gender composition, factors known as biosocial structure or sibling 
constellation factors (Buhrmester, 1992). Given that research has demonstrated that sibling 
constellation factors affect aspects of socioemotional characteristics of the sibling 
relationship (Buhrmester, 1992), it is possible that the processes by which siblings influence 
theory of mind specified by Dunn (1994) may be dependent on features of sibling 
constellation. 
1.3.5.1 Gender composition of siblings. Some studies have documented that children 
with opposite-gender siblings demonstrate better performance on theory of mind tasks 
(Carlson & Moses, 2001; Cassidy, Fineberg, Brown, & Perkins, 2005). Opposite-gender 
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siblings may be most beneficial in fostering understanding of minds as they expose children 
to diverse perspectives, play styles and preferences that differ from their own (Kennedy, 
Lagattuta, & Sayfan, 2015). Opposite-gender sibling relationships are also characterised by 
more conflict (Dunn & Kendrick, 1982a), and therefore may provide more opportunities for 
children to navigate opposing points of view.  
While these studies have noted that opposite-gender siblings appear most facilitative 
of theory of mind, other work has suggested the same for same-gender siblings (Kennedy et 
al., 2015). Research from the literature on peer relationships has demonstrated that children 
prefer to interact within same-gender dyads (Maccoby, 1990). Same-gender sibling 
relationships have been found to be characterised by more play, conversation, positivity and 
intimacy than opposite-gender sibling relationships (Burhmester, 1992; Dunn & Kendrick, 
1981; Dunn, 1983; Kim, McHale, Osgood, & Crouter, 2006). It may be that same-gender 
siblings positively influence theory of mind via quality of relationship.  
1.3.5.2 Age spacing of siblings. Another sibling constellation feature of sibling 
relationships that may affect the degree to which siblings influence children’s theory of mind 
is birth interval. Peterson (2000) investigated the possibility that there are minimum and 
maximum age boundaries within which siblings foster theory of mind, demonstrating that 
children with very young siblings (< 12 months) or older siblings (> 12 years) do not show an 
advantage in measures of theory of mind over only children. While very young siblings lack 
the ability to engage in relevant interactions that foster theory of mind, older siblings may 
choose not to, in being aloof to childish interactions or by adopting a more parent-like role. 
This work highlighted that having a sibling with whom a child can engage in play, conflict 
and conversations in childish ways may be key to the sibling effect on children’s theory of 
mind.  
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The experience of having a twin provides no advantage in measures of theory of mind 
(Cassidy et al., 2005); therefore, in common with widely-spaced birth intervals, siblings born 
within very narrow birth intervals may similarly not facilitate children’s theory of mind. It 
has been argued that the sibling effect may only occur when the sibling provides children 
with exposure to a different mind; this is corroborated by evidence demonstrating that having 
both older and younger siblings may be of most benefit by exposing children to a wider 
variety of minds (Peterson, 2000). It is also possible that a twin may affect the mother-child 
relationship. Evidence has demonstrated that the stress and demands of having twins has been 
associated with less “…strong, elaborated, communicative interaction” (Thorpe, Rutter, & 
Greenwood, 2003, p. 346). It then seems plausible that children born within a very short 
interval may similarly not provide children with the sibling advantage.  
1.3.5.3 Birth order 
 1.3.5.3.1 Older siblings. Of the aspects of sibling constellation that have been 
investigated, birth order has by far received the most research interest. Following initial 
studies that older and younger siblings increase the likelihood of passing false belief tasks 
(Jenkins & Astington, 1996; Perner et al., 1994) a reanalysis and extension of the pivotal 
study by Perner and colleagues (1994) was conducted (Ruffman et al., 1998). When the 
influence of number of older and younger siblings were entered into the sample model whilst 
controlling for age, only older siblings were found to positively influence children’s false 
belief performance. Since this study, preschoolers with older siblings have been found to 
outperform those with younger siblings and without siblings on theory of mind measures in a 
number of studies (Farhadian et al., 2010; Jenkins & Astington, 1996; Kennedy et al., 2015; 
Lewis et al., 1996; McAlister & Peterson, 2007, 2013; Ruffman et al., 1998). 
One explanation for this finding has been coined the apprenticeship hypothesis 
(Lewis et al., 1996), proposing that interactions with more skilled partners, such as older 
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siblings, fosters children’s understanding of minds. With their experience and more advanced 
metacognitive skills, older siblings may play an important role in helping their younger 
siblings to become more proficient in their understanding of internal states (Ruffman et al., 
1998). Older children may be better able to teach skills to their younger sibling (Azmitia & 
Hesser, 1993; Dunn & Kendrick, 1982a) as well as engage their younger sibling in more 
sophisticated pretend play (Farver & Wimbarti, 1995) and conversations about internal states 
(Jenkins et al., 2003).  
This reflects a Vygotskian perspective (Vygotsky, 1978), which proposes that 
understanding of minds is the product of the child’s engagement with other people in their 
social environment through the use of cultural tools, stimuli passed down through 
generations that act as a means to achieve goals and consequently facilitate cognitive 
development. As well as physical objects, these can include psychological tools such as 
language, values, skills and symbols. Cultural tools are used within social interactions 
between children and other individuals in their environment, which, when occurring with a 
more knowledgeable other, enables the knowledgeable other to scaffold the interaction with 
the child. By providing a framework to guide the interaction with the child, be it in a game, 
task or in conversation, more knowledgeable others can guide children’s active participation 
to reach higher levels of cognitive functioning. Vygotsky described this range of 
performance, between what children can do alone, and what their more knowledgeable other 
can support them to achieve, as the Zone of Proximal Development (Vygotsky, 1978) (see 
Figure 1.4).  
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Figure 1.4 Illustration of the Zone of Proximal Development.  
 
Older siblings may be particularly efficacious for children’s understanding of minds 
in the context of pretend play and through their use of internal state language. Children with 
older siblings have been found to use more sophisticated play strategies, whereas their 
firstborn counterparts are less successful at creating shared meanings in play (Howe, 
Petrakos, & Rinaldi, 1998; Howe, Petrakos, Rinaldi, & LeFebvre, 2005). It is thought that 
younger siblings may become involved in more sophisticated and complex play scenarios by 
the older siblings scaffolding, through the use of “…verbal suggestions, hints, strategies, 
extensions, or… physical gestures.” (Howe et al., 2005, p. 785).  
An alternative explanation focuses on observational learning, proposing that the 
sibling advantage comes about through the younger child’s observation of the older sibling’s 
interactions with the caregiver (Dunn & Kendrick, 1980). Children may particularly benefit 
from observing interactions between an older sibling and a caregiver, as this exposes children 
to more sophisticated forms of internal state language (Jenkins et al., 2003). This may foster 
children’s understanding of minds by promoting children’s understanding and generation of 
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such terms, which is positively associated with false belief performance (Ruffman et al., 
2002).  
1.3.5.3.2 Younger siblings. While it is well established that older siblings foster 
children’s understanding of minds, the influence of younger siblings on theory of mind 
remains unclear. A number of studies have indicated that younger siblings foster children’s 
theory of mind (Jenkins & Astington, 1996; Kennedy et al, 2015; McAlister & Peterson, 
2007; Perner et al., 1994; Peterson, 2000; Shahaeian, Nielsen, Peterson, & Slaughter, 2014). 
Some studies have found no effect of younger siblings on theory of mind measures 
(Farhadian et al., 2010, Ruffman et al., 1998; Shahaeian, 2015) and one study found that 
younger siblings have a negative effect on theory of mind performance (Wright & Mahford, 
2012).  
Although children with younger siblings may not benefit from scaffolding of higher-
level pretend play and internal state language like those with older siblings (Howe et al., 
1998, 2005; Jenkins et al., 2003), it may be that being the older sibling with the opportunity 
to teach a younger sibling such skills may also be beneficial (Dunn & Dale, 1984; Zajonc & 
Markus, 1975). Strauss, Ziv, and Stein (2002) emphasised the relationship between teaching 
and theory of mind; that teachers must understand the learners’ knowledge - whether it is 
absent, partial, or mistaken - in comparison to their own knowledge. Firstborn siblings have 
been found to adjust teaching strategies to suit the abilities of their younger siblings (Pérez-
Granados & Callanan, 1997), and adopting various teaching strategies has been found to be 
positively associated with measures of children’s theory of mind (Davis-Unger & Carlson, 
2008).  
 First and second-born children are born into very different family circumstances, and 
it may be the firstborn’s transition from only child to siblinghood that impacts on children’s 
understanding of minds. The changes that the arrival of this new family member brings to a 
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firstborn’s world have thus far not been investigated within the context of children’s 
developing theories of mind (Volling, 2012). Therefore, to some extent we can only speculate 
how the transition to siblinghood may impact children’s understanding of minds.  
The majority of children make the transition to siblinghood between the ages of 2 and 
3 (Baydar, Greek, & Brooks-Gunn, 1997), at the time when children’s understanding of 
minds is thought to emerge (Wellman, 2002). Therefore, the arrival of a new baby may play 
an important role during a time when children are increasingly thinking of themselves and 
others with minds. One such way the arrival of a new baby may foster children’s 
understanding of minds is by triggering changes to the family conversational climate. Dunn 
and Kendrick (1982a) studied mother-child conversations before and after the arrival of a 
sibling and noted that prior to the birth, the majority of mothers’ references to internal states 
referred to those of the child’s. Mothers’ references to the inner states of others, however, 
increased upon arrival of the sibling, due to references to the sibling’s inner states. Not only 
were mothers observed to frequently discuss the infant’s inner states with their firstborn, but 
much of their speech directed to the infant concerned their inner states: “Are you hungry?”; 
“Are you starving?”; “Oh you’re not getting hiccups are you? Silly fool!” (p 76, italics 
added), which are also likely to be overheard by the firstborn. 
Dunn and Kendrick have also observed changes in firstborns’ speech upon arrival of a 
sibling. Firstborns were found to use more internal state language, predominantly in their 
discussions about their siblings’ internal states. Additionally, firstborns were observed to use 
infant-directed speech when talking directly to their siblings (Dunn & Kendrick 1982a; 
1982b). Dunn and Kendrick also noted that firstborns showed particular interest in the 
physical manifestation of their younger siblings’ inner states (1982a, p.77, italics added): 
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Child: Brenda crying. 
Mother: Mm. 
Child: Why? 
Mother: ‘Cause you woke her up this morning.  
 
Children’s interest in the reasons why their younger sibling may behaving in a certain 
way, in addition to appropriate use of infant directed speech, suggests an understanding of the 
infant as a person with a mind (Dunn & Kendrick, 1982a), and is also suggestive of their 
ability to differentiate between the cognitive status of infants and other family members 
(Dunn & Kendrick, 1982b).  
 However, some studies have suggested that younger siblings do not influence 
children’s understanding of minds (Ruffman et al., 1998) or may even hinder theory of mind 
development (Wright & Mahford, 2012). It is possible that younger siblings do not foster 
children’s understanding of minds, as the processes described in section 1.3.2 may require a 
certain degree of cognitive maturity. Alternatively, the lack of influence, or indeed hindering 
effect of younger siblings may result from negative outcomes related to the arrival of the 
second child. Negative reactions from children upon the arrival of a second-born are common 
(Volling, 2012), so much so that Winnicott (1964) described this as normative, “It is so usual 
to be called normal when a child is upset at a new one.” (p.133). Indeed, the majority of 
children experiencing the arrival of a sibling show emotional upset, in their display of 
regressive behaviour, anxiety, and confrontational behaviour (Volling, 2005). This, coupled 
with the new infant placing increased demands on the caregivers’ time, may be responsible 
for resulting decreases in mother-firstborn positive affection, play, responsiveness and 
verbalisations upon arrival of a second child (Baydar et al., 1997; Dunn & Kendrick, 1980, 
1982; Field & Reite, 1984; Kendrick & Dunn, 1982). It is also possible that parents’ 
explanations to their firstborn children are frequently interrupted due to the demands of the 
younger sibling (Wright & Mahford, 2012).  
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1.4 Summary of Chapter 
Children’s understanding of minds is crucial to understanding the many complexities 
of their social worlds. It is argued that children come to understand the minds of themselves 
and of others through their social interactions; this chapter has reviewed the unique 
contribution made by siblings. Sibling relationships provide a rich context for developing an 
understanding of minds, from discussion about internal states, to humour, pretend play and 
conflict. However, this review has also highlighted the need to develop our understanding of 
such processes within the context of children’s sibling constellation factors, whilst 
considering their other close relationships, such as the mother-child dyad. Rather than simply 
understanding how children develop their knowledge of minds within the child-sibling dyad 
or the parent-child dyad, it is essential to understand the social influences on the development 
of theory of mind within the context of family life. 
I have identified one main inconsistency within the literature concerning sibling 
influences on children’s theory of mind. Despite the positive influence of older siblings being 
well-established, it is unclear whether younger siblings foster, hinder, or do not influence 
theory of mind development at all. Given that many studies examining processes by which 
siblings influence theory of mind have focused on older sibling influence and very little 
research has been conducted regarding how sibling arrival may affect children’s theory of 
mind, this presents a clear issue that warrants further investigation.  
The questions raised in this thesis will be explored within the context of the Cardiff 
Child Development Study (CCDS). Because the CCDS is the source of data for all empirical 
chapters in this thesis, Chapter 2 will outline its general method. Following this, the first 
question that will be addressed in this thesis is: 
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1.4.1 Why might the findings regarding younger sibling influence on theory of mind be 
so inconsistent?  
Prior to further investigation into the influence of younger siblings on theory of mind, 
it is first necessary to explore why there may be such inconsistency within this literature. This 
will be addressed in Chapter 3, in a close examination of this body of work to identify 
theoretical and methodological flaws that must be addressed in future study of this 
relationship. This will include further consideration of family structure, as well as issues of 
sample sizes and inclusion of relevant correlates of theory of mind in the existing literature. 
This will then be taken into consideration in the next question: 
1.4.2 Do younger siblings, like older siblings, foster children’s theory of mind?  
As we have seen, the role of younger siblings in the development of theory of mind is 
controversial.  It is unclear whether experience with younger as well as older siblings fosters 
theory of mind. Following the critique of the literature, Chapter 3 will then proceed to 
establish whether there is a relationship between the presence of younger siblings in the home 
and theory of mind in a community sample of firstborn children and their families, whilst 
addressing issues with the existing literature.  
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CHAPTER 2 
The Cardiff Child Development Study: General Method 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The present chapter outlines the methods used in the Cardiff Child Development 
Study (CCDS), which provided the data used in all chapters of this thesis. This chapter 
describes the general design, participants’ recruitment and demographic information, the 
procedure and measures used in the CCDS. 
2.2 General Method 
2.2.1 Design 
The Cardiff Child Development Study (CCDS) is a prospective longitudinal cohort 
design that investigates children’s early social development in a nationally representative 
sample of mothers and their firstborn children. Mothers were recruited during the pregnancy 
of their first child and data collection took place in pregnancy (Wave 1) and at 6, 12, 21, 33 
and (Waves 2 – 5 respectively) months postpartum. The final assessments took place when 
the children were between 6.5 and 7.5 years of age (Wave 6). The CCDS was funded by the 
UK Medical Research Council (MRC) Grants G0400086 and MR/J013366/1 and grants from 
the Medical Research Foundation and Waterloo Foundation. Ethical approval was obtained 
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for the procedures from the NHS Multi-Centre Research Ethics Committee and the Cardiff 
University School of Psychology Research Ethics Committee. 
2.2.2 Participants 
2.2.2.1 Recruitment. Three hundred and thirty-two primiparous women and their 
partners were recruited from 1st November 2005 to 31st July 2007 from National Health 
Service (NHS) antenatal clinics in hospitals and GP surgeries in Cardiff and The Vale 
University Health Board, and the Gwent Healthcare Trust, UK. These areas were selected to 
provide a diverse sample of families. Further representativeness was enabled by midwifery 
teams granting the recruitment team access to antenatal clinics for specialist medical 
problems, and to outreach services for vulnerably housed individuals.  A recruitment DVD 
was made to inform the midwifery teams of the procedures of the study. 
Trained researchers approached expectant mothers and their families in the hospital or 
clinics, with the guidance of receptionists indicating who might be primiparous women 
suitable for the study. The families were given a brief explanation of the study and what 
participation would involve, and interested families were shown the recruitment DVD and 
provided with a leaflet, and their contact details were recorded. Within two weeks of the 
initial contact, the project administrator contacted the families to provide further information. 
Families willing to participate had their first appointment booked during the 3rd trimester of 
the pregnancy, which became Wave 1 of the CCDS. Translators were employed for families 
whose native language was not English or Welsh, or for participants who had impaired 
hearing. No inclusion criteria were required for this study, except in the case of miscarriage 
or infant death.  
2.2.2.2 Sample. The full CCDS sample is used in the investigation in Chapter 4; 
however, in the remaining chapters a subsample of the CCDS is used, as younger siblings are 
the focus of this thesis. In this context, younger siblings are defined as full, step-, half- or 
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adopted younger siblings who are living in the same home as the firstborn child. Therefore 
according to this definition, children with an older half- or step-sibling, a twin, or a younger 
sibling out of the home were excluded from the samples used in Chapters 3, 5 and 6 of this 
thesis (Figure 2.1), resulting in a younger sibling study sample of 269 (81.0%) families 
included in these chapters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Derivation of younger sibling study sample used in Chapters 3, 5 and 6 of 
this thesis. 
 
By the time that the firstborn children were 7 years of age (Wave 6), 196 (72.9%) of 
firstborn children in the younger sibling study sample had at least one younger sibling living 
in the home. One hundred and fifty-five (57.6%) children had one younger sibling, 34 
N= 332 families recruited in pregnancy 
n= 18 (5.4%) older step/half 
sibling living out of the home 
n= 7 (2.1%) older step/half sibling 
living in the home 
 
n= 6 (1.8%) twins 
 
n= 7 (2.1%) younger siblings out 
of the home only 
 
n= 24 (7.2%) limited contact with 
family, sibling status not 
determined 
 
N= 269 (81.0%) children in younger sibling 
study sample 
n= 1 (0.3%) not a firstborn child 
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(12.6%) had two younger siblings, and seven (2.6%) had three younger siblings. Figure 2.2 
shows the full breakdown of these groups. 
 
Figure 2.2 Percent of siblings living in the home by the time of the middle childhood 
assessment. 
 
 In this thesis, characteristics of firstborns’ closest in age younger sibling are 
investigated. Birth dates were available for 268 (99.6%) closest in age younger siblings, and 
gender was known for 267 (99.3%) closest in age younger siblings. Of the children with 
younger siblings, the mean age at arrival of the next in age younger sibling was 35.25 months 
(SD = 16.23). One hundred and three (53.1%) closest in age siblings were female and 91 
(46.9%) were male. One hundred and four (53.6%) firstborns were in a same-gender sibling 
dyad with their closest in age younger sibling, and 90 (46.4%) were in an opposite gender 
sibling dyad. Table 2.1 shows the number of children per gender composition between the 
firstborn child and their closest in age younger sibling. 
 
 
73, 27%
141, 52%
13, 5%
1, 0% 29, 11%
4, 2%
1, 0% 5, 2%
2, 1%
No sibling
1 full younger sibling
1 half younger sibling
1 adopted younger sibling
2 younger full siblings
2 younger half siblings
2 younger siblings, 1 full, 1
half
3 younger full siblings
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Table 2.1  
Gender compositions of firstborn children and their closest in age younger siblings. 
 Closest in age younger sibling gender 
Male Female 
 
Firstborn 
gender 
 
Male 
53 
27.3% 
52 
26.8% 
 
Female 
38 
19.6% 
51 
26.3% 
 
2.2.2.3 Demographic characteristics. The sample of participants who took part in 
the CCDS has been shown to be nationally representative, as it did not significantly differ on 
sociodemographic characteristics of firstborn children in the nationally representative sample 
in the Millennium Cohort Study (for more details see Hay et al., 2014). The full sample 
characteristics and the characteristics of the sibling subsample are presented in Table 2.2. The 
demographic characteristics of the participants were collected during interviews and 
questionnaires during the prenatal assessment (Wave 1), with the exception of maternal and 
paternal age at first birth, which were calculated using the infant’s date of birth during the 
early infancy telephone calls to book Wave 2 appointments. The Standard Occupational 
Classification 2000 (SOC2000; Elias, McKnight & Kinshott, 1999) was used to determine 
occupational status of mothers. This was based on the highest ranked employment that the 
mother ever had at entry into the study. A dichotomous variable was created using mothers’ 
highest rank of employment on the SOC2000 six-category scale to categorise individuals as 
working class or middle class.  
Information provided about maternal educational attainment was also dichotomised to 
indicate whether mothers had achieved the minimum level of qualifications required for the 
completion of secondary education in the United Kingdom (5 General Certificate of 
Secondary Education examinations grade A*- C or equivalent). It was also ascertained as to 
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whether mothers identified that they were in a stable partnership with the baby’s father and 
marital status was also dichotomised. 
In this thesis, the child’s exposure to socioeconomic adversity was indexed by these 
sociodemographic risk variables. All these items were categorical; therefore a principal 
components analysis based on the polychoric correlation matrix confirmed that all these items 
contributed to a single component, which explained approximately 77% of the shared 
variance in these risk indicators. Summary scores derived from this PCA measured the 
family’s exposure to socio-economic adversity (Perra, Phillips, Fyfield, Waters, & Hay, 
2015). 
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Table 2.2  
Demographic information for full CCDS sample and the younger sibling study sample.  
 Total sample 
(Chapter 4) 
Younger sibling study 
sample 
(Chapters 3, 5 and 6) 
 N = 332  N = 269 
Age at first birth (mean) 
     Mother 
 
     Father 
 
28.15 ( SD 6.35, range 
16.09 - 42.99) 
30.81 (SD 6.82, range 
15.62 – 30.81) 
 
28.41 (SD 6.21, range 
16.09 – 42.18) 
31.11 (SD 6.63, range 
16.50 – 56.67) 
Social class (%) 
     Middle class 
     Working class 
 
50.9 
49.1 
 
54.3 
45.7 
Mother’s education (%) 
     No qualifications 
     Less and 5 GCSEs A*= C/Basic e.g. key skills, NVQ, NNEB 
     5+ GCSEs A*-C or GNVQ higher level 
     A-levels A*-E/BTEC/HNC 
     Undergraduate degree (BA or BSc)/HND 
     Postgraduate degree e.g. MSc, MD, PhD, PG Cert 
 
5.1 
16.6 
13.9 
11.7 
28.0 
24.7 
 
4.8 
16.7 
11.5 
11.2 
27.1 
28.6 
Relationship status at the child’s birth (%) 
     Married 
     Cohabiting 
     In a relationship but not living together 
     Single  
 
50.3 
33.7 
6.3 
9.6 
 
55.8 
29.4 
5.2 
9.7 
Ethnicity (%) 
     British 
     Non-British 
 
92.7 
7.3 
 
92.2 
7.8 
Firstborn child gender (%) 
     Male 
     Female 
 
56.8 
43.2 
 
55.8 
44.2 
Adversity score (mean) .00 (SD .99, range  
-.95 – 2.51) 
-.06 (SD 1.02, range  
-.95 – 2.51) 
Note. The N = 269 younger sibling study sample used in this thesis was not significantly 
different from the original N = 332 recruited. 
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2.2.3 Procedure 
The CCDS procedures involved combinations of interview, questionnaire and 
observational methods at each wave. Waves 1, 2, 4 and 6 took place in the participants’ 
homes, and at Waves 3 and 5, the participants were invited to a purpose-designed laboratory 
at Cardiff University. Figure 2.3 provides an overview of the study; the darker shaded areas 
of the figure highlight waves of assessment that were investigated in this thesis. The 
following sections provide explanation of specific procedural details of each wave of interest 
in this thesis. The additional waves that were not investigated are also described to provide 
the full context of this longitudinal study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Overview of the procedure in the CCDS.  
2.2.3.1 Wave 1: Prenatal home visit.  Mothers and fathers were interviewed in their 
homes by CCDS research assistants during the third trimester of the pregnancy. Where 
possible, the mothers and fathers were interviewed at the same time in different rooms. 
Otherwise, efforts were made to arrange the interviews to take place separately. The 
interviews included a psychiatric assessment of symptoms of psychopathology using the 
Schedules for Clinical Assessment in Neuropsychiatry (SCAN; Wing et al., 1990), as well as 
employment history, sociodemographic information, social support networks and family 
history of mental health problems. Following the interview, questionnaires that measured 
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demographic variables, lifestyle, general health, relationship quality, fertility history and 
behavioural history were given to both parents to complete and return to the university at 
their convenience. A remuneration of a £20 gift voucher was given to the family upon 
completion of the visit.  
2.2.3.2 Wave 2: Early infancy home visit. Families were visited in the home by 
research assistants when the infant was 6 months old (mean age was 6.64 months). The home 
visit took approximately two hours and during that time the mothers were again interviewed 
using the SCAN to assess their mental health since the prenatal home visit (Wave 1). They 
were also asked questions regarding their experience of labour, obstetric complications, and 
any changes in general lifestyle arrangements and their social network. The infant was filmed 
during a 25 minute assessment where various social, emotional and cognitive tasks were 
administered, including several parent-child interaction tasks. A questionnaire battery was 
also administered to mothers, fathers and, where possible, another significant person in the 
infant’s life (such as a close family member or friend). Mother and father questionnaires 
included questions regarding their health, lifestyle, life events, relationships, family structure 
and their infant’s behaviour. Upon completion of the assessments, a remuneration of a £20 
gift voucher was given to the family. 
2.2.3.3 Wave 3: Late infancy laboratory visit. Families were invited to the 
laboratory to attend a simulated birthday party at the School of Psychology, Cardiff 
University, when the children were approaching their first birthday (mean age was 12.84 
months). Where possible, three participating families would attend the laboratory on the same 
afternoon. The infants, accompanied by their caregivers would first complete assessments in 
individual rooms. The infants were assessed using various social, emotional and cognitive 
tasks, and the accompanying caregiver would complete a battery of questionnaires regarding 
their infant’s behaviour. Following this, all the families were observed together during a 
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simulated birthday party, which took place in a family room decorated to resemble a living 
room. A researcher joined the party dressed as a ‘birthday lady’ in a princess costume and 
administered a ‘teddy bear’s picnic’, during which another researcher dressed in a teddy bear 
costume would enter the room and join the party (for details see Hay et al., 2016). After the 
‘teddy bear’s picnic’, the families were left alone and asked to proceed as they normally 
would at a birthday party with other families, and the infants were observed for 20 minutes of 
free play. At the end of the session, children were invited to select a gift-wrapped book from 
a lucky dip in a box of balls, and a remuneration of a £20 gift voucher was given to the 
family. 
2.2.3.4 Wave 4: Toddler home visit. Families were visited in the home by two 
research assistants for approximately two hours when the child was approximately 18 months 
old (mean age was 20.59 months). First, the mothers were briefly interviewed regarding their 
current circumstances. In the second half of the visit, the participating family was asked to 
invite a familiar and similarly-aged friend of the toddler to their home. The children were 
provided with a miniature toy kitchen and a wooden shape sorter cube toy, and observed for 
45 minutes of free play where they could play with these or their own toys as they normally 
would. The play session ended with a lucky dip present, such as felt pens, for both children. 
The participants were provided with questionnaires for the mother and father regarding their 
health, lifestyle, life events, relationships, family structure and their toddler’s behaviour. A 
questionnaire battery was also completed by another significant person in the child’s life. A 
remuneration of a £20 gift voucher was given to the family at the end of the session. 
2.2.3.5 Wave 5: Early childhood laboratory visit. Families were invited to the 
laboratory to attend a simulated birthday in the laboratory when the children were 33 months 
old (mean age was 33.60). Where possible, three participating families would attend the 
laboratory on the same afternoon. First, the children took part in various cognitive, social and 
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emotional assessments in separate rooms, accompanied by their caregivers. Due to a paucity 
of developmentally appropriate tasks for this age, there was no theory of mind assessment at 
this wave of data collection. Following these assessments, the families were observed during 
another simulated birthday party, identical to that of Wave 3. A questionnaire battery was 
also given to the mother and father, and a third significant person in the child’s life, to be 
completed before, during or after the laboratory visit. At the end of the session, the children 
were invited to select a gift-wrapped book from a lucky dip in a box of balls, and a 
remuneration of a £20 gift voucher was given to the family. 
2.2.3.6 Wave 6: Middle childhood home visit. Families were visited in the home by 
2 or 3 research assistants for two 2-hour sessions (mean age 83.28 at session 1, 83.87 at 
session 2). During the first session, the primary caregiver (typically the mother) would 
complete a Preschool Age Psychiatric Assessment (PAPA) with a trained research assistant 
(Egger & Angold, 2004). In the second visit, the same research assistant administered a 
SCAN interview with the caregiver, as well as additional questions to gain updates on the 
family lifestyle arrangements and social network. Where possible, these interviews would 
take place in a separate room from the child. During these interviews, the child completed 
various cognitive, social and emotional assessments in a quiet space with a second trained 
research assistant. Where required, a third research assistant would attend to keep any 
younger siblings occupied and away from the child testing and mother-child interaction tasks. 
They were also administered a free play task with a tea set. At the end of each session, the 
child and caregiver would take part in some family games, including a ‘Bop it’ and ‘Etch-a-
Sketch’ toy, and dressing up. In games of ‘I-Spy’ and ‘Simon Says’, the whole family was 
encouraged to join in. A questionnaire battery was also provided during the visit to mothers 
and fathers and, where possible, a significant person in the infant’s life (such as a close 
family member or friend) and teachers. Mother and father questionnaires included questions 
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regarding their health, lifestyle, life events, relationships, family structure and their child’s 
behaviour. A remuneration of £20 was given to the caregiver and a book voucher of £10 to 
the child at the end of the session. 
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CHAPTER 3 
“Because she thinks Nick has no idea that she’s put the teddy in the cupboard.” 
Younger Sibling Influence on 7-year-olds’ Understanding of Second-order 
False Belief2 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 The contribution of younger siblings to children’s developing understanding of minds 
has remained unclear, as evidence regarding their influence on measures of theory of mind 
has been mixed (Jenkins & Astington, 1996; Kennedy et al, 2015; McAlister & Peterson, 
2007; Perner et al., 1994; Peterson, 2000, Shahaeian et al., 2014; Calero, Semelman, Salles, 
& Sigman, 2013; Farhadian et al., 2010, Ruffman et al., 1998; Shahaeian, 2015; Wright & 
Mahford, 2012). In Chapter 1, I reviewed ways in which siblings may influence children’s 
developing theories of mind. Chapter 1 also considered how these processes may differ 
according to structural features of the sibling relationship, such as birth order. To establish 
whether younger siblings foster children’s understanding of minds, it is first important to 
understand why evidence has remained so mixed in this investigation. First, this issue will be 
                                                 
2 The findings reported in this chapter are in press in the Journal of Experimental Child Psychology. 
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explored in a critique of this literature with the aim to identify any limitations that must be 
addressed in future research. Following this, the influence of younger siblings on children’s 
understanding of minds will be examined in the CCDS dataset whilst taking those issues into 
account.  
 Studies that have explored features of sibling constellation factors in relation to 
children’s understanding of minds, as assessed using false belief tasks, are presented in Table 
3.1. Only studies that assessed theory of mind using false belief tasks were included for 
comparability with the work presented in this thesis. The literature search for this 
investigation was conducted using MEDLINE, PsychINFO, PubMED and Web of Science 
databases, with search terms including combinations of theory of mind, social understanding, 
[first-order, second-order, primary, secondary] false belief, sib [-ling, -ship, -linghood] and 
family. The search included an examination of reference lists in relevant articles and of 
publication lists of authors within the field. Relevant journals that had been identified as 
publishing relevant articles within the last 5 years were also manually searched to check for 
studies that included siblings as a covariate whilst investigating other sources of individual 
difference in false belief performance. These included Journal of Experimental Child 
Psychology, Child Development, British Journal of Developmental Psychology and Infant 
and Child Development.  
3.1.1 Limitations of past research 
3.1.1.1 Focus on preschool years. Given that children typically pass the standard 
false belief task between the ages of 3 and 5, most work exploring individual differences in 
children’s theory of mind has focused on the preschool years (Wellman et al., 2001). As such, 
the two streams of work reviewed in Chapter 1, one concerning sibling relationship structure 
and the other processes of sibling influence, focused on developments in the preschool years. 
However, this vast literature does not represent the entire developmental picture insofar as 
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children’s understanding of minds continues to develop throughout middle childhood (Miller, 
2012). The paucity of research concerning theory of mind in middle childhood thus far means 
there is scope to explore sources of individual differences in children’s theory of mind 
beyond the preschool years (Hughes, 2016).  
For the very few studies that have explored the influence of siblings in samples of 
older children, the findings have, as in the preschool literature, remained mixed (see Table 
3.1). Two recent studies have reported no effect of siblings on higher-order measures of 
theory of mind (Calero et al., 2013; Miller, 2013). It is possible that this work corroborates 
studies conducted with preschoolers, suggesting that younger siblings do not foster children’s 
understanding of minds across different phases of development (Farhadian et al., 2010, 
Ruffman et al., 1998; Shahaeian, 2015). It is also possible that any advantage of younger 
siblings in the preschool years may disappear on account of children starting school and 
spending more time amongst non-familial adults and peers rather than their family members 
(Lagattuta et al., 2015; Larson & Verma, 1999).   
In another sample, however, it has been reported that both older siblings and same-
gender younger siblings facilitate performance on measures of theory of mind in middle 
childhood (Kennedy et al., 2015). It is possible that any younger sibling advantage in middle 
childhood represents ‘residual’ effects of younger siblings in the preschool years, or it may be 
that younger siblings foster children’s understanding of minds in middle childhood as they 
gradually become more proficient play-mates. Not only do children increase the amount of 
time spent playing with their younger siblings as they get older (Brown & Dunn, 1992), but 
older sibling dyads also engage in more sophisticated interactions that may foster theory of 
mind; for example, older sibling dyads’ pretend play is characterised by more negotiation and 
creation of roles and shared meaning (Howe et al., 1998, 2005). It has been argued that 
younger siblings may become more important in fostering children’s understanding of minds 
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in middle childhood, as younger siblings may have to reach a certain threshold in age to 
provide an advantage. This has been coined the age threshold model (Kennedy et al., 2015).  
As such, it is possible that null findings regarding younger sibling advantage in middle 
childhood are due to the younger siblings being too young to provide any advantage. 
Certainly, more research is warranted to establish younger sibling influences on theory of 
mind in middle childhood (Lagattuta et al., 2015).  
A focus on children in the middle childhood years would require use of higher-order 
false belief tasks; second-order false belief has been suggested to be an age-appropriate task 
to explore theory of mind in samples with older children (Perner & Wimmer, 1985) and has 
already been used by Miller (2013) to investigate the influence of siblings on theory of mind 
in older children. Whereas first-order false belief tasks typically assess the mistaken 
knowledge of one character in a story, second order false belief tasks add an additional 
element to the narrative. Where first-order false belief tasks typically assess children’s 
understanding of one character’s belief, a second-order task assesses whether children 
understand that a character can have a mistaken belief about another character’s belief. 
Between the ages of 6 and 7 years, some children are successful at passing this higher-order 
test of theory of mind (Perner & Wimmer, 1985); thus, this extended task is a more 
developmentally appropriate indicator of theory of mind for this age range. 
3.1.1.2 Sampling issues. It has also been argued that null findings in terms of younger 
sibling influence on measures of theory of mind may be due to small sample sizes (Lagattuta 
et al., 2015). This is a problem in studies investigating this relationship in both the preschool 
and the middle childhood literatures; although overall sample sizes may be acceptable, when 
participants are divided into subgroups according to sibling constellation factors, cell sizes 
often become small (see Table 3.1). To detect medium to large effect sizes, group 
comparisons with approximately 30 participants per cell should lead to 80% power (Cohen, 
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1988). Certainly, it has been recommended that cell sizes should be no lower than seven 
(Wilson van Voorhis & Morgan, 2007). This is a problem for many studies within this 
literature, particularly in studies exploring children’s theory of mind in middle childhood 
(e.g., Miller, 2013). It is possible that inadequate sample sizes could lead to failure in 
detecting sibling influences on measures of theory of mind (or type II error). To tease apart 
the benefits of particular kinds of sibling constellations with sufficient power, a larger scale 
study is required (Cassidy et al., 2005). 
These small subsamples are a particular issue for ‘only child’ groups in this research 
(Miller, 2013; Peterson & Slaughter, 2003; Shahaeian et al., 2014). This not only leads to a 
decrease in power to detect an advantage in having a sibling over none, but also leads to 
samples that have a very high proportion of children who have siblings (in some studies over 
90%). Given that 80% of children in Western families have a sibling (Volling, 2012), these 
samples with disproportionate numbers of children with siblings cannot be regarded as 
representative.  
 Additionally, many of these studies are not representative of the general population, 
with participants often recruited from two-parent intact families living in middle-class, well-
educated affluent areas (Cutting & Dunn, 1999). Given that family background is associated 
with children’s false belief understanding (Cutting & Dunn, 1999), questions of sibling 
influence on children’s mind understanding should be asked within a more representative 
community sample (Cole & Mitchell, 2000).  
3.1.1.3 Identifying correlates. The preschool literature has highlighted correlates that 
need to be accounted for in studies of sibling influence on theory of mind. Passing first-order 
false belief is related to the child’s age (Wellman et al., 2001), language ability (Astington & 
Jenkins, 1999), sociodemographic risk factors (Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Cole & Mitchell, 
2000) and executive function (Devine & Hughes, 2014). Like the first-order false belief 
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literature, children’s age has been found to be positively associated with passing second-order 
false belief. In Perner and Wimmer’s (1985) original studies, it was identified that some 6-
year-olds and most 7- to 8-year-olds pass second-order false belief problems. However, given 
the paucity of research regarding children’s understanding of minds in middle childhood, the 
extent to which other factors are associated with passing second-order false belief is not yet 
clear. 
It is plausible that language would influence children’s second-order false belief 
performance as these stories are linguistically complex. These stories also require children to 
retain information in their working memory, and when responding to test questions, could 
require inhibition of an immediate prepotent response of the child’s understanding of reality, 
as opposed to the mistaken reality of the characters (Miller, 2012). Evidence has suggested 
that second-order false belief understanding, like first-order, is positively associated with 
children’s language and executive function competence (Astington, Pelletier, & Homer, 
2002; Lagattuta, Sayfan, & Blattman, 2010; Lagattuta, Sayfan, & Harvey, 2014; Perner, 
Kain, & Barchfield, 2002). However, when examined together, one study found that 
executive function was positively associated with second-order false belief when age was 
controlled, but not when language ability was controlled (Hasselhorn, Mahler, & Grube, 
2005).  
In studies of sibling influences on theory of mind, the child’s age, sociodemographic 
risk, language and executive function have rarely been controlled in a single study (see 
Kennedy et al., 2015; Miller, 2013). Prior to an analysis of sibling influences on children’s 
understanding of second-order false belief, it will be essential first to examine the correlates 
that must be controlled. Although known correlates of first-order false belief may also be 
relevant for second-order false belief, this has not yet been fully established (Miller, 2012). It 
has been argued that some of these factors, such as executive function, may be most 
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important during early development of theory of mind, yet after reaching a certain threshold 
in these skills, these relationships may attenuate or disappear by middle childhood (Lagattuta 
et al., 2015). 
3.1.2 Research questions 
Chapter 1 highlighted an issue of inconsistency in the preschool theory of mind 
literature regarding the influence of younger siblings on children’s developing theories of 
mind. Three possibilities for this inconsistency are explored in this chapter. Firstly, the effects 
of younger siblings may be somewhat confounded by their age, and the influence of younger 
siblings may be better detected beyond the preschool years. Secondly, the samples used to 
explore these questions may have lacked sufficient power to detect smaller effects of younger 
siblings. Finally, correlates of theory of mind such as age, sociodemographic risk, language 
and executive function have rarely all been controlled within a single study. In summary, the 
primary question this chapter will answer is: 
3.1.2.1 Does the presence of younger siblings influence children’s ability to pass a 
second-order false belief task? This chapter will examine the influence of younger siblings 
on children’s understanding of second-order false belief in middle childhood. This will be 
conducted within the context of the Cardiff Child Development Study (see Chapter 2), a 
moderately sized, representative community sample of firstborn children and their families. A 
subsidiary question that must be asked as a prerequisite to this investigation is:  
3.1.2.2 What are the correlates of passing the second-order false belief task? I 
will also explore the influence of potential correlates of second-order false belief identified in 
the literature; age, sociodemographic risk, language, working memory and inhibitory control. 
Relevant correlates will be brought forward into a final investigation of sibling constellation 
factors including younger sibling presence, gender composition and birth interval on 
children’s understanding of second-order false belief. 
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Table 3.1  
Methods and measures used in previous research examining the influence of siblings on false belief tasks.3 
Author N Sibling constellation Age (months) Design 
Measures of theory of 
mind 
Other details Results 
Calero, Salles, 
Semelman, & 
Sigman (2013) 
 
 
76 Not specified Range 61 - 103 
mean 86.5 
Cross-
sectional 
Six ToM tasks: 
Diverse desires, diverse 
beliefs, knowledge 
access, contents false 
belief, explicit false 
belief, belief vs 
emotion (Wellman & 
Liu, 2005). 
 
 
ToM tasks 
presented in novel 
computer format. 
 
Found sequential 
progression 
through Wellman 
and Liu’s suite of 
ToM tasks in 6-8 
year olds. 
 
No effect of sibling amount or birth order was found 
on ToM performance. 
Cassidy, 
Fineberg, 
Brown, & 
Perkins (2005) 
 
 
72 16 no siblings 
25 w/ siblings 
31 identical and 
fraternal twins 
Mean 47.8 Cross-
sectional 
Three FB tasks: 
One change location 
story, 2 unexpected 
contents 
Twins were better 
able to answer FB 
questions involving 
their twin than FB 
questions involving 
a friend. 
The sibling group had higher ToM scores than the 
no sibling group and the twin only group. Twins who 
had another sibling also performed better than 
these two groups. When sibling constellations were 
scored according to variety (e.g. only children 0, 
children with a younger and an older sibling 2) 
sibling variety positively explained 12% of the 
variance in ToM score. Children with a sibling of 
opposite gender had higher ToM scores than those 
with a matched gender sibling. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 FB, False belief; ToM, Theory of Mind. 
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Author N Sibling constellation Age (months) Design 
Measures of theory of 
mind 
Other details Results 
 
Cole & 
Mitchell 
(2000) Study 1 
119 25 no siblings 
19 had older and 
younger siblings 
(range 2 – 6) 
47 had older siblings 
only (range 1 - 4) 
28 had younger 
siblings only (range 1 
– 3)  
Nursery group 
range 37 – 48 
mean 44.2 
 
Reception 
group range 
48 – 61 
mean 55.9 
Cross-
sectional (2 
phases) 
Three ToM tasks: x2 
Deceptive box and 1 
appearance reality 
 
Post hoc, unexpected 
transfer FB task 
included 
Sample drawn from 
community rated 
high on Townsend 
Deprivation Scale 
(TDS). 
Four months after 
1st testing, 93 
children from 
original sample 
given FB 
unexpected 
transfer task. 
Executive function 
also measured. 
 
No significant differences were found between 
sibling groups (younger sibling, older sibling, both or 
no sibling) in individual social understanding 
measures. No significant differences between 
sibling groups detected when ToM tests were 
combined into a single score.   
Cole & 
Mitchell 
(2000) Study 2 
 
71 12 only children 
31 had older siblings 
10 had younger 
siblings 
9 had both older and 
younger siblings 
Range 47 – 68 
mean 63 
Cross-
sectional 
Six ToM tasks: x2 
unexpected transfer, x2 
deceptive box self-
belief x2 deceptive box 
other belief 
Executive function 
also measured. 
There was a tendency for children with younger 
siblings to fail more deceptive box tasks, but no 
significant correlation between siblings and ToM 
tasks found. No significant differences between 
sibling groups when socio-economic status was 
taken into account. 
 
Cutting & 
Dunn (1999) 
 
 
128  Range 41.9 – 
57.6 
mean 49.9 
Cross-
sectional 
Eight FB tasks: x4 
unexpected location 
stories, x2 unexpected 
identity questions, x2 
FB tasks. Emotion 
understanding tasks: 
affective labelling task 
and affective 
perspective taking task. 
 
 
Diverse sample. 
 
Positivity and 
negativity of target 
child’s relationship 
with closest in age 
sibling also 
assessed. 
 
No significant correlation between number of 
siblings and false belief or emotion understanding. 
No effect of older and younger siblings. Positivity 
and negativity in target child’s relationship with 
closest in age sibling was also unrelated to false 
belief and emotion understanding scores.  
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Author N Sibling constellation Age (months) Design 
Measures of theory of 
mind 
Other details Results 
Farhadian et 
al. (2010)  
 
 
163 103 first born 
63 second born 
 
88 no sibling 
62 1 sibling 
13 2+ siblings 
 
Range 43 - 66 
mean 54.4  
Cross-
sectional 
Three ToM tasks: Two 
change of location 
stories and 1 change of 
content task 
Sample of children 
from Iran. 
 
 
Children with an older sibling showed better 
performance on ToM tasks than those with no 
siblings when controlling for age and verbal ability. 
No significant differences found in ToM scores 
according to number of siblings in the family. No 
significant difference in ToM scores between 
children with older or younger siblings. Children 
with an older brother showed an advantage in ToM 
performance over children with an older sister. 
 
Jenkins & 
Astington 
(1996) 
 
68 22 no sibling 
32 1 sibling 
13 2 siblings 
1 3 siblings 
 
38 first-born 
24 second-born 
5 third-born 
1 forth-born 
Range 35 – 65 
Mean 49.2  
Cross-
sectional 
Four FB tasks: 
Two change location 
stories, 1 unexpected 
contents, 1 unexpected 
picture task 
Verbal and non-
verbal memory did 
not predict FB 
performance when 
age and language 
ability were taken 
into account. 
Family size significantly and positively predicted FB 
performance, when controlling for age, language 
and birth order. Sibling effect more pronounced for 
children with lower levels of language ability. No 
significant effect of birth order when controlling for 
age and language ability, suggesting it does not 
matter whether the siblings are older or younger. 
Also found it does not matter how close the siblings 
are in age to the target child. 
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Author N Sibling constellation Age (months) Design 
Measures of theory of 
mind 
Other details Results 
Kennedy, 
Lagattuta, & 
Sayfan (2015) 
 
192 3.1% no siblings 
48.7% 1 sibling 
38.7% 2 siblings 
9.4% 3+ siblings 
When separated by 
age, 
56.3% older siblings 
58.4% younger 
siblings 
9.5% same age 
siblings 
20.5% both older and 
younger siblings 
65 children 
range 48.5 – 
71.4 
mean 59.8 
62 children 
range 72.4 – 
95.4 
mean 84 
65 children 
range 96.1 – 
138.7 
mean 108.5 
 
Cross-
sectional  
Interpretive ToM  
task (IToM) 
- A number of sibling composition variables were 
positively correlated with IToM scores, including 
number of siblings, number of older siblings, 
number of female siblings and number of same-
gender siblings. When age and executive function 
(inhibitory control and verbal working memory) 
were controlled, number of older siblings explained 
a significant amount of the variance of IToM tasks, 
as did having a same-gender sibling, regardless of 
whether they were older or younger. 
Lewis, 
Freeman, 
Kyriakidou, 
Maridaki-
Kassotaki, & 
Berridge 
(1996) Study 1 
 
82 Mean number of 
older siblings .87, of 
younger siblings .43 
16 children 
mean 40 
26 children 
mean 45 
28 children 
mean 49  
12 children 
mean 57 
Cross- 
sectional  
Three ToM tasks: The 
deceptive box test, the 
unexpected transfer 
test and the deceptive 
object task. 
Sample of children 
from Greece. Also 
examined number 
of adult and child 
kin living in close 
proximity.  
Demonstrated that number of older siblings and 
number of younger siblings significantly predicted 
towards children’s total ToM score. Children with 
no siblings scored significantly lower on ToM than 
children with a younger sibling, children with an 
older sibling, and children with both an older and a 
younger sibling.  
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Author N Sibling constellation Age (months) Design 
Measures of theory of 
mind 
Other details Results 
Lewis, 
Freeman, 
Kyriakidou, 
Maridaki-
Kassotaki, & 
Berridge 
(1996) Study 2 
 
100 Mean number of 
older siblings .95, of 
younger siblings .31 
26 children 
mean 38.5 
24 children 
mean 44 
36 children 
mean 51 
14 children 
mean 58 
Cross-
sectional 
Three ToM tasks: The 
deceptive box test, the 
unexpected transfer 
test and the deceptive 
object task. 
Sample of children 
from Cyprus. Also 
examined number 
of adults and 
children interacted 
with recently. 
Number of older siblings was positively associated 
with ToM score. There were significant differences 
between ToM scores between children with no 
sibling, and older sibling and both older and 
younger sibling groups. Yet when controlling for 
age, only ‘number of adults interacted with the day 
before’ and ‘number of older children interacted 
with the day before’ predicted higher ToM scores.  
 
 
McAlister & 
Peterson 
(2007) 
 
63 10 no siblings 
33 1 sibling 
17 2 siblings 
3 3 siblings 
At time 1 
mean 50  
At time 2 
mean 64 
Longitudinal ToM tests at time 1: 
changed location FB 
test, unexpected 
contents FB test. Two 
pretend representation 
tests. 
ToM tests at time 2: 
changed location FB 
task, emotion FB task 
and appearance-reality 
tasks 
 
Australian sample At time 1, children with 2 or 3 siblings scored 
significantly above children without siblings, and 
children with just 1 sibling did not differ from either 
group. This was the same at time 2. At time 1, 
higher number of siblings significantly predicted 
better ToM scores when age and verbal IQ were 
controlled. At time 2, number of siblings 
significantly predicted better ToM scores, when age, 
verbal IQ and ToM scores at time 1 were controlled.  
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Author N Sibling constellation Age (months) Design 
Measures of theory of 
mind 
Other details Results 
McAlister & 
Peterson 
(2013) 
 
157 85% (133) lived with 
at least 1 child-aged 
sibling at time 1, 15% 
(24) had no child-aged 
sibling access (21 with 
no sibling, 3 with 
preverbal infant 
sibling) 
 
 
At time 1 
mean 50  
At time 2 
mean 62  
Longitudinal ToM tasks at time 1: 
Unseen displacement, 
misleading container, 
appearance-reality and 
pretend play. 
ToM tasks at time 2: 
real-apparent emotion, 
emotion-based false 
belief, unseen 
displacement and 
appearance-reality. 
 
  
Australian sample 
 
Executive function 
measured. 
Number of siblings was found to be positively 
associated with ToM scores at time 1 and time 2, 
when the effects of age and language ability were 
controlled. Mere presence of a sibling was a 
significant predictor of ToM scores at time 1 and 
time 2, where only-children scored lower than 
children with a sibling present. In a comparison of 
children with siblings, those with 3 or more siblings 
outperformed children with 1 or 2 siblings. There 
was no significant difference between children who 
were youngest children, middle children or eldest 
children. When age, language ability, ToM 
performance at time 1 and executive function at 
time 1 were controlled, number of child siblings was 
a significant predictor of time 2 ToM performance, 
above all other variables. 
 
Miller (2013) 70 4% 0 siblings 
48% 1 sibling 
37% 2 siblings 
10% 3 siblings 
2% 5 siblings 
(older/younger not 
specified) 
 
 
34 
kindergartene
rs mean 72  
 
36 first-
graders mean 
84  
 
Cross-
sectional 
Four second-order 
false belief stories 
First study of sibling 
effect on second-
order 
understanding. 
 
 
Non-significant correlation between number of 
siblings and second-order FB performance. No 
evidence for a sibling effect. Examination of older vs 
younger siblings also did not show sibling effect. 
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Author N Sibling constellation Age (months) Design 
Measures of theory of 
mind 
Other details Results 
Miller (2013) 55 10 no siblings 
28 1 sibling 
11 2 siblings 
4 3 siblings 
1 4 siblings 
1 5 siblings 
(older/younger not 
specified) 
Mean 72  
 
Cross-
sectional 
Three second-order 
false belief stories, one 
standard location 
change, and 2 including 
element of deception. 
- Non-significant correlation between number of 
siblings and second-order FB performance. No 
significant difference between children with or 
without a sibling. 
 
Perner, 
Ruffman, & 
Leekam (1994) 
Study 1 
76 22 no siblings 
42 1 sibling: 
18 older sibling 
23 younger sibling 
1 twin 
11 2 siblings 
4 middle children 
6 with older siblings 
1 with 1 older sibling 
and 
a twin 
Range 37 – 57  
 
Cross-
sectional 
One FB story, half the 
children received an 
unexpected change 
story, the other half 
had a misinformation 
story. 
- Number of siblings had a significant positive effect 
on children’s understanding of false belief. Children 
who had 2-3 siblings were shown to have the same 
magnitude of improvement as children from 3 to 4 
years of age. 
        
Perner, 
Ruffman, & 
Leekam (1994) 
Study 2 
 
42 All children had 
exactly 1 sibling 
15 with an older 
sibling, 27 with a 
younger sibling 
 
Range 38 – 69  
mean 58  
Cross-
sectional 
Six FB unexpected 
change stories. 
- When controlling for age, no additional sibling 
factors introduced in this second study were 
significant; sibling’s age, and the difference in age 
between target child and sibling, and the interaction 
between the two, did not predict target children’s 
passing of false belief. 
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Author N Sibling constellation Age (months) Design 
Measures of theory of 
mind 
Other details Results 
Peterson 
(2000) Study 1 
 
 
98 12 with no siblings 
45 eldest children 
with at least 1 sibling 
35 with 1 sibling 
10 with 2 siblings 
41 youngest children 
22 with 1 sibling 
14 with 2 siblings 
5 with 3-4 siblings 
 
Range 46 – 69  
mean 58  
Cross-
sectional 
Two trials of change 
location FB task 
Australian sample Mean FB scores differed according to sibling groups. 
Children with no siblings scored lower than eldest 
children with siblings and youngest children with 
siblings. The latter groups did not significantly differ 
in terms of FB scores. There were no significant 
differences between sibling-present groups 
according to number of siblings (no differences 
between children’s FB scores with 1, 2, or 3+ 
siblings). 
Peterson 
(2000) Study 2 
 
 
167 14 with no siblings 
7 with 1 infant sibling 
29 1 younger sibling 
7 2 younger siblings 
35 with 1 older and 1 
younger sibling 
11 with multiple older 
or younger siblings 
54 with older siblings 
10 twins 
 
 
Range 43 – 68  
mean 56  
Cross-
sectional 
Two trials of change 
location FB task as in 
study 1. Additionally an 
unexpected contents 
FB task. 
Australian sample There was a significant difference between sibling 
groups according to their total FB scores. Children 
with mature (teen or adult) older siblings scored 
lower than children who had a child-aged older 
sibling. Children with an infant sibling (< 12 months) 
performed no better than only children. These two 
groups scored significantly lower than sibling groups 
who had at least one older or younger child-aged 
sibling. Sibling variety (SV) scores were coded (no 
siblings = 0, 1 older 1 younger sibling = 2), and SV 
scores were positively associated with total FB 
scores, and significantly predicted with controlling 
for age and language ability. Number of 
older/younger siblings was not significant when 
added into the model. 
 
Peterson & 
Slaughter 
(2003) Study 1 
 
 
61 6 with no siblings 
24 with 1 sibling 
25 with 2 siblings 
6 with 3+ siblings 
(older/younger not 
specified) 
 
Range 48 – 67 
mean 57.8  
Cross-
sectional 
Two trials of change 
location FB task. 
Measured mother’s 
use of mental state 
language and 
conversational 
preferences. 
 
 
Children’s FB scores were not significantly 
associated with number of siblings. 
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Author N Sibling constellation Age (months) Design 
Measures of theory of 
mind 
Other details Results 
Ruffman, 
Perner, Naito, 
Parkin, & 
Clements 
(1998) Study 1 
 
 
78 22 no siblings 
42 1 sibling: 
18 older sibling 
23 younger sibling 
1 twin 
11 2 siblings 
4 middle children 
6 with older siblings 
1 with 1 older sibling 
and 
a twin 
 
Range 37 – 57  
 
Cross-
sectional 
One FB story, half the 
children received an 
unexpected change 
story, the other half 
had a misinformation 
story. 
Data used in this 
study was the same 
from that of Perner, 
Ruffman & Leekam 
(1994, Study 1) 
Found that when ‘family size’ variable was replaced 
with ‘number of younger siblings’ and ‘number of 
older siblings’ variables, When controlling for age, 
only number of older siblings significantly predicted 
FB understanding and number of younger siblings 
did not.  
Ruffman, 
Perner, Naito, 
Parkin, & 
Clements 
(1998) Study 2 
 
 
56 Not specified 19 mean 54  
17 mean 69  
20 mean 79  
 
Cross-
sectional 
Four FB tasks, 
unexpected contents. 
Sample drawn from 
lower social classes 
to recruit children 
who would be late 
in developing social 
understanding. 
When controlling for age, there was a significant 
effect of number of older siblings on total FB scores, 
but number of younger siblings did not approach 
significance. 
Ruffman, 
Perner, Naito, 
Parkin, & 
Clements 
(1998) Study 3 
 
 
116 Not specified 73 mean 
46  
43 mean 48  
 
Group 
comparison 
Two FB stories change 
location enacted in a 
cartoon video. 
Compared the 
effect of siblings for 
younger and older 
children. 
When controlling for age, neither number of older 
nor number of younger siblings significantly 
predicted FB scores. When target children were 
split into younger and older groups, an interaction 
was found between age group and number of older 
siblings, where the effect of older siblings on FB 
performance was significantly greater in the older 
age group. When looking at just the older group of 
target children, only number of older, not younger 
siblings significantly predicted better FB scores, and 
when language was controlled. 
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Author N Sibling constellation Age (months) Design 
Measures of theory of 
mind 
Other details Results 
Ruffman, 
Perner, Naito, 
Parkin, & 
Clements 
(1998) Study 4 
 
 
214 Not specified 48 mean 42  
71 mean 53  
95 mean 67  
 
Cross-
sectional 
One FB change location 
story. Four source 
tasks, 2 ‘see’ and 2 
‘feel’ tasks. 
Sample of children 
from Japan. 
For the whole sample, when age and verbal mental 
age were controlled, number of older siblings 
significantly predicted FB performance and number 
of younger siblings did not. No difference for sibling 
gender, but same-gender siblings did slightly worse 
than opposite-gender siblings. There was no sibling 
effect on children’s performance in the source 
tasks. 
Ruffman, 
Perner, & 
Parkin 
(1999) 
 
64 Mean number of 
younger siblings 0.27, 
mean number of 
older siblings 0.53. 
23 mean 43.1 
41 mean 53.3 
 
Cross-
sectional 
2 FB stories  Some participants 
were drawn from 
Ruffman et al. 
(1998). 
Number of older siblings positively correlated with 
belief understanding. This remained when 
controlling for mental state language, child age, 
verbal mental age, time spent with the mother and 
number of younger siblings. 
 
Shahaeian 
(2015) 
 
 
142 High SES mean 
number of siblings 1.2 
Low SES mean 
number of siblings 1.3 
Non-urban mean 
number of siblings 3.0 
Mean 57.8  
33 high SES 
children 
mean 56.9 
37 low SES 
children 
mean 59.1  
72 non-urban 
children 
mean 57.6  
 
Group 
comparison 
ToM scale, including 
diverse desires, 
knowledge access, 
diverse beliefs, false 
belief and hidden 
emotions. Three FB 
tests: change of 
location, surprise 
contents and emotion 
false belief task. Three 
tests of diverse beliefs. 
A comparison of 
children from high 
SES, low SES and 
rural families from 
Iran. 
There were no differences between the high SES, 
low SES and rural children in their ToM scores, so 
examined as a whole. There were no significant 
correlations between number of siblings, number of 
older siblings and younger siblings and number of 
people living in the home with any of the ToM 
measures.  
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Author N Sibling constellation Age (months) Design 
Measures of theory of 
mind 
Other details Results 
Shahaeian, 
Nielsen, 
Peterson, & 
Slaughter 
(2014) 
 
164 
 
 
 
 
80 Iranian children: 
39% (30) no siblings 
36% (29) 1 sibling 
2% (2) 2 siblings 
0% (0) 3+ siblings 
22% (18) missing 
information 
84 Australian children 
7% (6) no siblings 
58% (48) 1 sibling 
28% (23) 2 siblings 
6% (5) 3+ siblings 
1.2% (1) missing 
information 
(older/younger not 
specified) 
 
Iranian 
children mean 
74.8  
 
Australian 
children mean 
73.5  
Multicultural 
group 
comparison 
6 ToM tasks: 
Diverse desires, diverse 
beliefs, knowledge 
access, false belief, 
hidden emotion and 
sarcasm tasks. 
No difference 
between Iranian 
and Australian 
children on overall 
ToM scores, but 
some task-specific 
differences. 
Range number of 
siblings varied 
between cultures 
which may explain 
results. 
Number of child-aged siblings positively associated 
with performance on overall ToM score for 
Australian children, but not for Iranian children.  
Taylor & 
Carlson (1997) 
 
152 80% of children had 1 
or 2 siblings.  
57 mean 43.2 
95 mean 52.8 
Cross-
sectional 
Appearance-reality 
tasks, false belief and 
representational 
change tasks, 
interpretative diversity 
task 
 
Children’s 
engagement in 
fantasy/pretence 
was associated with 
ToM performance. 
Children with two siblings outperformed children 
with one sibling on FB performance.  
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Author N Sibling constellation Age (months) Design 
Measures of theory of 
mind 
Other details Results 
Wright & 
Mahford 
(2012) 
 
114 For all groups, mean 
number of younger 
siblings .63 
Mean number of 
older siblings .99 
Mean number of both 
older and younger 
siblings 1.61 
18 mean 44.4  
33 mean 58 
41 mean 67.9 
22 mean 78.4  
 
Cross-
sectional 
Two FB change location 
tasks and an 
unexpected contents 
‘smarties’ task. 
- A significant positive association was found 
between number of older siblings and ToM 
performance. Number of younger siblings was 
negatively associated with ToM performance 
although did not reach significance. When target 
child age, memory, play opportunities with nuclear 
and extended family, and friends and home and 
school were entered into a model, number of older 
siblings did not significantly predict towards ToM 
scores, but number of younger siblings had a 
negative effect on ToM scores that trended towards 
significance. 
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3.2 Method 
The analyses presented in this chapter are based on Waves 1 and 6 of the Cardiff Child 
Development Study (Figure 3.1). A full description of the younger sibling study sample and 
study design and procedure at each wave of assessment is presented in Chapter 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 CCDS waves used in the present chapter. 
3.2.1 Participants 
Of the 269 children in the younger sibling study sample, 244 (90.7%) were assessed at 
age 6 and 229 (85.1%) were directly observed in the home. Figure 3.2 shows the progression 
of the younger sibling study sample to the data available for use in the present analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Derivation of the sample. 
N= 269 families in younger sibling study sample 
n= 244 (90.7%) provided some data at childhood assessment:  
n= 11 (4.5%) questionnaire only 
n= 5 (2.1%) partial home visit 
n=228 (93.4%) home visit completed 
 n= 1 developmentally delayed 
n= 1 data withdrawn 
n= 2 no child assessment, interview only 
 
n= 229 (85.1% of younger sibling study sample) in sample for 
present study 
n= 222 (96.9%) fully completed 
second order false belief task 
n= 224 (97.8%) 
completed verbal IQ task 
n= 216 (94.3%) completed 
working memory task 
n = 6 withdrawn from study 
n = 19 contacted but no data 
 
n= 224 (97.8%) 
completed inhibition task 
N= 3 task incomplete 
n= 2 technical error 
n= 1 partial visit 
n= 1 not English/Welsh speaker 
 
n= 3 partial visit 
n= 1 child refusal  
n= 1 not English/Welsh 
speaker 
 
n= 7 partial visit 
n=2 technical error 
n= 3 child not testable 
n= 1 child refusal 
 
n= 3 data unusable 
n= 1 technical error 
n= 1 child not testable 
 
Wave 2 
 
Early Infancy 
 
6 months 
Home visit 
 
Parent 
questionnaires 
and interview  
 
Infant 
assessment  
 
Parent-child 
interaction 
Wave 1 
 
Prenatal 
 
 
Home visit 
 
Parent 
questionnaires 
and interview 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wave 3 
 
Late Infancy 
 
12 months 
Laboratory visit 
 
Parent 
questionnaires 
 
 
Infant 
assessment 
 
 
 
 
Wave 4 
 
Toddlerhood 
 
21 months 
Home visit 
 
Parent 
questionnaires 
and interview  
 
 
 
 
Parent-child 
interaction 
 
Wave 5 
 
Early Childhood 
 
33 months 
Laboratory visit 
 
Parent 
questionnaires 
 
 
Child 
assessment 
 
 
 
 
Wave 6 
 
Middle 
Childhood 
7 years 
Home visit 
 
Parent 
questionnaires 
and interview 
 
Child 
assessment 
 
Parent-child 
interaction 
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The participants’ mean age at the time of testing was 83.20 months (range 67 to 104 
months, SD = 4.59). The N = 229 in the present study was not significantly different from the 
original N = 332 recruited in terms of sociodemographic risk. 
Of the 229 children in the present study, 75.1% of children had at least one younger 
sibling living in the home. Of these, 133 (58.1%) had 1 sibling, 32 (14.0%) had 2 siblings, 
and 7 (3.1%) had 3 siblings. The mean age of the closest in age younger sibling at the time of 
the middle childhood assessment was 47.8 months (SD = 16.5).  
Of the children with siblings, 90 (52.3%) closest in age siblings were female and 81 
(47.7%) were male. Ninety-one children (52.9%) were in a same-gender sibling dyad, and 81 
(47.1%) were in an opposite-gender sibling dyad. Table 3.2 shows the number of children per 
gender composition between the firstborn child and their closest in age younger sibling.  
 
Table 3.2  
Gender compositions of firstborn children and their closest in age younger siblings. 
 Closest in age younger sibling gender 
Male Female 
 
 
 
Firstborn 
gender 
 
Male 
47 
27.3% 
46 
26.7% 
 
Female 
35 
20.3% 
44 
25.6% 
 
The firstborn children entered siblinghood at a mean age of 35.7 months (SD = 16.8). 
To investigate the influence of sibling birth interval, children were grouped according to the 
interval between the firstborn and second born sibling birth. Children who entered 
siblinghood at the first quartile (≤ 24 months) were categorised as having an early arrival 
sibling (n = 45, 19.7%), children who entered siblinghood at the fourth quartile (≥ 43 months) 
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were categorised as having a later arrival sibling (n = 44, 19.2%), and children with a sibling 
arriving between these quartiles were categorised as having an average arrival sibling (n = 
83, 36.2%). 
Table 3.3 shows the breakdown of the early, average and later arrival sibling groups 
according to the firstborns’ relationship to the closest in age younger sibling. There was no 
significant difference in relationship according to the sibling arrival groups χ2 (4) =8.46, p 
<.07. 
 
Table 3.3 
Timing of younger sibling arrival groups and relationship to firstborn child. 
  Sibling arrival group 
  Early Average Late 
Sibling 
relationship to 
firstborn 
Full 
42 
(27.6%) 
76 
(50.0%) 
34 
(22.4%) 
Half 
3 
(15.8%) 
7 
(36.8%) 
9 
(20.5%) 
Adopted 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(100.0%) 
 
3.2.2 Measures 
3.2.2.1 Second-order false belief task. This age-appropriate task was adapted from 
the second-order belief paradigms used by Coull, Leekam, and Bennett (2006) and Perner and 
Wimmer (1985). Each child was told a story enacted with plastic Playmobil® figures by the 
experimenter, with the experimenter acting the story out by moving the Playmobil figures. 
The protagonist was gender-matched to the participant, a figure named Nick for boys and 
Kate for girls. The sibling was gender-matched to the participant’s closest-in-age younger 
sibling. The sibling figures were both called Alex. In cases where the focal child had no 
siblings, the sibling character’s gender was randomly selected. The mother figure was referred 
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to as ‘Mum’ (Figure 3.3). The setup of the characters and the sequence of events is illustrated 
in Figure 3.4. The false belief story is shown in Table 3.4. 
 
Figure 3.3. Playmobil characters used in the false belief story. Front row, left to right: 
Nick, Kate, Alex and Alex. Back row: Mum. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 False belief story with Playmobil®. Labels (a) to (h) correspond to false belief 
story in Table 3.4. 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
(e) (f) (g) (h) 
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Table 3.4 
The false belief story used to assess children’s understanding of second-order false belief.  
Note. This is an example of the story for male participants, whereby the protagonist was 
gender matched and named ‘Nick’. The protagonist for female participants was named ‘Kate’. 
Labels (a) to (h) correspond with images of false belief story depicted in Figure 3.4. 
 
Pathways to passing or not passing this task are shown in Figure 3.5. Children’s 
responses to the test questions were transcribed from video records of the task, and then coded 
from transcripts using the recommendations of Coull and colleagues (2006). Children were 
classified as passing second-order false belief if they correctly answered the first location 
question and with an appropriate justification (see Appendix I), and as passing second-order 
false belief with full comprehension if they additionally correctly answered the additional 
comprehension questions. An independent observer coded transcripts for 32.9% of the 
participants and established excellent agreement for passing second-order false belief (κ = 
1.00) and for whether justifications were appropriate or inappropriate (κ = 1.00). There was 
also very good agreement for appropriate and inappropriate justification codes, where the 
Kappa coefficients were .89 and .79 respectively.  
It’s almost bedtime. Nick has had his special teddy for a very long time. He likes to have it nearby when he 
goes to sleep (a). So he tucks the teddy in his duvet in the bed (b). Mum comes into the room and asks Nick 
to brush his teeth (c). Alex sees Nick leave and runs to get the teddy (d) to hide it in the cupboard (e). But 
Nick comes back, and stands in the doorway and sees Alex hiding the teddy in the cupboard (f). But, Alex 
doesn’t see Nick. Nick goes away again, and Alex goes back to playing (g). Nick comes back in and says, “I 
want my teddy!” (h) 
Test questions: 
1. Mental state: Where does Alex think Nick will look for the teddy? 
2. Justification: Why does Alex think that Nick will look for the teddy in the ________? 
Comprehension questions: 
3. Does Nick know that the teddy is in the cupboard? 
4. Does Alex know that Nick saw him/her hide the teddy? 
5. Where will Nick look for the teddy? 
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Figure 3.5 Flow diagram displaying pathways to passing and not passing second-order false 
belief in the false belief story. 
 
3.2.2.2 Sociodemographic risk. See Chapter 2, section 2.2.2.3, page 30. 
3.2.2.3 Verbal IQ. Each child’s vocabulary knowledge was assessed using the British 
Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Pintillie, 1982). Each child’s 
verbal IQ was calculated by age-normalising the data to produce a standardised score. The 
mean score for verbal IQ was 99.54 (SD = 11.99), and the average age children in the sample 
were equivalent to was 84.14 months (SD = 14.66) and ranged from 49 to 150 months.  
3.2.2.4 Executive Function. Cognitive function was assessed using tasks from the 
Amsterdam Neuropsychological Tasks (ANT) (de Sonneville, 1999). The ANT has been 
proven to be a well-validated and sensitive instrument to evaluate executive functioning in 
population-based (Brunnekreef et al., 2007) and clinical samples (Rommelse et al., 2008). The 
Incorrect answer: 
Any other location, e.g., in the 
cupboard 
Start: 
Second-
order false 
belief 
1. Where does Alex think 
Nick will look for the teddy? 
Not pass (n = 
86) 
Correct 
N Y 
2. Why does 
Alex think Nick 
will look for the 
teddy in the 
________? 
Correct 
N 
Inappropriate justifications: 
Code 1: First-order reasoning.  
Code 2: Zero-order reasoning.  
Code 3: Irrelevant information. 
Code 4: Nonsensical information. 
Not pass (n = 
44) 
Appropriate justifications: 
Code 1: Embedding of mental state 
Code 2: Nesting of crucial 
information within another’s belief 
Code 3: Original location of the 
critical object is mentioned 
Y 
Comprehension questions: 
3. Does Nick know the 
teddy is in the cupboard? 
4. Does Alex know that 
Nick saw her hide the 
teddy? 
5. Where will Nick look for 
the teddy? 
Pass with full 
comprehension 
(n = 67) 
Pass (n = 95) 
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tasks were presented on a laptop and children made responses using a mouse. For each task, 
the experimenter gave verbal instructions whilst showing examples. Following this children 
were given a practice trial before starting the test trials. 
The Response Organisation Objects (ROO) task was used to measure response 
inhibition via children’s reaction times to stimuli. Children were asked to hold the mouse with 
a forefinger of each hand on each button of the mouse. In Part 1, (compatible condition), the 
children were presented with a fixation cross in the middle of the screen, and were asked to 
respond to a red ball appearing on either side of the cross by clicking the same side of the 
mouse to which the ball appeared. In Part 2 (incompatible condition), the children were 
presented with a white ball on the screen. Children were instructed to click the opposite side 
of the mouse according to the position of the ball. Response inhibition was operationalised as 
the difference between children’s mean reaction speed times (M = 314.32, SD = 195.65) in 
milliseconds between the compatible (Part 1) and incompatible (Part 2) tasks.  
The Visuo-Spatial Sequencing (VSS) task was used to measure visuo-spatial working 
memory. In this task children were presented with a grey square containing 9 circles 
symmetrically positioned in a 3x3 matrix on a computer screen. After a beep, a sequence of 
circles was pointed at by a computer animated hand, and after the sequence the children took 
control of the mouse to replicate the sequence of circles. The test consisted of 24 trials, and 
gradually increased in difficulty in the number of targets and complexity of the sequence. 
Working memory was assessed using the total number of correct targets in the correct order, 
with a total of 100 possible correct targets. The mean score for correct targets in the correct 
order was 67.24 (SD = 17.94). 
Full details of the tasks are available in the official ANT manual (de Sonneville, 
1999). A compilation of the descriptions of the tasks, instructions for administration and 
details of the construction of data sets and variables specific to the Cardiff Child Development 
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Study is also available in the CCDS ANT Manual. Sections of this manual for the tasks used 
in the present study are available in Appendix II. 
3.3 Results 
Correlations, means and standard deviations for all variables of interest are presented 
in Table 3.5. Prior to investigating the influence of siblings on the false belief task, children’s 
overall performance on the second-order false belief task is described, and the subsidiary 
question regarding the correlates of the false belief questions is addressed.  
3.3.1 Children’s understanding of second-order false belief. 
Correlations, means and standard deviations for all variables of interest are presented 
in Table 3.5. Ninety-five children (42.8%) passed the initial location question and provided an 
appropriate justification, and 67 (30.2%) additionally passed the second-order false belief 
comprehension questions (Figure 3). Supplementary descriptive data are presented in 
Appendix I. These two levels of passing second-order false belief were positively correlated 
(Table 3.5). Younger sibling constellation factors were only associated with passing second-
order false belief with full comprehension (Table 3.5). Therefore, the subsequent analyses 
focus on children’s full comprehension of second-order false belief. Prior to investigating the 
influence of siblings on this measure of false belief understanding, a preliminary investigation 
of its correlates was conducted. 
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Table 3.5 
Intercorrelations among all variables of interest. 
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
1. Presence of a sibling in the home -            
2. Number of siblings living in the home .77** -           
3. Gender composition of siblings .a .04 -          
4. Timing of sibling arrival .a -.33** .09 -         
5. Firstborn age at false belief tasks .10 .03 -.03 .22** -        
6. Firstborn gender .03 .06 -.05 -.03 .01 -       
7. Second-order false belief  .09 .07 .03 -.03 .04 .10 -      
8. Second-order false belief conservative .10* .10 .05 .02 .06 .12 .76** -     
9. Sociodemographic risk -.09 -.01 .02 .15* .25** -.11 -.18** -.18** -    
10. Verbal IQ -.01 -.05 .02 -.12 -.23** .07 .24** .23** -.47** -   
11. Response inhibition -.15* -.15* -.04 .13 -.12 .15* -.07 -.04 -.07 -.01 -  
12. Working memory -.02 .02 -.05 .07 .21** .16* .09 .09 -.24** .32** -.17* - 
Mean .75 .95 .47 35.68 83.20 .45 .43 .30 -.13 99.54 314.32 67.24 
SD .43 .71 .60 16.84 4.59 .50 .50 .46 .97 11.99 195.65 17.94 
Note. Associations between dichotomous variables were tested by Kappa coefficients. 
*p <.05. **p <.001.  
acorrelation not computed as one variable is constant. 
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3.3.2 What are the correlates of second-order false belief understanding? 
Examination of the correlation matrix (Table 3.5) and of collinearity statistics 
established no issues with collinearity amongst predictor variables (VIF < 10, Tolerance > 
.20) (Menard, 1995; Myers, 1990). Verbal IQ and sociodemographic risk were significantly 
associated with passing second-order false belief questions with full comprehension, where 
higher verbal IQ scores were associated with better performance, and higher 
sociodemographic risk scores with lower performance. No relationship was detected between 
either children’s response inhibition or working memory and children’s performance on 
second-order false belief with full comprehension, nor was a relationship detected between 
age at the time of testing and second-order false belief (Table 3.5). However, in view of 
earlier research suggesting that individual differences in performance on false belief tasks 
exist across different ages (Wellman, Cross, & Watson 2001), age was included in the 
subsequent logistic regression.  
In a logistic regression these potential confounds accounted for 11% of the variance in 
second-order false belief with full comprehension, χ2 (3) =18.45, p <.001, Nagelkerke R2 =.11. 
Children who were older at the time of testing, Wald statistic = 4.21, p <.05, OR = 1.08, 95% 
CI(1.00-1.16), and those with higher verbal IQ scores, Wald statistic = 7.17, p <.01, OR = 
1.04, 95% CI(1.01-1.07), performed significantly better on second-order false belief; age and 
verbal IQ were therefore used as covariates in the subsequent analysis. 
3.3.3 Do younger siblings influence firstborn’s second-order false belief understanding? 
Sibling variables were only associated with passing second-order false belief with full 
comprehension (Table 3.5). Therefore, all subsequent analyses in this chapter and throughout 
this thesis focus on firstborns’ passing of the full sequence of second order questions with full 
comprehension. There was no significant association between number of siblings living in the 
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home and second-order false belief performance (Table 3.5). Therefore, all subsequent 
analyses explore sibling constellation factors related to the closest in age sibling.  
3.3.3.1 Sibling presence in the home. To test for variations in second-order false 
belief as a function of presence or absence of siblings in the home, the sample was divided 
into two groups. Preliminary analyses showed no differences between the groups in ratio of 
males to females, firstborn mean age, sociodemographic risk, verbal IQ, and working 
memory. Children with siblings in the home performed better on the response inhibition task 
t(222) = 2.03, p <.05 (Table 3.6). A significant difference was detected between the two 
sibling groups in their passing of the second-order false belief task with full comprehension χ2 
(1) = 5.00, p <.05, OR = 2.33, 95% CI (1.10 – 4.97), where children with a sibling had a 
twofold advantage on the second-order false belief task (Figure 3.6). 
 
Figure 3.6 Percentage of children who passed the second-order false belief task with full 
comprehension according to sibling presence groups. 
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Table 3.6 
Means and standard deviations of all variables of interest for sibling groups. 
Variable Sibling presence groups Sibling arrival groups 
No younger sibling 
present in the home 
Younger sibling  
present in the home 
Early arrival younger 
sibling 
Average arrival 
younger sibling 
Later arrival younger 
sibling 
Average to later 
arrival younger sibling 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Firstborn age at false 
belief tasks 
82.44 3.91 83.45 4.78 82.67 5.29 83.05 3.79 85.02 5.57 83.74 4.57 
Firstborn gender .42 .50 .46 .50 .42 .50 .48 .50 .45 .50 .47 .50 
Second-order false 
belief 
.33 .47 .46 .50 .39 .49 .55 .50 .37 .49 .49 .50 
Second-order false 
belief full 
comprehension 
.18 .39 .34 .48 .25 .44 .41 .50 .30 .46 .37 .49 
Sociodemographic risk .03 .95 -.19 .98 -.19 1.07 -.38 .82 .19 1.06 -.18 .95 
Verbal IQ 99.78 12.54 99.46 11.85 99.18 11.91 101.37 11.92 96.23 11.18 99.56 11.88 
Response Inhibition 366.29 230.11 297.40 180.60 317.48 175.05 267.18 148.92 334.49 229.62 290.34 182.69 
Working Memory 67.73 18.50 67.09 17.82 64.20 19.44 69.29 16.12 66.00 18.93 68.14 17.15 
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In a logistic regression analysis (Table 3.7), the covariates were entered into the first 
step of the model, which accounted for 9% of the variance in second-order false belief χ2 (2) = 
15.07, p <.001, Nagelkerke R2 = .09. At the second step, presence of a younger sibling 
accounted for significant additional variance in passing second-order false belief χ2 (1) = 4.97, 
p <.05, and the overall model remained significant χ2 (3) = 19.98, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = 
.12. Within this model verbal IQ remained a significant predictor of second-order false belief 
performance. Children with a younger sibling present in the home were over twice as likely as 
children without siblings to pass second-order false belief with full comprehension, Wald 
statistic = 4.53, p <.05, OR = 2.35, 95% CI(1.07–5.15).  
 
Table 3.7 
Logistic regression of presence of a younger sibling in the home, firstborn age and verbal IQ 
as predictors of passing second-order false belief with full comprehension. 
Variable R2 B SE Wald χ2 eβ 95% CI for OR 
Step 1 
 
.09***      
     Constant 
     Firstborn age 
     Verbal IQ 
 -10.91 
.06 
.05*** 
3.61 
.04 
.01 
9.12 
2.86 
12.68 
.00 
1.06 
1.05 
 
.99 – 1.14 
1.02 – 1.08 
Step 2 .12***      
     Constant 
     Firstborn age 
     Verbal IQ 
     Presence of a younger sibling in the 
home 
 
-11.47 
.06 
.05*** 
.85* 
3.70 
.04 
.02 
.40 
9.59 
2.45 
13.00 
4.53 
.00 
1.06 
1.05 
2.35 
 
.99 – 1.14 
1.02 – 1.08 
1.07 – 5.15 
Note. The table presents the total R2 Nagelkerke statistic.  
N = 219. 
Ɨp <.10. *p < .05. **p <.01. ***p <.001. 
 
3.3.3.2. Gender composition. Gender composition was examined in two ways; same-
gender and opposite gender dyads were investigated, then all four possible gender 
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compositions: older female-younger female; older female-younger male; older male-younger 
male; and older male-younger female were explored. Preliminary analyses showed no 
differences between the groups in ratio of males to females, firstborn mean age, 
sociodemographic risk, verbal IQ, and working memory or inhibition across all the groups. 
No associations were detected between gender compositions of sibling dyads and second-
order false belief. 
3.3.3.3. Birth interval. Although no association was detected between timing of 
sibling arrival and second-order false belief understanding (Table 3.4), the four sibling arrival 
groups: no sibling, early-, average- and later arriving sibling groups were investigated. 
Preliminary analyses showed no differences between these groups in ratio of males to 
females, verbal IQ and working memory. Significant differences were detected between 
groups in sibling age F(3,224) = 3.16, p < .05, sociodemographic risk F(3,225) = 4.13, p <.01 
and ANT inhibition scores F(3, 220) = 3.12, p < .05. Post hoc tests were selected in 
accordance with results from tests for homogeneity of variances. Games-Howell post hoc tests 
indicated that children in the later arrival sibling group were older than those in the no sibling 
group, and children with an average arriving sibling performed better on the inhibition task 
than those without a sibling (ps < .05). A Tukey post hoc test indicated that children with an 
average arriving younger sibling had lower sociodemographic risk than those with a later 
arriving sibling (p <.01). A significant difference was detected between the four sibling 
groups in their passing of the second-order false belief task with full comprehension χ2 (3) = 
8.97, p <.05 (Figure 3.7). 
This finding was explored further whilst controlling for covariates of second-order 
false belief. As later arriving siblings did not significantly differ from average arriving sibling 
group in performance on passing second-order false belief with full comprehension, these 
were collapsed into one ‘average to later’ sibling arrival group. There were no significant 
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differences between the groups in ratio of males to females, firstborn mean age, 
sociodemographic risk, verbal IQ, and working memory or inhibition when these groups were 
collapsed (see Table 3.5). 
Figure 3.7 Percentage of children who passed the second-order false belief task with full 
comprehension according to sibling arrival groups. 
    
The three remaining sibling status groups were dummy coded with the no sibling 
group assigned as the reference category in a logistic regression. Covariates (age and verbal 
IQ) were entered into the first step of the logistic regression model. When entered into the 
model at the second step, early arrival of a younger sibling and average to later arrival of a 
younger sibling accounted for a significant step when entered into the model, accounting for 
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an additional 4% of the variance in second-order false belief with full comprehension, χ2 (2) = 
6.57, p <.05. The overall model remained significant χ2 (2) = 21.57, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = 
.13. The early arrival of younger siblings did not predict firstborns’ passing of second-order 
false belief with full comprehension; however, average to later arrival siblings conveyed a 
significant advantage, Wald statistic = 5.63, p <.05, OR = 2.66, 95% CI(1.19–5.96) (Table 
3.8). 
 
Table 3.8 
Logistic regression of dummy coded sibling status groups, firstborn age and verbal IQ as 
predictors of passing second-order false belief with full comprehension. 
Variable R2 B SE Wald χ2 eβ 95% CI for OR 
Step 1 
 
.09***      
     Constant 
     Firstborn age 
     Verbal IQ 
 -10.91 
.06 
.05*** 
3.61 
.04 
.01 
9.12 
2.86 
12.68 
.00 
1.06 
1.05 
 
.99 – 1.14 
1.02 – 1.08 
Step 2 .13***      
     Constant 
     Firstborn age 
     Verbal IQ 
     Early arrival younger sibling 
     Average to Late arrival younger 
sibling 
 
-10.87 
.05 
.05 
.46 
.98* 
3.71 
.04 
.02 
.51 
.41 
8.58 
1.86 
12.87 
.82 
5.63 
.00 
1.05 
1.05 
1.59 
2.66 
 
.98 - 1.13 
1.02 - 1.08 
.58 - 4.34 
1.19 - 5.96 
Note. The table presents the total R2 Nagelkerke statistic.  
N = 219. 
Ɨp <.10. *p < .05. **p <.01. ***p <.001. 
 
3.4 Discussion 
 
3.4.1 Sibling influences on children’s understanding of second-order false belief  
When predictors of second-order false belief understanding were controlled, children 
with a younger sibling present in the home were twice as likely to succeed on a second-order 
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false belief task with full comprehension. In a closer examination of sibling constellation 
factors, it was established that this sibling advantage is only the case for firstborns who did 
not experience the early arrival of a sibling. This finding stands in contrast to the first study of 
sibling effects on second-order false belief tasks, which found no effect (Miller, 2013), but is 
consistent with previous research showing that presence of a younger sibling in the home is 
advantageous for theory of mind (Perner et al., 1994; Lewis et al., 1996; Peterson, 2000). In 
contrast to earlier work (Kennedy et al., 2015), the younger sibling’s influence on a higher-
order theory of mind task in this sample was not limited to same-gender siblings. Although 
the effects reported in this study were not large, it is important to note that the sample size 
used in the present study provided sufficient power to enable detection of such small to 
moderate effects. 
There are various mechanisms whereby younger siblings could facilitate their older 
sibling’s false belief understanding; see Chapter 1. These included engaging in joint pretence 
(Youngblade & Dunn, 1995), sharing knowledge through teaching (Zajonc & Markus, 1975; 
Azmitia & Hesser, 1993) and engaging in conflict and resolution (Dunn, 1994; Foote & 
Holmes-Lonergan, 2003).  
Siblings may also foster children’s understanding of false belief indirectly, by 
triggering changes in parent-firstborn interactions (Carpendale & Lewis, 2006). Many 
parental characteristics and features of parent-child interaction have been explored in relation 
to children’s development of theory of mind (Miller, 2016) such as attachment quality, 
general parenting style, warmth and affection (Arranz, Artamendi, Olabarrieta, & Martin, 
2002; Ruffman, Slade, Devitt, & Crowe, 2006; Steele, Steele, Croft, & Fonagy, 1999). 
Children’s conversational environments have been the focus of numerous studies, where 
perhaps the most robust associations in this area have been identified between maternal 
internal state language and children’s performance on theory of mind tasks (see Harris, de 
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Rosnay, & Pons, 2005; de Rosnay & Hughes, 2006). Given that the arrival of a sibling has 
been found to be associated with changes in maternal internal state language use (Dunn & 
Kendrick, 1982a), it is possible that younger sibling influences on false belief understanding 
are mediated by maternal internal state language.  
The experience of the arrival of a sibling early in development however, does not 
appear to provide a similar advantage brought about by a younger sibling. The first two years 
of life represent an important time period in theory of mind development, which features 
evidence of consciousness, pretence and the use of lexical terms for mental states (Astington, 
Harris, & Olson, 1988; Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). It is possible that transition to siblinghood 
during this time may disrupt this process.  
3.4.2 Correlates of second-order false belief 
Children who experienced socioeconomic adversity performed less well on the 
second-order false belief task; however, this association did not remain significant when 
accounting for age and verbal IQ. This finding stands in contrast to previous research (Cutting 
& Dunn, 1999; Cole & Mitchell, 2000), perhaps because this study took into account a 
number of dimensions of sociodemographic risk beyond occupational class or income. 
Although a number of sociodemographic risk factors have been found to be associated with 
theory of mind, such as income, maternal education (Andersson, Sommerfelt, Sonnander, & 
Ahlsten, 1996), and parental occupational class (Cutting & Dunn, 1999), these factors are 
rarely all controlled in a single study (Pears & Moses, 2003).  
Although the effects reported in this study were not large, it is important to note that 
the sample size used in the present study provided sufficient power to enable detection of such 
small to moderate effects. Thus, the absence of an association with children’s executive 
function abilities in this sample is noteworthy, given that there was sufficient power to detect 
such an effect. Although executive function abilities and first-order false belief understanding 
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have been found to be positively related (Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002), a finding 
replicated in the present study, there has not been consistent evidence for a correlation 
between executive function and performance on second-order false belief tasks (for a review, 
see Miller, 2009). This may indicate that second-order false belief is predominantly a social 
rather than a cognitive advance. Alternatively, it may be that the non-verbal measures used in 
this study to assess executive function may not be comparable to other verbal measures of 
inhibition and working memory, such as Bear/Dragon ‘Simon Says’-type inhibition tasks or 
word/digit span working memory tasks (Carlson, Moses & Breton, 2002). Before a more 
definitive conclusion can be made, replication of this finding using other executive function 
tasks is warranted. 
3.4.3 Limitations of the study 
The findings must be interpreted with some caution. Data collection took place in the 
family homes; therefore the assessment of false belief is likely to be influenced by situation-
specific influences, such as distractions within the home environment. This situational factor 
as well as the broader nature of the community sample may explain why fewer children 
passed first- and second-order false belief than previously reported in the literature. However, 
the use of home visits may also have led to the inclusion of more families than would have 
otherwise been unable to participate in such a study. Further research might be advised to 
conduct similar assessments in a more controlled environment, such as in a laboratory or 
school setting, which may reduce situational influences that increase measurement error. 
3.4.4 Chapter summary and next directions in the thesis 
The finding that the presence of a younger sibling in the home facilitated false belief 
understanding draws attention to the contribution of the sibling relationship to social cognitive 
development in middle childhood. Taken together with evidence from the vast literature on 
first-order false belief understanding, the findings contribute to knowledge about the influence 
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of younger as well as older siblings on the child’s development of a theory of mind. In the 
next stage of this thesis, I will examine mothers’ references to internal states as a mediator of 
younger sibling influence on children’s understanding of second-order false beliefs. For this 
investigation to take place, Chapter 4 will first review theoretical and methodological issues 
of studying maternal internal state language. In Chapter 5, maternal references to internal 
states will be tested as a potential mediator of the sibling effect on children’s second-order 
false belief understanding.  
In the present chapter, younger siblings were found to foster children’s performance 
on the second-order false belief task; however, this was not the case for firstborns who 
experienced the early arrival of a sibling. Chapter 6 will focus on the early arrival younger 
sibling group with the aim to discover why these younger siblings did not provide an 
advantage in children’s understanding of minds. This will include a review of family 
characteristics associated with rapid subsequent childbearing and an exploration of the effects 
rapid sibling arrival may have on mother-child interaction.
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CHAPTER 4 
“What’s that, what have you seen, nosy parker?” 
Mothers’ Use of Internal State Language: Associations with Children’s 
Understanding of False Belief and Methodological Considerations 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this thesis thus far, it has been demonstrated that younger siblings foster firstborns’ 
understanding of higher-order understanding of minds in middle childhood. In Chapter 3, the 
presence of a younger sibling in the home was found to result in a two-fold advantage in 
children’s performance responding to second-order false belief questions. It was hypothesised 
that this association may be explained in part by changes in mothers’ use of internal state 
language towards the firstborn child upon the arrival of a younger sibling. In the present 
chapter, I will review the relationship between mothers’ use of internal state language and 
children’s understanding of minds. I will also highlight methodological issues that must be 
taken into consideration when studying maternal use of internal state language. This will take 
place in preparation for testing the contribution of both mothers’ use of internal state language 
and presence of a younger sibling on firstborns’ second order false belief understanding in 
Chapter 5. 
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4.1.1 Mothers’ use of internal state language: Associations with children’s false belief 
understanding 
A recently growing body of work within the theory of mind literature has focused on 
the association between children’s conversational environments and their emerging 
understanding of minds. This line of enquiry is reminiscent of Vygotsky’s (1978) 
interactionist-dialectical (p. 124) approach in explaining the development of social 
understanding. As highlighted in section 1.3.5.3.1 of Chapter 1 (page 18), Vygotsky theorised 
that conversation is a ‘tool’ that facilitates children’s understanding of minds, by the sharing 
of experience, memories and meaning to reach mutual understanding (see also Zone of 
Proximal Development, Figure 1.4 in Chapter 1, page 20). In the revival of this work, research 
has explored the features of parental discourse that may foster children’s understanding of 
minds. Although some work has explored features of paternal speech (LaBounty, Wellman, 
Olson, Lagattuta, & Liu, 2008), most studies have focused on mothers’ speech, including talk 
about causality (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, et al., 1991), elaborative discourse (Garner, 
Jones, Gaddy, & Rennie, 1997; Laible, 2004), as well as conversations about, and sensitivity 
to, internal states (Ruffman et al., 2002). 
Internal state language encompasses references to an individual’s internal, mental 
worlds, and in the literature is also referred to as mental state language, language of mind and 
metacognitive language (see de Rosnay & Hughes, 2006, see also section 1.3.2.1 of Chapter 
1, page 8). The majority of studies focus on mothers’ speech about desires, emotions, 
cognitions, and in the infancy literature, perception, as examples of internal state language 
(Table 4.1). Although few studies have explored the relationship between mothers’ use of 
internal state language and children’s understanding of minds in middle childhood, this 
association has been well-established in studies of mothers and their preschool-aged children. 
This feature of language has been associated with children’s emotion understanding (Dunn, 
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Brown, & Beardsall, 1991; Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006, 2008), children’s own use of 
internal state language (Jenkins et al., 2003; Garner et al., 1997; Moore, Furrow, Chiasson, & 
Patriquin, 1994) as well as performance on false-belief tasks (Ruffman et al., 2002, 2006; 
Symons, Peterson, Slaughter, Roche, & Doyle, 2005). Caregivers’ internal state language has 
been consistently found to relate to children’s understanding of minds; this is demonstrated in 
Table 4.1, where the majority of studies have reported positive associations between features 
of mothers’ internal state language and children’s understanding of false belief. 
The majority of studies investigating mothers’ use of internal state language and 
children’s understanding of false belief have focused on the frequency of references to 
emotions, desires and cognitions (de Rosnay & Hughes, 2006). This investigation was 
initiated by the seminal work of Judy Dunn and colleagues, who coded from transcripts of 
over two hours of video footage with 33-month-olds. In their work, Dunn and colleagues 
identified a link between maternal discourse about feeling states at 33 months and children’s 
success on false belief 7 months later (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, et al., 1991). Following 
this landmark study, mothers’ references to emotions (e.g. “happy”, “sad”, “angry”, “scared”) 
and references to desires (e.g. “want”, “wish”, “like”, “hope”) also predicted children’s 
understanding of false belief in cross-sectional studies (Adrian, Clemente, Villanueva, & 
Rieffe, 2005; Racine, Carpendale, & Turnball, 2007; Symons, Fossum, & Collins, 2006). 
Nevertheless, when taken together, mothers’ references to cognitions (e.g. “think”, 
“know”, “believe”, “guess”, “figure”) have emerged as perhaps the most consistent predictor 
of children’s understanding of false belief (Adrian et al., 2005). The frequency of mothers’ 
use of cognitive terms has been associated with children’s passing of false belief tasks 
(Adrian et al., 2005; Ensor & Hughes, 2008; Ruffman et al., 2002), and such references have 
remained significant predictors of children’s false belief understanding, even when children’s 
early false belief performance is controlled (Ensor, Devine, Marks, & Hughes, 2014).  
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Table 4.1  
Methods and measures used in previous research examining the association between caregivers’ use of internal state language and children’s 
false belief understanding.4 
                                                 
4 Studies were included in Table 4.1 if they had assessed caregivers’ internal state language and children’s false belief understanding in community samples of infants, 
toddlers and children. 
 
Author 
Age of 
children 
N Study Design 
Child theory of mind 
outcome measure 
Parent-child 
interaction 
assessment 
Internal 
state 
language 
coded 
Summary of findings 
Adrian, Clemente, 
Villanueva, & 
Rieffe (2005) 
48 – 60 
months 
34 Cross-
sectional 
False belief Wordless picture 
book 
Cognition 
Emotion 
Desire 
Perception 
Frequency and variety of cognitive terms 
and frequency of emotion terms 
predicted false belief. 
Dunn, Brown, 
Slomkowski, 
Tesla, & 
Youngblade 
(1991) 
T1: 33 months 
T2: 40 months 
50 Longitudinal False belief 
Emotion 
understanding 
2 x 75 minute 
natural home 
observation  
Emotions 
Preferences 
Child’s participation in family discourse 
about feelings and causality were 
associated with understanding of 
feelings and false belief. 
Ensor & Hughes 
(2008) 
T1: 29 months 
T2: 41 months 
T3: 50 months 
120 Longitudinal False belief battery 
Emotion 
understanding 
30 minute natural 
home observation  
Cognition 
Emotion 
Desire 
Mothers’ cognitive references were 
associated with children’s social 
understanding; however this did not 
remain a predictor when covariates 
(including mothers’ connected turns) 
were controlled. ‘Connectedness’ found 
to have moderating effect, mothers’ 
mental state language strongest 
predictor in connected turns. 
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Ensor, Devine, 
Marks, & Hughes 
(2014) 
T1: 28 months 
T2: 40 months 
T3: 78 months 
T4: 111 
months 
105 
(to age 
6) 
77 
(to age 
10) 
Longitudinal False belief battery 
Strange stories 
30 minute natural 
home observation 
(T1) 
Wordless picture 
book (T3) 
Cognition 
Emotion 
Desire 
Mothers’ references to cognition at T1 
predicted children’s performance on FB 
at T2 and strange stories at T3, even when 
controlling for children’s FB performance 
at T1.  
Howard, Mayeux, 
& Naigles (2008) 
36 – 48 
months 
60 Cross-
sectional 
False belief battery 
Mental verb 
understanding 
30 mins natural 
observation  
Semi-structured 
memory game 
Cognition Children’s mental verb understanding 
was facilitated by mothers’ questions 
including mental verbs and mothers’ 
references to others rather than self. 
Mothers’ use of ‘know’ and ‘remember’ 
but not ‘think’ in single-clause utterances 
predicted children’s false belief 
performance. 
LaBounty, 
Wellman, Olson, 
Lagattuta, & Liu 
(2008) 
T1: 41 months 
T2: 69 months 
106 Longitudinal False belief battery 
Desire understanding 
Emotion 
understanding 
Wordless picture 
book 
Cognition 
Desire 
Emotion 
Mothers’ causal explanations about 
emotions predicted children’s emotion 
understanding. Fathers’ causal 
explanations regarding desires predicted 
children’s false belief performance. 
Ontai & 
Thompson (2008) 
48 – 60 
months 
76 Cross-
sectional 
False belief battery Semi-structured 
conversation 
General 
internal 
state 
language (no 
categories) 
Mothers’ conversational elaboration, not 
references to mental states, significantly 
predicted children’s false belief 
performance.  
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Racine, 
Carpendale, & 
Turnball (2007) 
36 – 60 
months 
78 Cross-
sectional 
False belief 
Emotion 
understanding 
Wordless picture 
book 
Belief-
dependent 
emotion 
Non-belief-
dependent 
emotion 
Parents’ belief-dependent talk about 
emotions predicted children’s 
understanding of false belief. 
Ruffman, Slade, & 
Crowe (2002) 
T1: 36 months 
T2: 41 months 
T3: 48 months 
82 Longitudinal False belief battery 
Emotion 
understanding 
Desire understanding 
Ambiguity task 
Wordless picture 
book 
Desire 
Emotion 
Modulations 
of assertion 
Think and 
know 
Other 
mental state 
Mothers’ use of ISL was correlated with 
children’s theory of mind at all three 
time-points. When children’s earlier 
theory of mind understanding was 
partialled out, mothers’ ISL still predicted 
theory of mind performance, indicating a 
causal relationship. 
Ruffman, Slade, 
Devitt, & Crowe 
(2006) 
T1: 36 months 
T2: 48 months 
55 Longitudinal False belief battery 
Emotion 
understanding 
Desire understanding 
Conflict/cooperation 
task 
Wordless picture 
book 
Cognition 
Desire 
Emotion 
General 
mental 
states 
Modulations 
of assertions 
All categories of internal state language 
were examined together. Mothers’ use 
of mental state talk was a significant 
predictor of children’s theory of mind, 
even when controlling for parenting 
style. 
Slaughter, 
Peterson, & 
Mackintosh 
(2007) 
38 – 57 
months 
30 Cross-
sectional 
False belief battery Wordless picture 
book 
Simple/ 
clarification 
of:  
Cognition 
Affect  
Perception 
Mothers’ use of cognition clarifications 
(not simple) predicted children’s theory 
of mind performance. 
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Symons, Fossum, 
& Collins (2006) 
T1: 25 months 
T2: 69 months 
43 Longitudinal Internal state 
language 
False belief battery 
Laboratory free play Cognition 
Desire 
Basic 
emotion 
Mothers’ appropriate use of desire 
language at T`1 predicted children’s later 
theory of mind understanding at T2.  
Symons, 
Peterson, 
Slaughter, Roche, 
& Doyle (2005) 
60 – 85 
months 
51 Cross-
sectional 
False belief battery Story book reading Cognition 
Emotion 
Desire 
All categories of internal state language 
were examined together. Comments 
about the internal states of the 
characters in the story and discourse 
regarding story theme were related to 
children’s false belief understanding. 
Turnbull, 
Carpendale, & 
Racine (2008) 
36 – 70 
months 
70 Cross-
sectional 
False belief battery Wordless picture 
book 
Cognition 
Emotion 
Desire 
All categories of internal state language 
were examined together. When age was 
controlled, mothers’ internal state 
language predicted false belief 
understanding. Mothers’ internal state 
language did not remain a significant 
predictor when taking into account 
discussion about overall story elements.  
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While this pattern of findings indicates that mothers’ references to cognitions are 
important for fostering children’s false belief understanding, the majority of these 
investigations focused on the frequency of use of such terms. Beyond a simple tally of 
references to cognitions, research indicated that the more varied the references to cognitions, 
the better children’s understanding of false belief (Adrian et al., 2005). In a closer inspection 
of cognitive terms, mothers’ use of know and remember, but not think, predict children’s false 
belief performance (Howard, Mayeux, & Naigles, 2008). In broad investigations of references 
to cognitions within sentences, clarifications of cognitive terms using explanatory, casual or 
contrastive statements have been identified as predictors of false belief understanding e.g. 
“He remembers that he has not done the bedroom yet” rather than “he remembers” 
(Slaughter, Peterson, & Mackintosh, 2007 p. 843). Broader still, within the context of the 
whole conversational exchange, the degree to which a mother’s speech is semantically related 
to the child’s previous conversational turn, known as connectedness, has been found to 
moderate the influence of mothers’ cognitive references on children’s false belief 
performance (Ensor & Hughes, 2008).  
4.1.2 How might maternal internal state language facilitate children’s understanding of 
belief? 
The reason why caregivers’ use of internal state language appears to facilitate children’s 
theory of mind understanding is relatively unclear. It is proposed that within their 
conversations children are provided with opportunities to appreciate the perspectives of 
others, whilst shifting from concrete to abstract topics of conversation (Harris, 1999). 
Caregivers’ propensity to comment on inner states may add to this “constant tutorial” (p.102) 
in children’s understanding that conversation with others can move beyond current mutual 
activities and subjects of joint attention, to discussions of what is absent and unobservable, 
including the beliefs and knowledge of their conversational partner. 
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Along a similar vein, caregivers’ mind-related discourse encourages children to attend 
to, reflect on and represent abstract concepts. By drawing attention to the thought process, 
caregiver speech scaffolds children to overcome the saliency of reality and understand the 
discrepancies between their own experience of reality and the reality experienced by others 
(Adrian et al., 2005). Given that one’s beliefs and knowledge, more so than other mental 
states such as emotions and desires, can be subjective and are most likely to contradict 
someone else’s perception of reality, this explanation best fits research showing that mothers’ 
discourse about belief and knowledge is most related to children’s passing of false belief tasks 
(Adrian et al., 2005; Ensor & Hughes, 2008; Ensor et al., 2014). 
The linguistic account of theory of  mind asserts that caregivers’ use of internal state 
language exposes children to particular aspects of syntax, specifically propositions that 
invariably follow a mental state verb in a sentence, such as “She thought the world was flat” 
(de Villiers & Pyers, 2002, p. 1038). It has been argued that mastery of this feature of 
language, known as sentential complements, enable children to represent others’ points of 
view. Understanding of the relation between the mental state verb, “she thought” and the 
complement, “the world was flat” enables children to evaluate perspectives of others in 
relation to their own reality. This view is consistent with Vygotsky’s claim that language 
acquisition provides children with psychological tools (1978). In the absence of such tools, 
passing false belief tasks would be difficult (as they include such inner state verbs and 
propositions). Indeed, this position has been supported by Slaughter and colleagues’ (2007) 
work which highlighted the importance of clarifications, as well as de Villiers and Pyers’ 
work, (2002) where children’s passing of false belief tasks were associated with their memory 
of sentential complements, with and without the use of inner state verbs.  
Although the exact mechanism by which caregivers’ references to inner states 
facilitates children’s understanding of belief remains unclear, these current suggestions are 
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corroborated by research exploring children’s outcomes when such conversations are 
diminished. Studies demonstrating differences in social understanding between deaf children 
within hearing families and native signers (for a review, see Peterson & Siegal, 2000) showed 
that profoundly deaf children from hearing families (who are therefore belatedly signing) 
consistently perform worse on false belief tasks than native signing children (Peterson & 
Siegal, 1999; Russell, Hosie, Gray, Scott, & Hunter, 1998). Hearing parents of deaf children, 
even if they learn to sign, have difficulties conversing about topics without the presence of a 
visual referent (Meadow, Greenberg, Erting, & Carmichael, 1981), resulting in less frequent 
and less rich conversation regarding abstract topics, such as non-present objects, events, 
memories, future events, and notably, inner states (Morford & Goldin-Meadow, 1997; 
Vaccari & Marschark, 1997). This research strengthens the claim that exposure to proficient 
conversational partners may be necessary for false belief understanding. Children’s 
conversations with their caregivers regarding inner states may serve as a ‘window’ for 
children to gain insight into the minds of others.  
4.1.3 The importance of mothers’ internal state language beyond the preschool years 
 In this review thus far, there is clear evidence that mothers’ references to internal 
states are positively associated with children’s understanding of minds in the preschool years 
(Ruffman et al., 2002, 2006; Symons et al., 2005). However, few studies have explored this 
relationship beyond the fifth year of life (Ensor et al., 2014). A handful of studies indicate that 
mothers’ overall frequency of references to internal states are associated with children’s 
understanding of false belief beyond the preschool years (Symons et al., 2005). Others 
indicate that specific references to desire and causal explanations about emotions are 
positively associated with children’s false belief understanding before their sixth birthday 
(Symons et al., 2006; LaBounty et al., 2008). 
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Evidence suggests that mothers’ references to cognitive internal states fosters 
children’s performance on strange stories tasks that measure children’s advanced insights 
about the mind, such as understanding of instances concerning deception and 
misunderstanding (Adrian, Clemente, & Villanueva, 2007; Ensor et al., 2014). In a 
longitudinal study of children from two to ten years of age, mothers’ references to cognitions 
during interactions with their children at age 2 and 6 years predicted children’s understanding 
of false belief at 6 years (Ensor et al., 2014). Mothers’ cognitive references to their two-year-
olds predicted children’s later performance at age 10 years on the strange stories task. This 
finding was corroborated by another study that found mothers’ use of cognitive verbs 
predicted children’s performance on the strange stories task at age 7 (Adrian et al., 2007). 
 Nonetheless, it may be the case that associations between mothers’ references to 
internal states and children’s mind-understanding in middle childhood are merely residual 
effects of earlier maternal input. Mothers’ references to cognitions may be most critical 
during the third year of life in scaffolding children’s theory of mind (McElwain, Booth-
LaForce, & Wu, 2011). Maternal speech may foster children’s understanding of minds until 
they reach a certain level of theory of mind mastery (Lagattuta et al., 2015). As children reach 
middle childhood and increasingly spend more time with peers and other adults, experience 
with the minds of interlocutors other than the mother may become increasingly important 
(Lagattuta et al., 2015). Before a more definitive conclusion can be made, more research is 
needed to examine whether concurrent associations can be identified between maternal 
references to internal states and children’s understanding of higher-order false belief.  
4.1.4 Mothers’ use of internal state language: Considerations for research 
 There is substantial evidence indicating that maternal use of internal state language 
fosters children’s theory of mind in the preschool years. To examine mothers’ references to 
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inner states in the context of this thesis, however, there are certain methodological issues that 
must be considered. 
4.1.4.1 Context of assessment. Mothers’ use of internal state language may differ 
across different contexts of assessment. Although the majority of studies exploring maternal 
use of internal state language include observations of mother-child interactions, these 
associations were identified in a variety of different contexts. These include natural 
observations, joint activity tasks, free play or semi-structured observations (see Table 4.1).  
Observational studies of mother-child interactions within the home have strength in 
their representation of children’s typical conversational environments (Dunn, Brown, 
Slomkowski, et al., 1991). Although data from naturalistic studies may be assumed to 
represent children’s everyday conversational environments, the rate of mother’s spontaneous 
internal state language in such circumstances tends to be fairly low: within about 10% of 
utterances (Jenkins et al., 2003; Howard et al., 2008).  
In order to promote an interaction that may be rich in internal state language, a second 
method has been adopted in other research: Parents are asked to describe wordless picture 
books to their children, which elicit more frequent internal state references than everyday 
conversation (Howe, Rinaldi, & Recchia, 2010; Sabbagh & Callanan, 1998). Internal state 
language has also been transcribed during free-play sessions (Symons et al., 2006), and semi-
structured conversation tasks (Ontai & Thompson, 2008), yet rates of internal state language 
can be lower in these contexts compared to topic-sharing tasks such as wordless picture books 
(Hoff-Ginsberg, 1991). 
4.1.4.2 Referent. It is also noteworthy that within these contexts of assessment there 
may be different referents of internal state language. In natural studies observing families in 
the home and during free play sessions, internal state language referring to family members’ 
inner states has been reported (Dunn, Brown, & Beardsall, 1991; Dun, Brown, Slomkowski, 
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et al., 1991; Symons et al., 2002). However, there are notable differences in referents of 
internal state language examined in wordless-picture book tasks. Whilst some focused 
exclusively on mothers’ references to the inner states of the characters in the books (Racine et 
al., 2007), others appear to include references to the inner states of mothers and children as 
well as characters (Adrian et al., 2005, Ruffman et al., 2002, 2006). The added referents in 
wordless picture books - the characters in the story - are an essential difference between these 
contexts of internal state language measurement. Maternal references to cognitive states of 
characters may be important in fostering children’s understanding of minds in that children 
are encouraged to access a double perspective (Adrian et al., 2007, see also landscape of 
actions or landscape of consciousness, Bruner 1986) of the inner worlds of the characters in 
stories. It must, therefore, be noted that studies do not tend to differentiate between the 
mother’s comments on her own inner states, those of the child or the characters in the book. 
This presents an issue that must be clarified in coding schemes of internal state language. 
4.1.4.3 Coding schemes. Given that mothers’ use of different types of internal state 
language shifts as children develop, and the relative importance of each category at different 
time-points of development (Ruffman et al., 2002), an inclusive coding scheme that captures 
all relevant categories of internal state language is required. As previously highlighted in this 
review and in Table 4.1, the majority of previous studies focused nearly exclusively on coding 
mothers’ references to desires, emotions and cognitions. Although a coding scheme that 
mirrors these key categories of internal state language is required for comparison across 
studies of false belief, there is scope to expand these categories by considering other coding 
schemes used to examine mothers’ internal state language with other dimensions of children’s 
social understanding. Although a number of other coding schemes were considered for this 
investigation, including the widely used ‘mind-mindedness’ coding scheme (Meins, 
Fernyhough, Fradley, & Tuckey, 2001), this was not considered appropriate given interest in 
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internal state language terms mothers’ use, and that a coding scheme appropriate for coding 
for mothers’ speech to children of a variety of ages was required. 
Within the Cardiff Child Development Study, a coding scheme was developed for 
parental use of child-directed internal state language at the early infancy assessment (mean 
age 6.6 months; Roberts et al., 2013). Like many of the studies of mothers’ internal state 
language and children’s false belief understanding (Dunn, Brown, & Beardsall, 1991; Dunn, 
Brown, Slomkowski, et al., 1991; Ruffman, et al., 2002, 2006), the coding scheme used by 
Roberts and colleagues (2013) was based on Bartsch and Wellman’s (1995) belief-desire 
categorisation of theory of mind. 
In their original coding scheme, Bartsch and Wellman refined codes based on data 
from the Child Language Data Exchange System (the CHILDES). Spontaneous utterances 
from 10 English-speaking children were collected longitudinally between the ages of 1 and 6, 
resulting in over 200,000 speech samples. From this database, Bartsch and Wellman refined 
codes for toddlers’ references to belief, knowledge and desire, from their conceptualisation 
that belief and desire are fundamental to mind-understanding, and that this is underpinned by 
auxiliary constructs such as perception, physiological states, and emotional reactions; these 
lead to behaviour (see Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1 Bartsch and Wellman’s (1995, p. 7) simplified scheme for depicting belief-desire 
psychological reasoning. 
 
In Roberts and colleagues’ adaptation of Bartsch and Wellman’s (1995) scheme, the 
three auxiliary constructs, basic emotions/physiology, perception and action (renamed 
intentional agency) were incorporated into the scheme. Emotion and perception in particular, 
not only reflect these ‘supporting’ internal states proposed in Bartsch and Wellman’s model, 
but also draw on the internal states coded in another classic scheme by Beeghly, Bretherton 
and Mervis (1986, see Table 4.2); a scheme originally used to code children’s speech in a 
longitudinal study of 10, 13, 20, and 28 month-old-children from Boulder, Colorado, referred 
to as the Boulder Sample (Bretherton, McNew, & Beeghly-Smith 1981; Bretherton & 
Beeghly, 1982). This scheme has also informed categories coded in the false belief literature 
explored in this review (Adrian et al., 2005). 
 
See, hear, 
smell, touch, 
and feel 
Perception 
 
Basic 
Emotions/Physiology 
Love, like, enjoy, hate, 
dislike, fear, hunger, 
thirst, pain, arousal 
 
Believe, expect, know, 
doubt, suspect, imagine, 
suppose 
Belief 
 
Desire 
Want, desire, 
wish, hope, ought, 
should 
 
Action 
Hit, grab, travel, 
search, attend 
to 
 
Reaction 
Happiness, contentment, 
pleasure, anger, sadness, 
disappointment, surprise, 
puzzlement, guilt, dismay 
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Table 4.2  
Beeghly and colleagues’ (1986) internal state coding scheme and examples for coding 
maternal speech. 
Maternal internal state 
language category 
Description Verbatim example about child 
Sensory perception Sight, hearing, taste, smell, skin senses, 
including touch, pain, temperature 
“That feel soft?” 
“You heard voices.” 
Physiology Hunger, thirst, states of consciousness “You’re a hungry guy.” 
“You’re not very alert today.” 
Affect Joy, surprise, love, kindness, distress, 
disgust, anger, fear 
“You having fun?” 
“Don’t be angry.” 
Moral 
judgement/obligation 
Moral conformity or transgression, 
permission and obligation 
“You have to finish your snack.” 
“Should your feet be on the table?” 
Volition/ability Desire, need, ability to do something 
difficult 
“Is that too hard?” 
“You can do it.” 
Cognition Knowledge, memory, uncertainty, 
dreaming, reality versus pretending 
“Think hard!” 
“Do you know how to do it?” 
 
Despite Roberts and colleagues’ (2013) expansion of categories, there appears to be 
some scope to expand this scheme into more categories. In particular, the basic 
emotion/physiology category includes a broad range of types of internal state language. From 
the examples, it can be seen that this category includes basic emotions such as fear, as well as 
physiological states, including hunger, thirst, pain, and arousal and finally preferences, such 
as love, like, enjoy, hate, and dislike. Separation of these categories may be an important next 
step in adapting this coding scheme for a broader age range. 
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Table 4.3  
Roberts and colleagues’ (2013) internal state language coding scheme and examples for 
coding parent’s infant-directed speech, developed from Bartsch and Wellman (1995). 
Maternal internal state language 
category 
Examples Cohen’s K 
Basic Emotions/Physiology 
     Love, like, enjoy, hate, dislike, fear, 
hunger, thirst, pain, arousal. 
“Are you hungry?” “You like the pretty butterfly.” 
“Are you not enjoying this game?” “Don’t worry.” 
.90 
Perception 
     See, hear, taste, smell, feel 
“Can you see the cow?” “Can you feel the fluffy 
lamb?” 
.88 
Intentional Agency 
     Attempt, try, acting to achieve a goal, 
acting with intent, purposeful acting on 
an object 
“What are you after?” “Are you trying to grab 
them?” “Can you open this one next?” “Were you 
hitting it?” 
.77 
Desire 
     Want, desire, wish, hope, ought, 
should 
“Do you want to have a go?” “Are you hoping it’s 
something to eat?” 
.92 
Belief 
     Believe, know, suppose, expect, 
doubt, suspect 
“Do you think they’re slugs?” “Do you know what 
that is?” 
1.00 
 
The inclusion of intention was a novel addition to Roberts and colleagues’ (2013) 
coding scheme. Bartsch and Wellman noted that in order to understand desire, it must be 
distinguished from intention; an expression of desire represents a current internal state, yet 
plans of intention must have a future quality. Essentially, “…planning to enact one’s desires 
later clearly separates a notion of desire from actions to obtain the desire.” (1995, p. 89, 
italics added). Yet, this future planning quality may represent an important internal state that 
had been neglected in coding schemes of internal state language thus far, although features 
briefly in some coding schemes under the category volition (Slaughter, Peterson, & Carpenter, 
2008, 2009). Roberts and colleagues’ coding scheme marked a first step in the development 
of coding schemes incorporating intention as a separate category. However the reliability 
statistic for occurrence of terms for intentional agency in transcripts, although in the 
acceptable range, was somewhat lower than the reliability statistics for the other categories 
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(see Table 4.3), suggesting there may be scope for further development and clarification of 
this code. 
4.1.4.4 Identifying maternal correlates. The majority of studies presented in Table 
4.1 include maternal characteristics as correlates of their use of internal state language. These 
include measures of mothers’ talkativeness, typically measured by mean length of utterance or 
number of conversational turns (Adrian et al., 2005; Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, et al., 1991; 
Ensor & Hughes, 2008) and a measure of maternal education (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, et 
al., 1991; Ruffman et al., 2002, 2006). Some studies have included socio-economic status as a 
correlate of mothers’ internal state language (Howard et al., 2008; Symons et al., 2005, 2006). 
The specific influence of each of these factors on mothers’ production of internal state 
language remains unclear. Sociodemographic risk factors, including employment status, 
education, lone parenthood, crowding and type of family home are associated with children’s 
performance on theory of mind tasks (Cole & Mitchell, 2000; Hughes, Deater-Deckard, & 
Cutting, 1999; Pears & Moses, 2003). Although in one study, maternal education was 
associated with mothers’ use of internal state language (Adrian et al., 2005), this finding has 
not been consistent when other measures of sociodemographic risk are controlled (Dunn, 
Brown, Slomkowski, et al., 1991). It is possible that other sociodemographic risk factors may 
also influence mothers’ references to internal states. Having two parents in the home, a higher 
income and more stability may result in less parent stress and more time to discuss internal 
states with children (Pears & Moses, 2003). Rarely have all these covariates been controlled 
within a single study of mothers’ internal state language; therefore an investigation of these 
socio-demographic characteristics within the same model is warranted (de Rosnay & Hughes, 
2006). 
Socioeconomic hardship is associated with maternal behavioural problems (Grant et 
al., 2004), which in turn are associated with suboptimal parenting practices (Harold et al., 
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2011). Mothers’ histories of behavioural problems are associated with verbal and non-verbal 
dimensions of mother-child interaction, including fewer expressions of positive affect and less 
variable pitch contours related to the musical quality of infant directed speech (Hay et al., 
under review). It seems possible, therefore, that this stable personality trait (De Brito & 
Hodgins, 2009) may be associated with mothers’ conversations about internal states with their 
children.  
4.1.5 Aims of the study 
It is well-established that mothers’ references to internal states fosters children’s 
understanding of minds in the preschool years. In this review, certain issues have arisen in 
terms of exploring mothers’ use of internal state language in the next stage of this thesis. 
These include selection of an appropriate context and coding scheme to assess internal state 
language and identifying maternal characteristics that need to be controlled. These issues must 
be addressed before exploring mothers’ internal state language in the next chapter of this 
thesis (Chapter 5).  
4.1.5.1 To expand the CCDS internal state language coding scheme and assess its 
reliability. In the remainder of this chapter I will describe an expanded coding scheme for use 
at different time points in the longitudinal CCDS. The internal state language coding scheme 
used by the CCDS (Roberts et al., 2013) was selected as a starting point for this investigation. 
This coding scheme will be evaluated and expanded further into one that is appropriate for 
examination of adult language directed to children of various ages. In this thesis the expanded 
coding scheme will be applied to transcripts of video records of mother-child interactions 
when children were 6 months, 21 months and 6 to 7 years of age, using developmentally 
appropriate topic-sharing tasks to elicit mind-related language. This study will then examine 
the reliability of the expanded scheme. 
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4.1.5.2 To identify maternal characteristics associated with mothers’ use of 
internal state language at the middle childhood assessment. Maternal use of internal state 
language is typically investigated whilst controlling for maternal talkativeness and education 
(Adrian et al., 2005; Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski et al., 1991; Ensor & Hughes, 2008; Ruffman 
et al., 2002, 2006), however, other potential correlates such as maternal behavioural problems 
must also be investigated. Before examining the relationship between maternal internal state 
language use and children’s understanding of second-order false belief, maternal correlates 
that may also partially explain children’s understanding of minds must also be identified. 
4.1.5.3 To investigate the association between mothers’ references to internal 
states and children’s second-order false belief understanding in middle childhood. Few 
studies have explored family influences on children’s understanding of second-order false 
belief in middle childhood (Hughes, 2016). The final aim of this chapter, therefore, was to 
apply the expanded coding scheme and examine the association between mothers’ references 
to internal states in mother-firstborn interactions and firstborns’ second-order false belief 
understanding. This was conducted whilst controlling for correlates of mothers’ internal state 
language and of children’s second-order false belief understanding (child age and verbal IQ, 
Chapter 3). In the present study it was expected that, in line with previous work (Adrian et al., 
2007; Ensor et al., 2014), mothers’ references to cognitive states at the middle childhood 
assessment would be positively associated with children’s understanding of second-order 
false belief.  
 
4.2 Method 
The analyses presented in this chapter are based on Waves 1, 2, 4 and 6 of the Cardiff 
Child Development Study (Figure 4.2). A full description of the study design and procedure at 
each wave of assessment was presented in Chapter 2.  
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Figure 4.2 CCDS waves used in the present chapter. 
4.2.1 Participants 
This chapter focuses on families who took part in mother-child interaction tasks in the 
early infancy, toddlerhood, and middle childhood assessments. The progression of the sample 
from recruitment in pregnancy to data available for home assessments at each wave is 
presented in Appendix III. Figure 4.3 shows the progression of the sample from families seen 
in the home to available mother-child interaction data. The children’s mean ages at these 
assessments were 6.63 (SD = .88, range 5.13 – 11.58) at early infancy, 20.63 in toddlerhood 
(SD 2.19, range 17.00 – 29.60) and 83.85 (SD 4.70, range 70.00 – 104.00) in middle 
childhood. Of the 321 families who were seen after childbirth, 276 (86.0%), 238 (74.1%) and 
227 (70.7%) provided mother-child interaction data at the early infancy, toddlerhood and 
middle childhood assessments, respectively. 
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Figure 4.3. Derivation of the sample from families seen in the home to the participants 
assessed in this study (full attrition diagram in Appendix III). 
 
4.2.2 Measures 
4.2.2.1 Mother-child interaction. At early infancy, mothers and their firstborns were 
given a topic-sharing task using an activity board, a commercially available plastic toy with 
flaps that equates to a wordless picture book (Roberts et al., 2013). Pilot testing had shown 
that a toy rather than a book was more acceptable to parents. Similar wordless picture books 
have been used in previous research to elicit discourse between parents and their children 
(LaBounty et al., 2008; Ruffman, 2002). The activity board contained pictures of cartoon 
Early infancy assessment 
 
Of the families assessed: 
 
Of those assessed in the 
home: 
n= 12 (4.0%) fathers in 
interaction 
n= 1 (0.3%) data not 
useable 
n= 3 (1.0%) task not 
completed 
n= 6 (2.0%) no video 
technical error 
n= 2 (0.7%) not translated 
n= 1 (0.3%) significant 
developmental delay 
 
 
Of those assessed in the 
home: 
n= 14 (5.2%) fathers in 
interaction 
n= 8 (3.0%) no video 
technical error 
n= 5 (1.9%) task not 
completed 
n= 3 (1.1%) not translated 
n= 2 (0.7%) data not 
usable 
n= 1 (0.4%) significant 
developmental delay 
 
 
Of those assessed in the 
home: 
n= 26 (9.6%) 
fathers/other family 
member in interaction 
n= 14 (5.2%) task not 
completed 
n= 2 (0.7%) no video 
technical error 
n= 1 (0.4%) data not 
usable 
n= 1 (0.4%) significant 
developmental delay 
n= 1 (0.4%) withdrew data 
 
Of those assessed in the home, 
n= 238 (88.1%) families in 
sample of mother-child 
interaction at toddlerhood 
assessment 
 
Of those assessed in the home, 
n= 276 (91.7%) families in 
sample of mother-child 
interaction at early infancy 
assessment 
 
Of those assessed in the home, 
n= 227 (84.1%) families in 
sample of mother-child 
interaction at childhood 
assessment 
 
Middle childhood 
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animals from farm, safari, park, and under the sea themes on flaps that could be opened and 
closed (Figure 4.4). The activity board was presented to the mother and child as they were 
seated on the sofa or floor. Each mother was then asked to “Show (infant’s name) this toy. 
Take him/her through the pictures,” and was invited to speak in her preferred language. If 
mothers had questions or needed reassurance, they were told phrases such as “Show him/her 
the toy, as you would normally do.” This mother-infant interaction was video recorded for 2 
minutes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Activity board used in early infancy mother-child topic sharing task 
 
At the toddlerhood assessment, mothers and their firstborn toddlers were given a 
topic-sharing task using a teddy bear puzzle, a commercially available wooden puzzle of a 
bear, with six large removable pieces with handles (see Figure 4.5). When the pieces were 
correctly placed in the spaces, the puzzle would sing, “This is my tummy/ear/nose/foot/hand,” 
and when complete the puzzle would sing the nursery rhyme ‘Teddy Bear, Teddy Bear.’ The 
puzzle was presented to the mother and child after a short 10-second restraint task where the 
child was held back from playing with the puzzle. The mother was then asked to “Show 
(infant’s name) this toy as you normally would,” in her choice of language. This interaction 
was video recorded for 2 minutes. 
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Figure 4.5 Bear puzzle used in toddlerhood mother-child topic sharing task. 
 
In middle childhood, mother-firstborn dyads were observed as they played with an 
Etch-a-Sketch, a commercially available drawing game (see Figure 4.6). In this task the Etch-
a-Sketch was presented to the mother and child, who were assigned one dial of the toy each to 
use; one which creates vertical lines and the other that creates horizontal lines. By using their 
dials at the same time, it is possible to produce diagonal lines. The mother and child were first 
told, “Now we’d like you to draw a picture with your mum. You can use that dial (researcher 
points to dial). Your mum can use that dial (researcher points to dial). You have to work 
together to draw a picture.” After 1 minute of free play with the Etch-a-Sketch, the researcher 
said, “Now we’d like you to draw a picture of a house.”  The researcher gave the dyad 5 
minutes to attempt to draw a house (Stevenson-Hinde & Shouldice, 1995), which was video-
recorded. Interactions took place in the dyad’s choice of language. 
 
101 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Etch-a-Sketch used in middle childhood mother-child topic sharing task. 
 
The video recordings of the 2-minute activity board and teddy bear puzzle tasks, and 
the 5-minute Etch-a-Sketch house drawing task, were transcribed in 5 second segments (24 
segments per participant for activity board and teddy bear puzzle; 60 segments per participant 
per Etch-a-Sketch). Whilst the majority of interactions took place in English, trained 
translators transcribed interactions that took place in Welsh, Spanish, French, Dutch and 
German. Examples of mother-child interaction transcripts are presented in Appendix IV. 
4.2.2.1.1. Mothers’ Internal State Language. Each 5-second segment of speech was 
coded for mothers’ attributions made about the mind. The revised coding scheme was an 
expanded version of that used by Roberts and colleagues (2013). Internal state language was 
divided into seven categories: Perception, physiology, preference, intention, desire, emotion 
and cognition. The development of each category is detailed in the subsequent sections, and a 
summary of the overall coding scheme is presented in Table 4.4. All internal state terms 
coded from the transcripts are presented in Appendix V. 
For each topic sharing task, all internal state codes for interactions that were shorter 
than the assigned time for the task were prorated up to 24 segments of speech (2 minutes) for 
the activity board (8.7%) and teddy bear puzzle tasks (25.0%). For the Etch-a-Sketch task, the 
majority of mother-child interactions were below 5 minutes in length; therefore, to limit  
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Table 4.4  
The expanded CCDS internal state language coding scheme. 
Internal state 
category 
Internal state category description Maternal verbatim examples 
  Early infancy Toddlerhood Middle Childhood 
Perception Comments made about perception of an object using one 
of five senses, such as “see,” “hear,” “feel,” “taste,” 
“smell.” 
“Can you feel that?” 
“What can you see under the 
sea?” 
“Can you hear teddy talking to 
you?” 
“What can you see?” 
“What are you looking at?” 
“Do you see that?” 
Physiology Comments made about physical states and sensations, 
including “sleepy,” “pain,” “hot/cold (as in temperature),” 
“sick,” “comfy.” 
“Are you getting tired?” 
“You’re tired.” 
“Is that hurting you, is it?” - 
(No instances of physiology 
occurred) 
Preference Comments made about positive or negative judgements of 
an object, action or experience. Coding preference 
includes terms include “like,” “hate,” “love,” “favourite,” 
“enjoy,” “interest.” 
“You love your fishes.” 
“They’re your favourite kind, 
aren’t they?” 
 
“You like the orange bag don’t 
you?” 
“You like the tummy.” 
 “Will you like that?” 
Intention Comments made about present intentional actions that 
are goal-directed and future intentions. Includes “try,” 
“attempt,” “on purpose,” “mean to,” “going to.” 
“Oh, you’re gonna open it.” 
“Are you gonna try this one?” 
 
“Are you gonna try put the nose 
back in?” 
“Are you going to make him 
again?” 
“Are you going to spoil it?” 
“You trying to make a knocker?” 
Desire Comments made about longing for an object, action or 
experience. Desire terms include “want,” “wish,” “hope,” 
“fancy,” “rather,” “need (as in want).”  
“You wanna open that one?” 
“You’d rather eat it?” 
“Do you want to do it?” 
“Do you fancy that one?” 
“Oh, you want it right there, do 
you?” 
“Or do you wanna do some 
windows there?” 
Emotion Comments made about feeling states, including basic 
emotions “happy,” “sad,” “surprised,” “disgusted” and 
variations like “fed up,” “bored,” “glad,” “excited.”  
“You fed up there?” 
“You’re getting bored with this 
aren’t you?” 
“Don’t be upset.” 
“Don’t worry.” 
“You’re fed up aren’t you now.” 
“Happy with that?” 
 
Cognition Comments made about beliefs and knowledge. Also 
include general terms indicating other cognitive activity, 
such as “remember,” “imagine,” “pretend,” “understand.” 
“Do you remember Nelly the 
elephant?” 
“Do you think it’s a safari?” 
“Does it go that side, do you 
think?” 
“Can you work it out?” 
“You’ve worked out how to do 
it.” 
“Remember yours can only go 
up and down.” 
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prorating as much as possible, coding was limited to 3 minutes and shorter sessions (39.2%) 
were prorated up to 36 segments of speech. Prorated codes were computed by dividing all 
each code by the number of speech segments available, then multiplying by the number of 
speech segments of the full task length (24 for the 2 minute tasks, 36 for 3 the minute task).  
Each coding category was divided by number of minutes of task length to yield a rate-per-
minute of each code. 
4.2.2.1.1.1 Perception. There is a paucity of research in the role of perception in 
comparison to other internal states (Gopnik, Slaughter, & Meltzoff, 1994), particularly in 
studies of parent-child conversation. Perception featured in one of the original coding 
schemes of toddler internal state language (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982), which also aligned 
with specifications made by others at the time (Gearhart & Hall, 1979). Bretherton and 
Beeghly’s (1982) scheme included utterances regarding: sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, 
pain, temperature, and was adapted for the study of mother’s discourse (Beeghly et al., 1986).  
More recent studies have developed a novel scheme to code for perception in 
mothers’ conversations with their infants (Slaughter et al., 2008, 2009). In the scheme by 
Roberts and colleagues (2013), the mother’s saying “look” alone was an exclusion criterion 
as it appeared to be a term used, not to comment on the child’s internal state, but rather to 
capture and orient the child’s attention. Slaughter and colleagues took this further to identify 
two types of perception categories: (a) imperatives, which included such terms used to 
manage the child’s attention, or to request their involvement in mental activity (e.g., “Look at 
this!” “Touch those blocks”) and (b) declaratives, which include mothers’ comments on 
children’s current mental states (e.g., “Are you looking at the doggie?” “How does that 
feel?”). Imperative perceptual terms were consistently used by mothers towards their infants 
at 9, 12 and 15 months of age, yet use of declarative terms declined when infants mastered 
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joint visual attention, highlighting the importance of separating these perceptual terms 
(Slaughter et al., 2008). 
In the revised coding scheme, references to perception of objects, events or symbols 
(declaratives) using one of the five senses (see, hear, taste, feel and smell) were coded as 
references to internal states. Utterances commenting on the feeling of “hot,” and “cold,” (as 
in temperature) were also included. Utterances that involved commands or invitations to 
perceive, or to capture and engage attention (imperatives) were coded separately, but not 
included as references to internal states.  
4.2.2.1.1.2 Physiology. Like perception, physiology has also not featured in the 
majority of recent coding schemes, despite being a category included in Bretherton and 
colleagues’ schemes (1982, 1986). In this scheme, physiology was coded as utterances 
commenting on hunger, thirst, and states of consciousness, and it was identified that mothers’ 
use of physiological terms increases as children reach the second year of life, along with use 
of cognitive and moral/obligation terms (Beeghly et al., 1986). In more recent studies, 
physiology has rarely featured in coding schemes as an internal state category. Instead 
‘physical states’ have been coded separately from internal states in some schemes (Ruffman 
et al., 2002; Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006, 2008). These have included terms such as “cry,” 
“smile,” “laugh,” “giggle,” “hurt,” “in pain,” “sleepy,” “tired,” “hungry,” and “thirsty” 
(Ruffman et al., 2002). Although Ruffman and colleagues (2002) did not find that mothers’ 
talk about ‘physical states’ was associated with children’s performance on theory of mind 
tasks, this may be because physical manifestations of internal states, such as “yawn,” were 
grouped with internal states, such as “sleepy.”   
As little is understood about use of terms commenting on physical states, it was 
decided that the current coding scheme should expand upon the Roberts and colleagues’ 
(2013) scheme by separating physiology from emotion, thus returning to the 
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recommendations of Bretherton and Beeghly (1982). This adaptation was further supported 
by research indicating that both mothers’ and children’s references to physiology may not 
follow the same pattern over development as emotion (Beeghly et al., 1986). As it can be 
difficult to separate perception from physiology, in this scheme, perception strictly refers to 
the five senses. Physiology however, refers to states of consciousness, such as “sleepy,” 
“alert,” “dopey, “hungry,” and “thirsty.” Utterances that comment on the external 
manifestations of these states, such as “giggle,” “yawn,” “sleeping,” and “cry,” were not 
coded as references to internal states.  
4.2.2.1.1.3 Preference. Like physiology, preferences were also extracted from Roberts 
and colleagues’ (2013) original scheme and coded separately from emotions. Despite some 
previous coding schemes including preferences with emotion categories (Jenkins et al., 
2003), more recently preferences have been extracted as a separate category of interest 
(Recchia & Howe, 2008). Given that the frequency of children’s use of emotion and 
preference-related terms differ across ages (Recchia & Howe, 2008), this provides good 
justification for their separation. In the present scheme, therefore, terms indicating the child’s 
preferences such as “like,” “love,” “hate,” “dislike” were coded. “Like” is coded only when 
denoting preferences, such as, “Do you like this game?” When “like” is used in idiomatic 
phrases, such as, “Shall we like, do it this way?” or for comparatives, “This game is like the 
one you have at Granny’s house,” these were not coded. Utterances indicating a positive or 
negative judgement on an object, activity or experience, such as, “Are you enjoying this 
game?” or, “You’re more interested in chewing it, aren’t you?” were coded as preferences. 
4.2.2.1.1.4 Intention. The criteria for coding intentions were based on the definitions 
used by Roberts and colleagues (2013), where utterances commenting on children’s attempts 
to achieve a goal, trying or purposeful action were coded. In the present scheme, this 
definition was clarified and made more conservative by drawing upon definitions of the two 
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faces of intention set forth by Bratman (1984). The first is present-directed intention, where 
present actions are seen to be intending to reach a current goal, e.g., “Are you trying to stroke 
the teddy?” The second face of intention is future-directed intention, involving not a present 
intentional act, but an intention to act later, e.g., “Are you going to stroke the teddy next?”  
Therefore, within the expanded coding scheme, both present intentional actions and 
future intentions were coded. Intention terms included “try,” “attempt,” “plan,” “on purpose,” 
“mean to,” “intend to,” “going to.” Comments made about children’s mismatched actions and 
intentions were also coded, “You didn’t mean to do that, did you?” “Did you do that by 
accident?” Furthermore, in line with Slaughter and colleagues’ (2008) distinctions between 
imperatives and declaratives, utterances that simply provide commentary on what the child is 
currently doing, such as, “Are you putting that in there?” “What are you doing?” or inviting 
the child to attempt a goal, such as, “try this,” and, “Can you find his nose?” were not coded. 
4.2.2.1.1.5 Desire. Terms coded for desire were predominantly in line with Bartsch 
and Wellman’s (1995) criteria, including utterances that commented on the child’s longing to 
“…obtain an object, engage in an action, or experience a state of affairs” (p. 67). Desire terms 
included variations of “want,” “wish,” “hope,” “love (to),” “like (to),” “fancy,” “prefer,” and, 
“rather.” Phrases that also commenting on the child’s desire such as, “You’re after that, aren’t 
you?” and, “You were dying to get to that a minute ago” were also coded. References to not 
wanting were also included. Instances where key terms were used in idiomatic phrases, such 
as, “wish upon a star” were not coded.  
According to Bartsch and Wellman (1995) and Ruffman and colleagues (2002), 
statements of desire without an object, e.g., “Do you wanna?” and ‘want-as-request’ 
utterances, “I want a cookie” should be excluded. In the present coding scheme however, a 
more inclusive approach was adopted. Given that it is impossible to determine whether such 
comments are mind-related or not, excluding these terms based on making such assumptions 
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could be problematic (Brown et al., 1996). Therefore all instances of desire terms were 
included in this scheme. 
Children’s utterances of “need” can denote a desire; however in the case of adults, 
“need” refers “…prototypically to objects required or necessary for some function, or 
compulsory because of some rule or convention, not merely desired.” (Bartsch & Wellman, 
1995, p. 93). Thus, in the present coding scheme, unless clearly used to denote a desire, 
“need”, was coded separately amongst other similar terms such as, “supposed to,” “ought to,” 
and, “must.” These were not included as internal states, but noted terms indicating obligation 
and adherence to rules, which may be of interest in their own right. 
4.2.2.1.1.6 Emotion. The coding for emotion was in line with the original coding 
schemes: Bretherton and colleagues’ (1982, 1986) coding for affect and Bartsch and 
Wellman’s (1995) categorisation within their belief-desire reasoning model. In contrast to 
Roberts and colleagues’ original scheme, physiology and preference were removed, so the 
emotion category now only included references to feeling states. Terms coded as emotion 
included variations of basic emotions: “happy,” “sad,” “angry,” “surprised,” “scared” and 
“disgust” and also included other feeling states, such as “bored,” “embarrassed,” “jealous,” 
and “lonely.” Phrases that indicate feeling states such as “fed up” or “make a fuss” were 
included. Instances were excluded when feeling terms were included in non-mind-related 
phrases such as “Happy birthday”. Utterances were only coded as emotion if they were direct 
comments on the internal state; comments on behaviour that refer to expressions of emotional 
states such as “cry,” “laugh,” “smile,” were not included in this scheme.  
4.2.2.1.1.7 Cognition. Cognition represented a broad category of terms referring to 
beliefs and mental activity. These included “think” and “know” (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995), 
and also various modulations of assertion, e.g., “guess,” “figure,” “suppose,” and other 
cognitive activity, such as “remember,” “understand,” “expect,” “imagine,” “forget,” and 
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“pretend” (Bretherton et al., 1982; 1986). Any utterances including contrastives (e.g., “I 
thought that was a dog, but it is a bear.”) were also noted and highlighted within this 
category. References to not knowing or believing were also included.  
There has been some contention in previous research concerning the inclusion of 
conversational uses of cognitive verbs, such as, “You know what?” and, “I dunno,” which 
have been excluded in some past research due to their ambiguity (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; 
Shatz, Wellman, & Silber, 1983).  However, such ambiguous phrases were included within 
the present coding scheme, based on the argument that it is impossible to determine if such 
conversational devices are mind-related or not, and excluding these terms based on this 
assumption could be problematic (Brown et al., 1996). Additionally, it has been demonstrated 
that there is no difference between such ambiguous terms and genuine terms in the strength 
of prediction to false belief understanding (Hughes & Dunn, 1998).  
4.2.2.1.1.8 Other considerations. There are some additional considerations that must 
be noted. The first is that multiple categories of internal state language may be present within 
a single utterance, for example, “You reckon you wanna play with the bear?” would be coded 
as both cognition and desire. The second consideration is the referent of internal state 
language. In this scheme, mothers’ references to her own and the child’s inner states are 
reported separately. This is a notable change from the original scheme, which focused 
exclusively on mothers’ references to the child’s internal states. This change will expand the 
ways in which internal state language can be examined. Thirdly, the pronouns used in internal 
state utterances were also noted, as, particularly for adult speech, comments may be made 
about children’s internal states directly to the child, “Are you happy?”; referring to first 
person plural with the child, “Are we happy?”; or they may be indirectly describing 
children’s internal states, “He is happy.” Finally, when coding both mother and child speech 
in the same interaction, unlike the recommendations set out by Shatz and colleagues (1983) 
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repetitions of internal state language are included in this scheme. This is due to the reasoning 
that excluding repeated terms could be too conservative and may underestimate use of 
internal state language.   
4.2.2.1.1.9 Creating total scores. Instances of internal state language were counted to 
form frequency counts for each category, total frequency according to referent, (mother’s 
own internal states or child’s internal states), and overall total frequency of references to 
internal states. Mothers’ internal state language was also coded for variety of terms within 
each category. For example, in four instances of references to cognition: “think”, “thought”, 
“know” and “remember”, the frequency count for cognitive terms was 4, but the variety count 
was 3.  
4.2.2.1.2 Mothers’ talkativeness. Mothers’ talkativeness during the early infancy, 
toddlerhood and middle childhood assessments was computed by dividing the number of 5-
second segments containing speech by total number of 5-second segments in each task. 
Mothers were therefore given proportional talkativeness scores between 0 and 1. This 
measurement of talkativeness has been validated by Audacity voice analysis software in a 
subsample of cases r(88) = .72, p < .001 (Roberts et al., 2013). The mean score for maternal 
talkativeness was .87 (SD = .18) during the early infancy task, .76 (SD = .18) during the 
toddlerhood task, and .82 (SD = .12) during the middle childhood task. 
4.2.2.1.3 Missing mother-child interaction data. Little’s Missing Completely At 
Random (MCAR) test was used to establish if there were any patterns in missing data in the 
maternal talkativeness scores and use of internal state language. Little’s MCAR test indicated 
random patterns of missing data for available maternal talkativeness χ2(9) = 13.12, p = .16 
and internal state language scores χ2(9) = 8.80, p = .46 across the three waves of assessment. 
Therefore, where talkativeness and internal state language scores were missing, scores were 
imputed from the mother’s most recent previous assessment where language data from a 
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mother-child interaction task was available. The scores were imputed using unstandardized 
predicted scores from SPSS regression analyses.  The final sample size for mother-child 
interaction data was therefore 276 (86.0% of those seen after childbirth), where 13.8% were 
imputed scores for the toddlerhood assessment and 17.8% were imputed scores for the middle 
childhood assessment. 
4.2.2.2 Maternal correlates of internal state language. 
4.2.2.2.1 Maternal productive language. The Wechsler Test of Adult Reading 
(WTAR; Wechsler, 2001) was used to assess adults’ ability to recognise and pronounce 
words with irregular phonological properties, and was developed for use as an estimate 
mothers’ intellectual and memory abilities. Data were available for 197 (71.4%) of mothers 
with interaction data. Each mothers’ score was calculated by age-normalising the data to 
produce a standardised score. The mean score for mothers’ productive language was 98.04 
(SD = 14.26) and ranged from 55 to 122. 
4.2.2.2.2 Sociodemographic risk. See Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2.3, page 30. 
4.2.2.2.3 Maternal behavioural problems. Maternal behavioural problems were 
assessed using seven DSM-IV items for conduct problems (disobedience, anger, stealing, 
dishonesty, truancy and vandalism) listed in the screening questionnaire for the International 
Personality Disorder Examination (IPDE; Loranger et al., 1994). Five symptoms of ADHD 
from the mother’s prenatal self-report questionnaire called ‘What I Was Like as a Child’ were 
combined with the items for conduct problems to create a composite variable of mothers’ 
history of behavioural problems. This composite variable was created by summing the scores 
for each set of symptoms, with missing items prorated. This had an internal consistency for 
mothers of α = .82 (Hay et al., under review). Additional descriptive data are presented in 
Appendix VI.  
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4.2.2.3 Second-order false belief. In this task, children were told a second-order false 
belief story that was enacted with plastic Playmobil figures by the experimenter. Children had 
to answer all belief, justification and comprehension questions correctly to be classified as 
passing second-order false belief with full comprehension. Excellent reliability was 
established for passing this task (Kappa coefficient 1.00). Full details of this task are 
described in Chapter 3, page 59. Within the sample of children who had mother-child 
interaction data available, 227 (82.2%) completed the second-order false belief task. 
4.2.2.4 Verbal IQ. Children’s vocabulary knowledge was assessed using the British 
Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; Dunn et al., 1982). Within the sample of children who had 
mother-child interaction data available, 229 (83.0%) completed the verbal IQ assessment. 
The mean score for verbal IQ was 99.74 (SD = 11.75), and the average age children in the 
sample were equivalent to was 84.20 months (SD = 14.52) and ranged from 57 to 150 
months. 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Establishing reliability of the internal state language coding scheme. An 
independent observer coded maternal use of internal state language in 70 cases (25.4% of 
transcripts) from the early infancy assessment, 51 cases (21.4% of transcripts) from the 
toddlerhood assessment, and 68 cases (30.0% of transcripts) from the middle childhood 
assessment. Excellent inter-rater reliability was established at all waves of assessment. The 
inter-class correlations are presented in Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5  
Categories for coding internal state language; reliability analysis across three waves of 
assessment. 
  Intra-class correlations for maternal internal state language 
  Time of assessment 
  Early Infancy Toddlerhood Middle Childhood 
References to 
child 
Perception .98 .97 1.00 
Physiology 1.00  1.00 a 1.00 a 
Preference .98 .98 1.00 
Intention .99 1.00 .98 
Desire 1.00 .99 .97 
Emotion 1.00 a .94 1.00 
Cognition .94 .98 .99 
References to 
self 
Perception 1.00 a .88 .93 
Physiology 1.00 a 1.00 a 1.00 a 
Preference 1.00 a 1.00 .92 
Intention 1.00 a 1.00 a .97 
Desire 1.00 a 1.00 a .89 
Emotion 1.00 a 1.00 a 1.00 a 
Cognition .98 .91 .99 
 Note. Reliability statistics represent Cohen’s alphas. a Reliability analysis not calculable as 
zero variance in scores. Agreement is therefore 1.00.  
 
4.3.2 Descriptive data for maternal use of internal state language 
4.3.2.1 Overall frequency at three waves of assessment. The majority of mothers 
produced at least one reference to their children’s or their own internal states (80.4%, 84.4% 
and 91.7% at the early infancy, toddlerhood and middle childhood interactions, respectively). 
The mean frequencies of internal state language across the three time-points are displayed in 
Figure 4.7. Mothers referred to the inner states of the child significantly more than to their 
own inner states, at the early infancy assessment t(275) = 16.74. p < .001, toddlerhood 
assessment t(275) = 15.82, p <.001, and the middle childhood assessment t(275) = 12.37, p < 
.001. A repeated-measures ANOVA indicated a significant difference in frequency of 
mothers’ overall use of internal state language across the three time-points F(2,550) = 9.08, p 
< .001, where pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction indicated mothers’ used 
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significantly less internal state language at the toddlerhood assessment than the early infancy 
and middle childhood assessments (ps < .01) 
  
Figure 4.7. Frequency of maternal use of child-directed and self-directed internal state 
language across three waves of assessment. Means are based on rate per minute, error bars 
are ± SE of the mean. 
 
4.3.1.2 Individual categories of internal state language. The range and mean rates 
for frequency of each category at the early infancy, toddlerhood and middle childhood 
assessments are presented in Table 4.6. Table 4.7 shows both frequency and variety of 
mothers’ internal state language categories broken down by references to the child’s inner 
states, and references to her own inner states. Perception was the most common occurring 
category during the early infancy interaction, desire at the early toddler interaction, and 
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cognition at the middle childhood interaction. This is further demonstrated by an illustration 
of the relative frequency of each internal state language category across the three time-points 
in Figure 4.8.  
 
Table 4.6  
Range, means and standard deviations for overall frequencies (rate per minute) of mothers’ 
references to internal states at each wave of assessment. 
Internal state language 
category 
Early infancy Toddlerhood Middle Childhood 
Range Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) 
Perception .00 – 6.00 .61 (.96) .00 – 2.12 .15 .(32) .00 – 1.92 .10 (.21) 
Physiology .00 – 1.33 .03 (.14) .00 – 1.00 .01 (.07) .00 – .41 .01 (.04) 
Preference .00 – 2.00 .24 (.39) .00 – 1.57 .09 (.24) .00 – .43 .02 (.07) 
Intention .00 – 2.67 .16 (.38) .00 – 2.40 .29 (.42) .00 – 3.33 .49 (.52) 
Desire .00 – 3.00 .41 (.55) .00 – 3.00 .38 (.50) .00 – 2.67 .43 (.44) 
Emotion .00 – 1.00 .02 (.13) .00 – 1.00 .03 (.14) .00 - .92 .02 (.08) 
Cognition .00 – 3.00 .20 (.40) .00 – 5.00 .43 (.62) .00 – 6.95 .70 (.76) 
Total internal state 
language about child 
.00 – 6.50 1.53 (1.41) .00 – 5.50 1.16 (1.00) .00 – 6.33 1.24 (.96) 
Total internal state 
language to self 
.00 – 2.50 .14 (.33) .00 – 2.57 .21 (.34) .00 – 3.43 .52 (.53) 
Total internal state 
language 
.00 – 7.00 1.68 (1.50) .00 – 6.50 1.38 (1.12) .00 – 7.33 1.76 (1.21) 
Note. N = 276. 
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Table 4.7  
Means and standard deviations for frequency and variety of maternal internal state language categories (rate per minute) directed to child and 
about self at each wave of assessment.
Mothers’ 
references to 
child’s internal 
states 
Wave of assessment Mothers’ 
references to 
own internal 
states 
Wave of assessment 
Early infancy 
assessment 
Toddlerhood 
assessment 
Middle Childhood 
assessment 
Early infancy 
assessment 
Toddlerhood 
assessment 
Middle Childhood 
assessment 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Perception 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.60 
.63 
 
.95 
.77 
 
.13 
.09 
 
.29 
.20 
 
.03 
.03 
 
.10 
.10 
Perception 
  Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.01 
.02 
 
.07 
.15 
 
.02 
.02 
 
.10 
.09 
 
.06 
.05 
 
.16 
.11 
Physiology 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.03 
.05 
 
.14 
.24 
 
.01 
.01 
 
.07 
.05 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
Physiology 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.04 
.04 
Preference 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.24 
.38 
 
.39 
.60 
 
.08 
.07 
 
.23 
.19 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.03 
.03 
Preference 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.00 
.01 
 
.05 
.08 
 
.01 
.01 
 
.05 
.05 
 
.02 
.02 
 
.07 
.07 
Intention 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.16 
.21 
 
.38 
.43 
 
.29 
.20 
 
.42 
.26 
 
.41 
.23 
 
.45 
.19 
Intention 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.03 
.06 
 
.01 
.01 
 
.05 
.05 
 
.06 
.05 
 
.16 
.11 
Desire 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.40 
.50 
 
.54 
.52 
 
.37 
.23 
 
.50 
.25 
 
.40 
.24 
 
.42 
.21 
Desire 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.01 
.01 
 
.05 
.10 
 
.01 
.01 
 
.05 
.05 
 
.02 
.01 
 
.07 
.06 
Emotion 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.02 
.03 
 
.13 
.18 
 
.03 
.03 
 
.14 
.12 
 
.02 
.02 
 
.08 
.08 
Emotion 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
Cognition 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.08 
.14 
 
.23 
.37 
 
.25 
.17 
 
.48 
.28 
 
.35 
.25 
 
.47 
.28 
Cognition 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.12 
.21 
 
.29 
.46 
 
.18 
.15 
 
.30 
.23 
 
.35 
.25 
 
.43 
.25 
116 
 
Figure 4.8 Relative frequencies of maternal child-directed internal state language categories 
across three waves of assessment. 
 
4.3.3 Maternal correlates of language in mother-child interaction. 
 Table 4.8 summarises associations between measures of maternal language and all 
potential maternal covariates identified in section 4.1.4.4, page 94. As maternal talkativeness 
was measured within the same context of assessment as internal state language, these 
predictors of these aspects of maternal language were investigated separately. 
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Table 4.8  
Intercorrelations among mothers’ language during the mother-child interaction task and 
maternal risk factors.  
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1. Early infancy maternal 
talkativeness 
-         
2. Early infancy maternal 
internal state language 
.36** 
(276) 
-        
3. Toddlerhood maternal 
talkativeness 
.04 
(276) 
.16** 
(276) 
-       
4. Toddlerhood internal state 
language 
.14* 
(276) 
.33** 
(276) 
.36** 
(276) 
-      
5. Middle childhood maternal 
talkativeness 
.14* 
(276) 
.18** 
(276) 
.06 
(276) 
.12 
(276) 
-     
6. Middle childhood maternal 
internal state language 
.03 
(276) 
.29** 
(276) 
.16* 
(276) 
.23** 
(276) 
.39** 
(276) 
-    
7. Maternal productive 
language 
.06 
(197) 
.11 
(197) 
.08 
(197) 
.15* 
(197) 
.04 
(197) 
.14* 
(197) 
-   
8. Maternal adversity score  -.23** 
(276) 
-.32** 
(276) 
-.06 
(276) 
-.15* 
(276) 
-.13* 
(276) 
-.18** 
(276) 
-.61** 
(197) 
-  
9. Maternal behavioural 
problems 
-.14* 
(276) 
-.18** 
(276) 
-.07 
(298) 
-.09 
(276) 
-.13* 
(276) 
-.19** 
(276) 
-.46** 
(197) 
.46** 
(276) 
- 
Mean  
(SD) 
.87 
(.18) 
1.68 
(1.50) 
.76 
(.18) 
1.38 
(1.12) 
.82 
(.12) 
1.76 
(1.21) 
98.04 
(14.26) 
-.11 
(.95) 
5.43 
(4.04) 
Note. *p < .05, ** p < .01, number of participants is shown in brackets below the correlation. 
 
Sociodemographic adversity and maternal history of behavioural problems were 
found to be negatively associated with mothers’ talkativeness scores at the early infancy and 
middle childhood assessments. Therefore these correlates were entered into a logistic 
regression analysis to establish their contribution towards maternal talkativeness at each wave 
of assessment. When entered into the same model, only sociodemographic adversity 
predicted maternal talkativeness at the early infancy assessment (ß = -.04, p < .10, see Table 
4.9). 
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Table 4.9  
Prediction of mothers’ talkativeness and use of internal state language at three waves of assessment from maternal risk factors. 
Note.  The coefficients presented are those obtained in the final models: Model 1: F(2, 273) = 7.72, p < .001, R2 = .07, Model 2: F(2, 273) = .47, 
p = .47, Model 3: F(2, 273) = 3.25, p < .05, Model 4: F(2, 273) = 15.89, p < .001, Model 5: F(2, 273) = 3.16, p < .05, Model 6: F(3, 193) =3.97, 
p < .01. 
ᶧp < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
Maternal talkativeness 
Early infancy (model 1) Toddlerhood (model 2) Middle Childhood (model 3) 
Predictor ΔR2 β Predictor ΔR2 β Predictor ΔR2 β 
 .05***   .01   .02*  
Maternal adversity score 
Maternal behavioural problems 
 -.04** 
-.00 
Maternal adversity score 
Maternal behavioural problems 
 -.01 
.00 
Maternal adversity score 
Maternal behavioural     
problems 
 -.01 
.00 
Maternal internal state language 
Early infancy (model 4) Toddlerhood (model 5) Middle Childhood (model 6) 
Predictor ΔR2 β Predictor ΔR2 β Predictor ΔR2 β 
 .10***   .02*   .06**  
Maternal adversity score 
Maternal behavioural problems 
 -.47*** 
-.02 
Maternal adversity score  
Maternal behavioural problems 
 -.14* 
-.01 
Maternal productive language 
Maternal adversity score 
Maternal behavioural     
problems 
 .00 
-.13 
-.07* 
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Sociodemographic adversity and mothers’ history of behaviour problems were also 
negatively associated with maternal internal state language at all time-points. Maternal 
productive language was also positively associated with references to internal states at the 
middle childhood assessment. In logistic regression analyses, these correlates were entered 
into the model. Only sociodemographic risk predicted mothers’ use of internal state language 
at the early infancy (ß = -.47) and toddlerhood (ß = -.14) assessments (ps < .05). Mothers’ 
history of behavioural problems significantly and negatively predicted maternal references to 
inner states at the middle childhood assessment (ß = -.07, p <.05, see Table 4.9).  
4.3.4 Is maternal language related to children’s second-order false belief understanding 
in middle childhood?  
 Seventy children (30.8%) passed the second-order false belief task with full 
comprehension in the sample used in this investigation. No features of mothers’ language at 
the early infancy and toddlerhood assessments were associated with children’s passing of 
second-order false belief. Similarly, mothers’ talkativeness at the middle childhood 
assessment was unrelated to children’s passing of second-order false belief questions. 
Therefore, all subsequent analysis focused on maternal use of internal state language at the 
middle childhood assessment. Table 4.10 summarises associations between mothers’ use of 
internal state language and children’s understanding of second-order false belief questions. 
Mothers’ frequency and variety of cognitive terms, both in referring to the cognitive states of 
the child and of herself, were positively associated with firstborns’ passing of the second-
order false belief questions. 
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Table 4.10  
Correlations between maternal internal state language terms (frequency and variety) at the 
middle childhood assessment and firstborn second-order false belief understanding with full 
comprehension. 
Mothers’ references to child’s internal states Mothers’ references to own internal states 
Internal state term Second-order false 
belief understanding 
Internal state term Second-order false 
belief understanding 
Perception  Frequency  
Variety 
.03 
.03 
Perception  Frequency 
Variety 
-.07 
-.07 
Physiology Frequency 
Variety 
. a 
. a 
Physiology 
 
Frequency 
Variety 
.05 
.05 
Preference Frequency 
Variety 
-.06 
-.06 
Preference Frequency 
Variety 
.02 
.02 
Intention Frequency 
Variety 
-.03 
-.04 
Intention Frequency 
Variety 
.04 
.03 
Desire Frequency 
Variety 
.03 
-.02 
Desire Frequency 
Variety 
.12ᶧ 
.11ᶧ 
Emotion Frequency 
Variety 
.07 
.07 
Emotion  Frequency 
Variety 
. a 
. a 
Cognition  Frequency 
Variety 
.14* 
.15* 
Cognition Frequency 
Variety 
.17** 
.15* 
      
Total 
Frequency 
Variety 
.08 
.07 
Total 
Frequency 
Variety 
.15* 
.13* 
Note. N = 227. a No occurrence of internal state language term, ᶧp< .10, *p< .05, **p< .01. 
 
Logistic regression analyses were used to investigate the association between 
maternal references to cognition and children’s passing of second-order false belief questions 
further. The four models presented in Table 4.11 assessed the prediction of firstborns’ 
passing of second-order false belief questions from mothers’ references to her own and to her 
child’s cognitive states in terms of variety and frequency. In each model, known covariates of 
passing second-order false belief (Chapter 3) firstborn age and verbal IQ, were entered. 
Maternal behavioural problems was entered at the second step as an identified covariate of 
maternal internal state language. Mothers’ cognitive references were entered at the final step 
of each model.  
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Mothers’ references to the child’s cognitive states was explored in models 1 and 2. In 
model 1, the frequency of mothers’ references to the child’s cognitive states represented a 
significant final step in explaining children’s second-order false belief understanding with 
full comprehension χ2 (1) = 5.34, p < .05, Wald statistic = 4.94, p <.05, OR = 1.97, 95% 
CI(1.09 – 3.57), and the overall model was significant χ2 (4) = 22.48, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 
=.13. Mothers’ variety of references to the child’s cognitive states also predicted a significant 
advantage on firstborns’ second-order false belief, representing a significant final step in 
model 2 χ2 (1) = 5.75, p < .05, Wald statistic = 5.62, p <.05, OR = 3.24, 95% CI(1.23 – 8.55), 
final model χ2 (4) = 22.89, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .14 (Table 4.11). 
In models 3 and 4, mothers’ references to her own cognitive states were investigated 
as predictors of firstborns’ second-order false belief understanding. Mothers’ frequency of 
references to her own cognitive states significantly predicted children’s passing of second-
order false belief, with a significant final step χ2 (1) = 7.47, p < .01, Wald statistic = 7.12, p 
<.01, OR = 2.42, 95% CI(1.26-4.62), final model χ2 (4) = 24.61, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 
=.15. Mothers’ variety of references to her own cognitive states also predicted children’s 
second-order false belief understanding, with a significant final step χ2 (1) = 4.66, p < .05, 
Wald statistic= 4.52, p <.05, OR = 3.40, 95% CI(1.10 – 10.49), final model χ2 (4) = 21.78, p < 
.001, Nagelkerke R2 = .13 (Table 4.11). 
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Table 4.11  
Prediction of children’s passing of second-order false belief with full comprehension from mothers’ references to cognitive states.  
Mothers’ references to child’s cognitive states 
Model 1 Model 2 
Predictor R2 B SE 
Wald 
χ2 
eβ 
95% CI for 
OR 
Predictor R2 B SE 
Wald 
χ2 
eβ 
95% CI for 
OR 
Step 1 .10***      Step 1 .10***      
   Constant  -15.13 3.81 15.80 .00     Constant  -15.10 3.79 15.87 .00  
   Firstborn age  .12** .04 9.68 1.13 1.05 – 1.21    Firstborn age  .12** .04 9.59 1.12 1.04 – 1.21 
   Verbal IQ  .04** .02 8.87 1.05 1.02 – 1.08    Verbal IQ  .04** .02 8.88 1.05 1.02 – 1.08 
Step 2 .10***      Step 2 .10***      
   Mothers’ behavioural  
problems 
 -.03 .04 .97 .49 .90 – 1.05    Mothers’ behavioural  
problems 
 -.03 .04 .45 .97 .90 – 1.05 
Step 3 .13***      Step 3 .14***      
   Frequency of 
cognitive references 
 .68* .31 4.94 1.97 1.08 – 3.57    Variety of cognitive 
references 
 1.18* .50 5.62 3.24 1.23 – 8.55 
Mothers’ references to own cognitive states 
Model 3 Model 4 
Predictor R2 B SE 
Wald 
χ2 
eβ 
95% CI for 
OR 
Predictor R2 B SE 
Wald 
χ2 
eβ 
95% CI for 
OR 
Step 1 .10***      Step 1 .10***      
   Constant  -15.40 3.86 15.94 .00     Constant  -14.36 3.75 14.70 .00  
   Firstborn age  .12** .04 9.66 1.13 1.05 – 1.21    Firstborn age  .11** .04 8.78 1.12 1.04 – 1.20 
   Verbal IQ  .05** .02 9.32 1.05 1.02 – 1.08    Verbal IQ  .04** .02 8.03 1.04 1.01 – 1.07 
Step 2 .10***      Step 2 .10***      
   Mothers’ behavioural  
problems 
 -.03 .04 .41 .97 .90 – 1.06    Mothers’ behavioural  
problems 
 -.03 .04 .50 .97 .90 – 1.05 
Step 3 .15***      Step 3 .13***      
   Frequency of 
cognitive references 
 .88 ** .33 7.12 2.42 1.26 – 4.62    Variety of cognitive 
references 
 1.22 .58 4.52 3.40 1.10 – 10.49 
Note. N = 224. The coefficients presented are those obtained in the final models. R2 represents Nagelkerke statistic. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p 
<.001.
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4.4 Discussion 
The primary aim of this chapter was to expand the internal state language coding 
scheme previously used in the Cardiff Child Development Study (Roberts et al., 2013). 
Following the development of this scheme I conducted an initial exploration of mothers’ use 
of child-directed internal state language during early infancy, toddlerhood and middle 
childhood. Secondly, I identified maternal correlates of internal state language use. Thirdly 
and finally, I investigated the hypothesis that mothers’ references to cognitive states during a 
topic-sharing task in middle childhood would predict firstborns’ second-order false belief 
understanding at the same time-point of assessment. 
4.4.1 Expanding the internal state language coding scheme used by the Cardiff Child 
Development Study 
In a previous study, the original internal state language coding scheme was used to 
explore mothers’ child-directed speech in the early infancy assessment (Roberts et al., 2013); 
this was based on Bartsch and Wellman’s (1995) categorisation of theory of mind and 
consisted of five categories: basic emotions/physiology, perception, intentional agency, 
desire and belief. This coding scheme expanded on the majority of previous schemes used in 
moderately sized, longitudinal studies that were limited to desire, emotion and belief (Ensor 
& Hughes, 2008; LaBounty et al., 2008). However, there were three main issues that needed 
to be addressed: (1) there was scope to expand the internal state language categories beyond 
the five already identified (2) the coding scheme lacked detailed descriptions and examples 
that would enable the coding scheme to be applied to adult language towards children of 
different ages; and (3) despite acceptable inter-rater reliability, the novel category intentional 
agency required further development. 
The adapted coding scheme for internal state language consisted of seven categories: 
perception, physiology, preference, intention, desire, emotion and cognition. The two new 
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categories, physiology and preference, were added for several reasons. In the original internal 
state language coding scheme, these terms were included within the basic 
emotion/physiology category. However, studies have suggested that, over time, the pattern of 
mothers’ use physiology and preference-related terms differs from terms commenting on 
children’s emotions (e.g., Beeghly et al., 1986; Recchia & Howe, 2008), providing strong 
justification for the separation of these categories. 
All original and new categories in the present coding scheme were described in detail 
in section 4.2.2.1.1, page 101, in the form of a manual to support the basic descriptions in 
Table 4.4. Each code was refined and clarified, based on recommendations from original and 
recent coding schemes reviewed in the introduction. Particular focus was given to the 
category intention, which was developed using Bratman’s (1984) definitions of the two faces 
of intention. With this adapted coding scheme and supporting manual, there was a clear 
improvement in the inter-rater reliability for all codes in the new scheme at the early infancy 
assessment. Excellent inter-rater reliability was also established for maternal speech at the 
toddlerhood and middle childhood assessments, indicating the effectiveness of this expanded 
scheme.  
4.4.2 Maternal correlates of internal state language.  
 Previous studies of mothers’ references to internal states have controlled for maternal 
talkativeness and sociodemographic risk, predominantly maternal education (Howard et al., 
2008; Symons et al., 2005, 2006; Ruffman et al., 2002, 2006). However, these covariates, in 
addition to other potential correlates such as mothers’ behavioural problems have, thus far, 
rarely been investigated in relation to mothers’ internal state language within a single study. 
This study corroborates previous work suggesting that sociodemographic risk is negatively 
associated with maternal talkativeness and use of internal state language (Cole & Mitchell, 
2000; Hughes et al., 1999; Pears & Moses, 2003).  
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Maternal history of behaviour problems was also found to be negatively associated 
with maternal use of internal state language. This finding can be brought together and extend 
previous work investigating parenting practices that are linked with parental behavioural 
problems. Mothers with a history of behavioural problems have been found to exhibit more 
negative parenting behaviours, such as more hostility in interactions and more harsh, coercive 
or inconsistent disciplinary practices (Kim-Cohen, Caspi, Rutter, Polo Tomás, & Moffitt, 
2006; Jaffee, Belsky, Harrington, Caspi, & Moffitt, 2006). This study extends these findings 
by highlighting the impact maternal antisocial histories may have on nuances in mother-child 
interactions, namely, discussions about internal states that foster children’s understanding of 
minds. 
4.4.3 Mothers’ internal state language predicts children’s understanding of second-
order false belief 
Concurrent associations were found between mothers’ references to internal states and 
children’s understanding of second-order false belief with full comprehension. Children who 
heard more frequent and more varied maternal references to cognitive states in the topic-
sharing task at the middle childhood assessment were found to have a two-fold increase in the 
likelihood of passing the second-order false belief questions. This corroborates previous 
findings showing positive associations between mothers’ references to cognitive terms in 
picture book reading tasks and performance on strange stories tasks at ages 7 and 10 (Adrian 
et al., 2007; Ensor et al., 2014). The frequency and variety of mothers’ references to the 
child’s and her own internal states predicted children’s second-order false belief 
understanding; this finding was slightly more pronounced for mothers’ frequency of 
references to her own cognitions. This provides support for both views that mothers’ 
references to cognitive states fosters children’s understanding of minds by drawing attention 
to the child’s thoughts (Adrian et al., 2005), and by exposing children to the perspectives of 
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others (Harris, 1999). Mothers who frequently discuss not only the child’s, but their own 
internal states, may make contrasting internal states more salient to their child. Although this 
finding stands in contrast to earlier work showing weaker associations between 7-year-olds’ 
higher-order theory of mind and mothers’ references to her own and the child’s inner states 
(Adrian et al., 2007), it is possible this difference is due to the nature of different tasks used 
across studies. The use of the Etch-a-Sketch as the topic sharing task in this study does not 
lend itself to coding references to characters discussed in picture book reading tasks, but 
focuses instead on mother-child discussions regarding their exploration of the toy.  
4.4.4 Limitations of the study 
 It is also important to note potential issues with the context in which internal state 
language was examined in this study. The equivalence of the topic sharing tasks used at each 
assessment could be brought into question, as it cannot necessarily be assumed that the 
activity board, teddy bear puzzle and Etch-a-Sketch tasks are analogous. Given that one of 
the aims of this study was to examine mothers’ use of internal state language during mother-
child interactions within a broad time interval, it was essential to select tasks that were 
developmentally appropriate. Given that there were no notable differences between the 
number of mothers using internal state language during each task, this presents promising 
evidence that these tasks can be used for the purpose of this investigation.  
 Additionally, this study has only explored internal state language within very 
concentrated time-periods. Although internal state language has been commonly explored in 
the context of shorter mother-child interaction tasks (Sabbagh & Callanan, 1998), exploring 
internal state language in natural observations of families within the home may give a more 
accurate reflection of children’s daily exposure to internal state language. Examining internal 
state language in this way presents a number of challenges. Perhaps most importantly, the 
time-consuming nature of this method inevitably results in a trade-off with sample size. It is 
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possible however, that this study has provided a balance between the issues of time and 
context. In the present sample, the families were examined in the home, and the topic-sharing 
tasks involved very limited instruction and consisted of toys typically found in the home. 
This balance is further evidenced when comparing the patterns of mother and child 
conversation reported by Howe and colleagues (2010); the patterns of internal state language 
in the present tasks appear to more closely reflect patterns found in natural interactions than 
structured tasks. 
4.4.5 Chapter summary and next directions in the thesis 
 The expanded internal state language coding scheme previously used by the Cardiff 
Child Development Study was presented in this chapter. The expanded coding scheme was 
shown to be successful in coding maternal speech to children at different ages. The patterns 
of internal state language for mothers were described; mothers’ use of internal state language 
closely resembled patterns from previous research. This coding scheme can now be used in 
future studies. The first finding using this scheme, however, is that mothers’ references to 
internal states continues to foster children’s understanding of minds beyond the preschool 
years. By conducting an in-depth analysis of maternal child-directed discourse in a topic-
sharing task, it has been possible to examine aspects of internal state language that are most 
important in children’s understanding of minds beyond the preschool years. These included: 
category; frequency; variety; and referent. Future steps in this thesis include examining the 
significance of mothers’ internal state language in line with the arrival of a sibling. Chapter 5 
will address this issue.
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CHAPTER 5 
 “Shall we think, what a, what a house looks like? So we’re gonna do a square.” 
Explaining Why Younger Siblings Foster Firstborns’ Understanding of Second-
Order False Belief in Middle Childhood: An Investigation of Mother-Firstborn 
Conversations about Internal States 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This thesis has drawn attention to two predictors of children’s understanding of 
minds. The first is the presence of a younger sibling living in the home (Chapter 3) and the 
second is maternal use of internal state language (Chapter 4). What has not yet been 
established, however, is the relationship between these two predictors and their relative 
contribution to firstborns’ understanding of minds. In the present chapter, the relationship 
between sibling presence in the home and maternal internal state language will be explored, 
to discover the contribution of both of these variables on firstborns’ second-order false belief 
understanding. By using the expanded internal state language coding scheme described in 
Chapter 4, this chapter will examine the relationships between sibling presence, maternal 
internal state language and firstborns’ understanding of second-order false belief. 
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5.1.1 Could mothers’ internal state language mediate the link between sibling presence 
and firstborns’ understanding of minds? 
Siblings may directly foster firstborns’ theory of mind through a) talk about causality 
and internal states (Dunn, Brown, Slomskowski, et al., 1991); b) management of conflict 
(Howe, 1991); c) joint play (Youngblade & Dunn, 1995); d) shared jokes (Dunn, 1994); and 
e) reasoning about moral issues (Dunn & Munn, 1987). Additionally, siblings may foster 
children’s understanding of false belief indirectly, by triggering changes in parent-firstborn 
interactions (Carpendale & Lewis, 2006). It has been suggested that “…having siblings may 
simply be a ‘marker for a change’ in the nature of the parent-child interaction experienced by 
children” (Carpendale & Lewis, 2006, p. 136-137). Indeed, the arrival of a sibling is 
associated with decreases in attachment security (Teti, Sakin, Kucera, Corns, & Eiden, 1996), 
maternal attention, affection, play, responsiveness and verbalisations (Baydar et al., 1997; 
Dunn & Kendrick, 1980, 1982; Field & Reite, 1984; Kendrick & Dunn, 1982), in addition to 
considerable increases in mother-firstborn negative confrontation (Dunn & Kendrick, 1980) 
and references to internal states (Dunn & Kendrick, 1982a).  
In their seminal work, Judy Dunn and Carol Kendrick described changes in the 
quality of mothers’ conversations with their firstborns before and after the birth of a sibling 
(1982a). In their naturalistic observations within the home, the frequency of mothers’ 
references to the inner states of others increased threefold following the birth of a sibling; this 
increase reflected mothers’ discussions of the younger sibling’s feelings, desires and 
intentions with firstborn child. Yet changes in conversation are also apparent within mother-
child conversations in the absence of a sibling. Conversations that follow the birth of a sibling 
centre on the firstborns’ role within the family, as a brother or sister and as an older child. 
Take the following excerpt of a transcript between a mother and her firstborn daughter (Dunn 
& Kendrick, 1982a, p. 67):  
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C: (Looking at baby’s clothes) I want one of those. 
M: Well, you know there aren’t any babygros for you. What are you doing with 
those? 
C: I’m a baby. I’m a baby. Another one for me. I want. 
M: There isn’t another one for you. 
C: I want one. I’m a baby. 
M: Now look. We’ve been through this about five times. There are no babygros 
in the world that would fit you ‘cause you’re a big girl. 
  
 These common topics of conversation between mother and firstborn highlight the 
developmental, physical and attributional differences between the firstborn and their sibling, 
to both the child and the mother. It seems likely therefore, that the arrival of a sibling 
highlights the developmental difference between the two children, leading to a major shift in 
the mothers’ perception of the firstborn child to an independent, thinking being. This may 
lead to more differentiation in mothers’ type internal state language used toward the firstborn 
and to the younger sibling, resulting in a higher level of stimulation in language input from 
the mother to her firstborn. Indeed, despite their propensity to use internal state language 
being consistent over time (Meins, Fernyhough, Arnott, Turner, & Leekam, 2011), mothers 
tend to adjust the type of internal state references in conversations with their first- and 
second-born children (Jenkins et al, 2003). At present, this possibility is speculative due to 
the lack of research examining changes in mothers’ speech in mother-firstborn interactions 
upon sibling arrival. However, it is considered likely that the presence of a sibling may 
positively foster firstborns’ understanding of minds indirectly by triggering a stimulating 
effect on theory of mind by the mother (Hughes, 2011).  
5.1.2 Aims of the study 
Few studies have explored family influences on children’s understanding of second-
order false belief in middle childhood (Hughes, 2016). In this thesis thus far, this has been 
addressed by examining the influence of siblings (Chapter 3) and of mothers’ language 
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(Chapter 5) on firstborns’ understanding second-order false belief. The overarching aim of 
this chapter was to bring these two strands of work together, in order to understand processes 
by which younger siblings may foster firstborns’ understanding of minds. 
5.1.2.1 Does mothers’ use of internal state language change upon arrival of a 
second child? The first aim of this study was to examine whether mothers’ use of internal 
state language alters upon the arrival of a sibling, either in frequency of use or in a shift to a 
higher-level type of internal state language, such as references to cognitive states. Mothers’ 
internal state language will be explored before the arrival of any siblings in early infancy, and 
after the siblings arrived in middle childhood.  
5.1.2.2 To what extent does maternal internal state language mediate the link 
between sibling presence and firstborns’ second-order false belief understanding? The 
second aim of this study was to test the extent to which mothers’ references to internal states 
mediates the positive association between younger siblings and firstborns’ second-order false 
belief understanding with full comprehension (Chapter 3). On account of the literature 
describing processes by which children directly influence their siblings’ theory of mind 
(Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, et al., 1991; Dunn, 1994; Dunn & Munn, 1987; Howe, 1991), it 
is not expected that mothers’ internal state language will fully explain the sibling effect on 
second-order false belief understanding. Rather, it is hypothesised that a change in mothers’ 
internal state language is one of many that foster children’s developing theories of mind upon 
the arrival of a sibling. 
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5.2 Method 
The analyses presented in this chapter are based on Waves 1, 2 and 6 of the Cardiff 
Child Development Study (Figure 5.1). A full description of the younger sibling study sample 
and study design and procedure at each wave of assessment is presented in Chapter 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 CCDS waves used in the present chapter. 
 
5.2.1 Participants 
Of the 269 children in the younger sibling study sample, 266 (98.9%) were assessed 
in early infancy and 255 (94.8%) were observed in the home. At the middle childhood 
assessment, 244 (90.7%) were assessed and 229 (85.1%) were directly observed in the home. 
The progression of the younger sibling study sample to the 229 children assessed in the home 
at the middle childhood assessment is described in Chapter 3, section 3.2.1, page 57 (Figure 
3.2). Similarly, the progression of the sample from those seen in the home at the early infancy 
and middle childhood assessments to the families who provided mother-child interaction data 
is described in Chapter 4, section 4.2.1, page 98 (Figure 4.3). Of the 229 children assessed in 
the home at the middle childhood assessment, mother-child interaction data were available 
for 209 (91.3%) families.  
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Of the 209 families that were investigated in the present chapter, 52 (24.9%) did not 
have a sibling, and 157 (75.1%) had at least one sibling living in the home. As sibling 
presence and birth intervals were the only sibling variables associated with passing second-
order false belief in Chapter 3, these were the only constellation variables explored in this 
investigation.  
5.2.2 Measures 
5.2.2.1 Mother-child interaction. Mothers and their firstborn children were observed 
during topic-sharing interaction tasks prior to the birth of a sibling and after the birth of a 
sibling. This involved a 2-minute observation with an activity board toy at the early infancy 
assessment and a 5-minute observation with an Etch-a-Sketch toy at the middle childhood 
assessment (Figure 5.2). Full task details are described from page 98 in Chapter 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Activity board (left) was administered at 6 months (before sibling arrival), Etch-a-
Sketch (right) was administered at 7 years (after sibling arrival). 
 
Two minutes of the activity board and 3 minutes from the Etch-a-Sketch drawing task 
were transcribed from videos, and when necessary, translated, in 5 second segments 
(Appendix IV). Of the 229 children in the sibling sample that were assessed in the home 209 
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(91.3%) had mother-child interaction data available from the early infancy assessment, and 
184 (86.5%) from the middle childhood assessment.  
5.2.2.1.1. Maternal talkativeness. Mothers’ talkativeness during the early infancy and 
middle childhood assessments was computed by dividing the number of 5-second segments 
containing speech by total number of 5-second segments in each task. Mothers were therefore 
given proportional talkativeness scores between 0 and 1. This measurement of talkativeness 
has been validated by Audacity software in a subsample of cases r(88) = .72, p< .001 
(Roberts et al., 2013). The mean score for maternal talkativeness was .87 (SD = .18) during 
the early infancy task and .82 (SD = .12) during the middle childhood task. 
5.2.2.1.2. Maternal references to internal states. Each 5-second segment of speech 
was coded for mothers’ attributions made about the mind. The revised coding scheme was an 
expanded version of that used by Roberts and colleagues (2013) (page 102 of Chapter 4). 
Internal state language was divided into seven categories: Perception, physiology, preference, 
intention, desire, emotion and cognition, and included references to firstborns’ and mothers’ 
own internal states. An independent observer coded maternal use of internal state language in 
70 cases (25.4%) from the early infancy assessment and 68 cases (30.0%) from the middle 
childhood assessment, establishing excellent inter-rater reliability (median α = .98 for both 
assessments). References to internal states were examined by referent, frequency and variety 
(see Chapter 4 for full details of coding scheme and Appendix V for complete lists of internal 
state language terms that were coded). 
5.2.2.1.3. Missing mother-child interaction data. For both tasks, all talkativeness and 
internal state codes for interactions that were shorter than the assigned time for the task were 
prorated up to 24 segments of speech (2 minutes) for the activity board task (6.7%) and up to 
36 segments of speech for the Etch-a-Sketch task (36.4%). Each coding category was divided 
by number of minutes of task length to yield a rate-per-minute of each code. The scores were 
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imputed using unstandardized predicted scores from SPSS regression analyses. The final 
sample size for mother-child interaction data within the sibling sample was therefore 209 
(91.3% of the sample used in this study), where 12.0% were imputed scores for the middle 
childhood assessment. 
5.2.2.2 Second-order false belief task. Children were told a second-order false belief 
story that was enacted with plastic Playmobil figures by the experimenter. Children had to 
answer all belief, justification and comprehension questions correctly to be classified as 
passing second-order false belief with full comprehension. Excellent reliability was 
established for passing this task (Kappa coefficient 1.00). Full details of this task are 
described on page 59 of Chapter 3. Of the 209 children in the sibling sample with mother-
child interaction data available, 204 (97.6%) completed the second-order false belief task. 
5.2.2.3 Study correlates 
5.2.2.3.1 Maternal behavioural problems. Maternal behavioural problems were 
included in the analysis as a covariate of mothers’ references to internal states. Maternal 
behavioural problems were assessed using seven DSM-IV items for conduct problems and 
five symptoms of ADHD. These items were combined to create a composite variable of 
mothers’ history of behavioural problems (see page 110 of Chapter 4). 
5.2.2.3.2 Child verbal IQ. Firstborns’ verbal IQ was included in the analysis as a 
covariate of their passing of second-order false belief (Chapter 3). Firstborns verbal IQ was 
assessed at middle childhood using the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; Dunn, 
Dunn, Whetton, & Pintillie, 1982). The mean standardised score for the 209 children in the 
sibling sample with available mother-child interaction data was 100.39 (SD = 11.60, range 69 
to 130), and the average age children in the sample were equivalent to was 84.84 months (SD 
= 14.52) and ranged from 57 to 150 months.  
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5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Preliminary descriptive data  
Of the 209 children in the sibling sample who had mother-child interaction data 
available, 64 (30.6%) passed the second-order false belief task. In terms of mothers’ 
references to internal states, the majority of mothers produced at least one reference to their 
child’s or their own internal state (83.3% and 90.4% at the early infancy and middle 
childhood interactions, respectively). There was no difference in mothers’ overall frequency 
of internal state language between the assessments. Mothers referred to the inner states of the 
child significantly more than to their own inner states at both assessments (ps <.001).  
5.3.2 Is maternal language related to presence of a sibling in the home? 
No differences were found when comparing mothers’ language according to the birth 
interval groups specified in Chapter 3 (no sibling, early arrival sibling and average to late 
arrival sibling). Therefore all analyses focus on comparing the sibling present in the home 
versus no sibling present groups. 
5.3.2.1 Maternal language at the middle childhood assessment. No differences 
were detected between mothers’ talkativeness at the middle childhood assessment according 
to whether there was a sibling in the home, therefore all subsequent analyses are focused on 
maternal internal state language. Means and standard deviations of mothers’ use of internal 
state language according to sibling groups at the middle childhood assessment are presented 
in Table 5.1. At the middle childhood assessment, the only difference detected was that 
mothers’ referred to the firstborns’ cognitive states significantly more, both in terms of 
frequency t(215.15) = 2.61, p < .01 and variety t(163.50) = 2.23, p <.05 if the firstborn had a 
sibling (Figure 5.3).  
To establish whether mothers who went on to have more children by the middle 
childhood assessment had a prior tendency to refer to internal states more than those who did 
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not, subsequent analyses compared mothers’ language at the early infancy assessment 
according to the sibling presence groups, prior to any sibling arrival.  
 
 
Figure 5.3 Frequency and variety of mothers’ references to the firstborn child’s cognitive 
states according to sibling presence groups, error bars are ± standard error of the mean,  
*p <.05, **p <.01. 
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Table 5.1 
Means and standard deviations for maternal use of internal state language (rate per minute) at the middle childhood assessment according to 
sibling presence groups. 
Note. N = 209
Mothers’ references 
to child’s internal 
states 
Sibling presence groups 
Mothers’ references 
to own internal states 
Sibling presence groups 
No younger sibling 
present in the home 
Younger sibling  
present in the home 
No younger sibling present 
in the home 
Younger sibling  
Present in the home 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Perception 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.06 
.06 
 
.15 
.15 
 
.02 
.02 
 
.08 
.08 
Perception 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.08 
.06 
 
.22 
.12 
 
.05 
.05 
 
.14 
.12 
Physiology 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
Physiology 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.01 
.01 
 
.05 
.05 
Preference 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.01 
.01 
 
.04 
.04 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
Preference 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.02 
.02 
 
.06 
.06 
 
.02 
.02 
 
.07 
.07 
Intention 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.47 
.28 
 
.39 
.20 
 
.39 
.22 
 
.51 
.20 
Intention 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.08 
.07 
 
.18 
.13 
 
.05 
.04 
 
.17 
.10 
Desire 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.41 
.26 
 
.43 
.18 
 
.42 
.23 
 
.48 
.22 
Desire 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.01 
.01 
 
.05 
.05 
 
.02 
.02 
 
.09 
.08 
Emotion 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.02 
.02 
 
.07 
.07 
 
.01 
.01 
 
.05 
.05 
Emotion 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
Cognition 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.23 
.19 
 
.28 
.22 
 
.38 
.28 
 
.54 
.32 
Cognition 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.30 
.26 
 
.29 
.25 
 
.36 
.25 
 
.48 
.27 
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5.3.2.2 Maternal language at the early infancy assessment. No differences were 
detected between mothers’ talkativeness at the early infancy assessment according sibling 
presence groups. Means and standard deviations of mothers’ use of internal state language 
according to sibling groups at the early infancy assessment are presented in Table 5.2. There 
were no significant differences in mothers’ use of category, frequency or variety of internal 
state language between sibling groups (prior to sibling arrival) at the early infancy 
assessment.  
5.3.3 To what extent do maternal references to child cognitive states mediate the 
association between sibling presence in the home in middle childhood and firstborns’ 
understanding of second-order false belief with full comprehension? 
  According to the Baron and Kenny (1986) causal steps approach, four conditions 
must be met in order to establish a partially mediating effect: (a) the dependent variable 
(second-order false belief understanding) must be predicted by the independent variable 
(sibling presence), (b) the mediating variable (maternal references to child cognitive states) 
must be predicted by the independent variable, (c) the dependent variable must be predicted 
by the mediating variable, and (d) the effect of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable must be attenuated when the mediating variable is controlled. Following these steps, 
in the subsequent sections mediations are tested further using the bootstrap procedure using 
the PROCESS custom dialogue box for SPSS (Hayes, 2013; available from 
www.afhayes.com/spsssas-and-mplus-macros-and-code.html). 
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Table 5.2  
Means and standard deviations for maternal use of internal state language (rate per minute) at the early infancy assessment according to sibling 
presence groups. 
Note. N = 209
Mothers’ references 
to child’s internal 
states 
Sibling presence groups 
Mothers’ references 
to own internal states 
Sibling presence groups 
No younger sibling 
present 
Younger sibling  
present 
No younger sibling  
present 
Younger sibling  
present 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Perception 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.52 
.29 
 
.90 
.40 
 
.74 
.37 
 
1.05 
.39 
Perception 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.01 
.01 
 
.07 
.07 
 
.01 
.01 
 
.06 
.06 
Physiology 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.03 
.03 
 
.12 
.12 
 
.03 
.03 
 
.13 
.13 
Physiology 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
Preference 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.22 
.18 
 
.39 
.30 
 
.26 
.20 
 
.40 
.31 
Preference 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.01 
.01 
 
.06 
.06 
Intention 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.16 
.10 
 
.39 
.22 
 
.16 
.12 
 
.37 
.24 
Intention 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.04 
.04 
Desire 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.41 
.23 
 
.58 
.25 
 
.44 
.28 
 
.57 
.27 
Desire 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.01 
.01 
 
.06 
.06 
Emotion 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.02 
.01 
 
.11 
.08 
Emotion 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
Cognition 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.11 
.10 
 
.27 
.25 
 
.10 
.08 
 
.26 
.19 
Cognition 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.14 
.13 
 
.30 
.26 
 
.11 
.10 
 
.29 
.23 
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5.3.3.1 Mothers’ frequency of references to child’s cognitive states. With 
covariates of second-order false belief and maternal internal state language controlled (child 
age, verbal IQ and maternal behavioural problems), regression analyses indicated that (a) 
sibling presence significantly predicted second-order false belief understanding with full 
comprehension ß = .89, (b) sibling presence significantly predicted frequency of maternal 
references to child cognition ß = .18 (c) frequency of maternal references to child cognition 
significantly predicted second-order false belief understanding ß = .64 (all ps <.05), and (d) 
the effect of sibling presence on second-order false belief understanding was attenuated when 
frequency of maternal references to child cognition was controlled ß = .87, p < .05. This 
mediation model was then tested further using the bootstrap procedure using the PROCESS 
custom dialogue box for SPSS (Hayes, 2013; available from www.afhayes.com/spsssas-and-
mplus-macros-and-code.html). Within this model, covariates of second-order false belief, 
firstborn age and verbal IQ were controlled. Tests for mediation using bootstrap estimation of 
indirect effects with 5000 replications did not confirm the mediation model (95% confidence 
interval [CI] = [-.02, .29]) (see Table 5.3).  
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Table 5.3  
Prediction of maternal frequency (model 1) and variety (model 2) of references to child cognitive states and presence of a sibling on firstborns’ 
second-order false belief understanding with full comprehension. 
Model 1 Model 2 
Variable R2 B SE 95% CI for OR Variable R2 B SE 95% CI for OR 
 .14***     .14***    
Constant 
     Firstborn age 
     Verbal IQ 
 
-11.88 
.08* 
.04** 
4.02 
.04 
.02 
 
.00 - .16 
.01 - 07 
Constant 
    Firstborn age 
     Verbal IQ 
 
-11.91 
.08* 
.04** 
4.02 
.04 
.02 
 
.00 - .16 
.01 - .07 
     Maternal behavioural problems  -.06 .05 -.16 - .03      Maternal behavioural problems  -.06 .05 -.15 - .03 
     Presence of younger sibling  .87* .42 .04 - 1.69      Presence of younger sibling  .87* .42 .04 – 1.69 
     Maternal frequency of 
references to child’s cognitive 
states 
 .54ᶧ .33 -.09 – 1.19 
     Maternal variety of references to  
child’s cognitive states 
 .90ᶧ .52 -.11 – 1.92 
Direct effect of sibling presence  .87 .42 .04 – 1.69 Direct effect of sibling presence  .87* .42 .04 – 1.69 
Indirect effect of frequency of 
maternal references to child’s 
cognitive states 
 .10 .08 -.01 - .29 
Indirect effect of variety of 
maternal references to child’s 
cognitive states 
 .10* .08 .00 - .30 
N = 201. Coefficients are based on the final models. ᶧp <.10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p <.001. Significance of indirect effect is determined if 
confidence interval does not cross zero.
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5.3.3.2 Mothers’ variety of references to child’s cognitive states. With covariates 
of second-order false belief and maternal internal state language controlled, (child age, verbal 
IQ and maternal behavioural problems), regression analyses indicated that (a) sibling 
presence significantly predicted second-order false belief understanding ß = .89, (b) sibling 
presence significantly predicted variety of maternal references to child cognition ß = .11, (c) 
variety of maternal references to child cognition significantly predicted second-order false 
belief understanding ß = 1.05 (all ps <.05), and (d) the effect of sibling presence on second-
order false belief understanding was attenuated when variety of maternal references to child 
cognition was controlled ß = .87, p < .05. Tests for mediation using bootstrap estimation of 
indirect effects with 5000 replications using PROCESS confirmed the mediation model (95% 
confidence interval [CI] = [.00, .30]) (Table 5.3). When taken together, these results indicate 
a partial mediation model. 
5.4 Discussion 
The present study examined links among presence of a sibling, mothers’ references to 
internal states and firstborns’ understanding of second-order false belief with full 
comprehension in middle childhood. I built upon the earlier findings that both presence of a 
sibling (Chapter 3) and mothers’ concurrent references to cognitive states (Chapter 4) fosters 
children’s understanding of minds at 7 years of age by testing two hypotheses. The first of 
these was that mothers’ references to internal states would differ according to whether there 
was a sibling present in the home. Secondly, it was hypothesised that mothers’ references to 
inner states would mediate the relationship between sibling presence and children’s 
understanding of second-order false belief.  
5.4.1 Mothers’ internal state language differs according to sibling groups 
 Mothers’ use of internal state language differed at the middle childhood assessment 
according to sibling groups. Mothers with two or more children referred to their firstborn’s 
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cognitive states more frequently and used more varied terms than those with an only child. 
This difference was not present at the early infancy assessment, which suggests that mothers 
who go on to subsequent childbearing do not necessarily have more of a propensity for 
internal state language use, but this may be a change that is the result of the arrival of a 
sibling. Although these findings do not allow us to clarify the ways in which the presence of a 
sibling may change maternal use of internal state language, this finding represents an 
important step in understanding how family interactions may change upon the arrival of a 
sibling. Previous work has explored changes in maternal speech within mother-child-sibling 
triadic interactions (Dunn & Kendrick, 1982a). This study expands these findings by 
demonstrating changes in the conversational climate of mother-child dyadic interactions in 
the absence of a sibling.  
5.4.2 Aspects of mothers’ internal state language partially mediates the association 
between presence of a sibling and children’s understanding of second-order false belief 
with full comprehension 
 Building on these findings, the contribution of both sibling presence and maternal 
references to cognitive terms towards children’s understanding of second-order false beliefs 
was explored in a mediation analysis. When taken together, it was found that mothers’ variety 
of references to the firstborns’ cognitive states had at least a partially mediating effect on the 
relationship between sibling presence and firstborn understanding of second-order false 
belief. This indicates that the arrival of a sibling may trigger changes in mothers’ 
conversations of internal states with their firstborn; namely, that mothers discuss more 
diverse cognitive states with their firstborn following the birth of a sibling. 
 The relationship among these three variables have, together, received little attention in 
the literature on children’s developing theories of mind. While it is possible that the arrival of 
a sibling triggers the mother to come to know and treat their firstborn child increasingly as 
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one with a mind, it is important to note that the associations between these variables are 
likely to be reciprocal in nature. Children’s early theory of mind ability predicts later 
maternal cognitive references; a pattern known as partner effects (Ensor et al., 2014). When 
also taking into account cognitive advances associated with sibling arrival (McAlister & 
Peterson, 2007; Zajonc & Markus, 1975), it seems likely that the child has a key role in 
triggering discussions of more complex internal states in their interactions with their mothers.  
5.4.3 Limitations of the study 
 Examining family influences on children’s understanding of minds longitudinally 
presents a number of challenges. One issue that must be acknowledged in this study is the 
need to impute maternal talkativeness and internal state language data. Given that the Cardiff 
Child Development Study is primarily a longitudinal development rather than mother-child 
interaction, there were instances where interactions took place with caregivers other than the 
mother. Although data were imputed only from earlier time-points where data was available 
and this was kept to a minimum, it is recommended that the findings must be interpreted with 
some caution. That being said, it is now current and recommended practice to address 
missing data with imputation, as missing data reduces sample size and therefore statistical 
power, and can also bias parameter estimates (Newman, 2003; Roth, 1994).  
5.4.4 Summary 
This study has demonstrated the importance of examining different family influences 
on children’s mind-understanding in middle childhood. Yet in doing so, I have also 
highlighted that further research must continue to explore the relationship between family 
influences and theory of mind by considering how changes in family structure affect the 
dynamics of children’s close relationships. 
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CHAPTER 6 
“Do you think that’s the teddy’s tummy? What do you think?” 
Early Arriving Younger Siblings: Antecedents and Consequences for Mother-
Child Interaction 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 In Chapter 3, I examined the relationship between sibling constellation factors and 
children’s understanding of second-order false belief. Although younger sibling presence was 
found to foster firstborns’ understanding of minds, it was established that this advantage was 
only the case for children who did not experience early entry into siblinghood. Firstborn 
children who experienced an early arrival sibling performed similarly to only children on the 
second-order false belief questions. In this chapter, I will investigate families within the early 
arrival sibling group. First, I will review maternal antecedents that predict early subsequent 
childbearing and explore relevant predictors of early sibling arrival within the families in 
Cardiff Child Development Study. Second, I will explore the consequences of early sibling 
arrival on mother-firstborn interactions. Given that aspects of mother-child conversation 
explain, in part, the influence of siblings on second-order false belief (Chapter 5), I will 
investigate whether features of mother-firstborn interaction known to foster children’s mind-
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understanding alter for the children who experienced the birth of their early arrival younger 
sibling by toddlerhood.  
6.1.1 Early arriving siblings 
Short birth intervals between first- and second-born children are of interest within 
several literatures beyond that of developmental psychology, given that short intervals are 
associated with higher rates of maternal, perinatal, infant and child (first- and second-born) 
adverse outcomes (Conde-Agudelo, Rosas-Bermudez, Kafury-Geota, 2007; Conde-Agudelo, 
Rosas-Bermudez, Castaño, & Horton, 2012). Much of this work is investigated under the 
banners of short interpregnancy interval or rapid repeat pregnancy, which in many studies is 
defined as an interval of ≤ 24 months between the delivery of a live birth and subsequent 
conception also resulting in a live birth (for example Crittenden, Boris, Rice, Taylor, & Olds, 
2009). Given this criterion, the families who experienced an early arriving sibling within the 
CCDS sample fit well within the category as a rapid repeat pregnancy group as classified 
within the literature.  
6.1.2 Antecedents of early sibling arrival 
A well-studied predictor of mothers who have a short interpregnancy interval is 
maternal age. Early research indicated a strong association between maternal age at first birth 
and further childbearing, where younger mothers had an increased pace of further 
childbearing and lifetime fertility (Bumpass, Rindfuss, & Janosik, 1978; Trussell & Menken, 
1978). However, recent studies have indicated that this association has weakened 
considerably, with more young mothers delaying subsequent childbearing and ending further 
reproduction (Morgan & Rindfuss, 1999). One exception, however, is the group of adolescent 
mothers, who have been identified as a particular risk group for rapid subsequent 
childbearing, with 42% becoming pregnant again within the first 24 months of their first birth 
(Raneri & Wiemann, 2007). Poverty, failure to adopt effective methods of contraception, 
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partner violence, alcohol or drug use, future childbearing intentions, a lack of return to 
education, and low cognitive ability are some of the many factors that significantly predict 
short birth intervals in adolescents (Coard, Nitz, & Felice, 2000; Crittenden et al., 2009; 
Crosby et al., 2002; Jacoby, Gorenflo, Black, Wunderlich, & Eyler, 1999; Raneri & 
Wiemann, 2007). 
Another age group that have been identified as more likely to have short intervals 
between their first and second children are primiparous women over 30 (Gemmill & 
Duberstein Lindberg, 2013; Kaharuza, Sabroe, & Basso, 2001). According to a recent Office 
for National Statistics survey (2012), postponement of childbearing to a later age is becoming 
more common, with the standardised mean age for commencing childbearing now being 29.7 
years: the highest age since 1938 where the ages of first birth data became available. This is 
likely to reflect changes in women’s economic position in terms of increases in educational 
and occupational opportunities, leading to the postponement of childbearing (Dion, 1995), 
and an increase in the rate of transition to the second birth (Hoem & Hoem, 1989; 
Kreyenfeld, 2002). Highly educated women are increasingly more likely to postpone 
childbirth to a time where they have a substantial income to afford childcare to prevent 
interruption to their careers (Rindfuss, Morgan, & Offutt, 1996). This may result in a time-
squeeze effect, where the delay in childbearing may result in a more rapid transition from first 
to second children in light of the biological limits of fertility (Kreyenfeld, 2002). 
 The increase in women’s economic independence is also presumed to be linked to 
changes in women’s tendency to marry, which in turn is related to childbearing and 
reproductive choices. It has been predicted that 94% of highly educated women will marry in 
their lifetime (Goldstein & Kenney, 2001), but they are more likely to delay marriage to a 
later age (Heath, 2009) and opt for longer cohabitation prior to marriage (Isen & Stevenson, 
2010). In the UK, married or civil partnered couples have been reported to have the highest 
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average number of dependent children within the household, at 1.79 children per family, 
compared to 1.62 for cohabiting couples and 1.59 for lone parent families (Office for 
National Statistics, 2013b). Given that cohabitation is often viewed as a precursor to marriage 
and childbearing, cohabitors are less likely to expect to bear children within a two-year time 
window than married couples (Rindfuss & van den Heuvel, 1990). Although studies 
examining the association between relationship status and short interpregnancy intervals are 
sparse, relationship circumstances may be an important factor in the timing of progressing to 
multiple children. While it is possible that women’s increasing tendency to delay marriage to 
a later age may result in a time-squeeze effect, cohabiting couples are more likely to have 
pregnancies that are unplanned and mistimed (Reed, 2006), and therefore may also be likely 
to experience short interpregnancy intervals. 
It is well established that mental health issues such as anxiety and depression are 
associated with an increased risk of pregnancy during the teen years (Gest, Mahoney, & 
Cairns, 1999; Quinlivan, Tan, Steele, & Black, 2004; Woodward, Fergusson, & Horwood, 
2001). However, links between mental health issues and subsequent childbearing have been 
rarely studied in adolescents and severely neglected amongst all age groups. Some studies 
have attempted to harness longitudinal data to investigate associations between these 
variables, but have failed to detect associations between depressive symptoms and subsequent 
pregnancies in studies of adults (Bennett, Culhane, McCollum, & Elo, 2006) and of 
adolescents (Raneri & Wiemann, 2007). Yet one study has detected a possible independent 
contribution of depressive symptoms towards subsequent pregnancies in African American 
adolescent mothers (Barnet, Liu, & DeVoe, 2008). It is plausible that maternal depression 
following the birth of the firstborn child may have an impact on the timing and nature of 
family transition to the second child, given that depression has been associated with impaired 
reproductive decision making (Cooper, Shapiro, & Powers, 1998), reduction in use of birth 
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control (Lehrer, Shrier, Gortmaker, & Buka, 2006) and an increased number of subsequent 
pregnancies (Barnet, Liu, & DeVoe, 2008). 
Factors that increase the risk for risky sexual behaviours throughout adolescence and 
young adulthood also includes women’s history of conduct problems. Conduct disorder in 
childhood is one of the most significant risk factors for young motherhood (Woodward & 
Fergusson, 1999; Zoccolillo & Rogers, 1991). Adolescent girls with conduct disorder have 
been identified to be as much as four times more likely than matched controls to have become 
pregnant by 21 years of age (Bardone, Moffitt, Caspi, Dickson, & Silva, 1996). Despite this 
finding, very little or no examination of the association between individuals with behaviour 
problems and subsequent childbearing has been conducted. It would seem intuitive to 
examine behavioural problems as potential determinants of family size, given that conduct 
disorder is associated with a tendency to affiliate with deviant peers (Bachanas et al., 2002), 
receive less parent-teen sexual guidance (Wilson & Donenberg, 2004) and experience high 
levels of family conflict (Ary, Duncan, Duncan, & Hops, 1999), which are all associated with 
higher levels of risky sexual behaviour. Furthermore, conduct disorder is characterised by 
impulsivity (or, behavioural undercontrol or disinhibition) which has been linked to risky 
sexual behaviour (Donohew et al, 2000; Lejuez, Bornavolova, Daughter, & Curtin, 2005; 
Ramrakha, Caspi, Dickson, Moffitt, & Paul, 2000).  
6.1.3 Consequences of early sibling arrival 
Mothers who have a short birth interval between children may experience a number of 
perinatal health issues. Rapid subsequent childbearing also puts both first- and second-born 
children at risk (see Conde-Agudelo et al., 2007, 2012). These physical health problems are 
summarised by Conde-Agudelo and colleagues (2012) (see Figure 6.1). Coupled with 
existing sociodemographic and psychological problems that predict to the timing of the 
second birth, mothers in this particular risk group can experience mental health problems 
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following the birth of their second child, such as postpartum low mood (Gürel & Gürel, 
2000).  
 
Figure 6.1 Hypothetical causal mechanisms proposed by Conde-Agudelo and colleagues 
(2012) for the association between short inter-pregnancy, -birth, or -recuperative intervals 
and increased risk of adverse maternal, perinatal, infant and child health outcomes. 
 
Taking into account existing sociodemographic and psychological issues, in addition 
to the physical health problems associated with interpregnancy intervals, the time-period 
following the second birth for this particular at-risk group is stressful. Maternal low mood 
postpartum may result from physical distress from frequent deliveries, from separation from 
the firstborn child during hospital stays, increases in work-load and responsibilities, and 
decreases in opportunities for maternal private activities associated with caring for multiple 
very young children (Gürel & Gürel, 2000; Hannah, Adam, Lee, Glover, & Sandler, 1992; 
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Thorpe et al., 2003). Given that 40% - 55% of short interpregnancy interval births are 
unintended (Gemmill & Duberstein Lindberg, 2014; Kaharuza et al., 2001), stress resulting 
from worries concerning finances and lack of preparation may also contribute to maternal 
mental health problems following a rapid subsequent birth. 
Adverse outcomes resulting from rapid subsequent childbearing are likely to impact 
on the mother-firstborn relationship. However, the effect of short birth intervals on the 
mother-child relationship has been rarely studied. Short birth intervals between siblings are 
associated with a more pronounced decline in positive mother-firstborn interactions and 
increase in maternal controlling parenting styles (Baydar et al., 1999). This reduction of 
positive interaction was mediated by family economic wellbeing, indicating that reduction in 
mother-child positive interactions is likely to be in attributable in part, to economic hardship. 
In addition to this study that specifically investigated the impact of short birth intervals, we 
can also look to early sibling research for insights into the consequences of early sibling 
arrival on mother-child interactions. Judy Dunn’s early work examined the changes in 
mother-child interactions following the birth of a sibling, where the median age of the older 
child at the time of sibling birth was 25 months (Dunn & Kendrick, 1980). In their sample, 
birth of a sibling was associated with decreases in maternal attention and initiation of 
conversation, in addition to more confrontation.  
6.1.4 Aims of the Study 
6.1.4.1 Antecedents of early sibling arrival. The first aim of this study is to profile 
mothers who had short intervals between their first- and second-born children in the Cardiff 
Child Development Study. Previous studies exploring antecedents of early sibling arrival 
have focused on analysing individual risk factors in isolation, which may exclude other 
important features that contribute to short intervals between first- and second-born children. 
Therefore, I will explore the extent to which a) maternal age at first birth, b) other 
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sociodemographic risk factors and c) maternal psychological factors contribute to the arrival 
and timing of a second born child. The selection of sociodemographic and psychological 
domains was guided by previous research implicating the importance of age, education, 
income, relationship status, postnatal depression and childhood conduct disorder in sexual 
behaviour and family planning (Bardone et al., 1996; Barnet et al., 2008; Raneri & Wiemann, 
2007; Rindfuss & van den Heuvel, 1990).   
6.1.4.2 Consequences of early sibling arrival for mother-firstborn interactions. 
Early sibling arrival is associated with much adversity, and this appears to negatively affect 
the mother-firstborn relationship (Baydar et al., 1999). However, it is yet to be established 
whether short birth intervals affect features of the mother-child relationship most relevant to 
firstborns’ theory of mind development. In the present chapter, I will examine differences in 
mother-child interactions at the toddlerhood assessment (mean age 21 months). This will 
involve an investigation of a subsection of the early arrival sibling group where infant 
siblings were already present in the home. In this chapter I will describe how the birth of an 
early arrival sibling impacts features of mothers’ speech that are significant in firstborns’ 
later understanding of minds. By harnessing the longitudinal data from the CCDS, I will 
explore whether any differences were apparent prior to early sibling arrival in early infancy 
mother-child interactions and whether differences persist into middle childhood. 
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6.2 Method 
The analyses presented in this chapter are based on Waves 1, 2, 4 and 6 of the Cardiff 
Child Development Study (Figure 6.2). A full description of the younger sibling study sample 
and study design and procedure at each wave of assessment is presented in Chapter 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 CCDS waves used in the present chapter. 
6.2.1. Participants 
This investigation focused on the 269 families included in the CCDS sibling sample. 
The progression of the full CCDS sample to the 269 families included in the sibling sample is 
described in Chapter 2, page 28. In the sibling sample, 196 (72.9%) children had at least one 
younger sibling living in the home by the middle childhood assessment, and the mean age of 
the closest in age younger sibling was 35.25 months (SD = 16.23) (see Chapter 2 for full 
details). A quartile split within the whole sibling sample yielded identical criteria (≤ 24 
months) as Chapter 3 for the early arrival sibling group. Fifty families (25.6%) were 
categorized as having an early arrival sibling.  
6.2.2 Measures 
 6.2.2.1 Sociodemographic adversity. For the purpose of this investigation, mothers’ 
demographic characteristics were investigated individually in addition to the family’s 
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exposure to socio-economic adversity variable described in Chapter 2 (section 2.2.2.3, page 
30). These included: 
 6.2.2.1.1 Maternal age at first birth. Mothers’ age at the time of the birth of the 
firstborn child was investigated both as a continuous variable and was also investigated by 
separating mothers into groups. Given that both teen mothers and older mothers are 
considered more likely to have a short interval between the birth of the first- and second-born 
child, and this is unlikely to be a linear relationship, thus three groups were made; (a) 41 
(15.3%) were adolescent mothers (≤ 19 years), (b) 105 (39.0%) become mothers in their 20s 
(20-29 years) and (c) 123 (45.7%) become mothers over 30 (≥ 30 years). 
 6.2.2.1.2 Maternal education. A dichotomous variable indicated whether the mother 
had achieved the minimum level of qualifications required for the completion of secondary 
education in the United Kingdom (5 General Certificate of Secondary Education 
examinations grade A*- C or equivalent; 1 = yes, 0 = no). 
 6.2.2.1.3 Social class. Mothers were dichotomized as working class (0) or 
middle/upper class (1) by the highest ranked employment the mother ever had using the 
Standard Occupational Classification 2000 (SOC2000; Elias et al., 1999).  
 6.2.2.1.4 Relationship status. Two variables were used; the first being marital status 
(1 = married, 0 = unmarried), and the second being whether mothers were in a stable 
partnership with the firstborns’ father (1 = stable partnership, 0 = no stable partnership). 
 6.2.2.2 Maternal history of conduct problems. Mothers’ history of conduct 
problems were assessed using self-reported items from a prenatal (Wave 1) questionnaire 
entitled, ‘What I Was Like as a Child’. This questionnaire included a set of items measuring 
DSM-IV symptoms of conduct disorder, including measures of anger, fighting, disobedience, 
truancy, stealing, dishonesty, and vandalism rated on a scale from 0 (absent) to 2 (definitely 
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present). The conduct symptom items showed an acceptable level of internal consistency α = 
.74 (Hay et al., 2011). Additional descriptive data are available in Appendix VI. 
 6.2.2.3 Mothers’ postnatal depression. Mothers were interviewed by formally 
trained research assistants during the early infancy visit (Wave 2) using the Schedules for 
Clinical Assessment in Neuropsychiatry (SCAN; Wing et al., 1990). SCAN interviews were 
coded according to DSM-IV diagnostic criteria, and final decisions regarding clinical 
diagnosis were made in case conferences with at least one adult psychiatrist. Diagnoses of 
postnatal depression were made with good agreement ᴋ = .80, p <.001 (Perra et al., 2015). 
Dichotomous variables of mothers’ depressive episodes after the first pregnancy were 
computed.  
6.2.2.4 Mother-child interaction. Mothers and their firstborn children were observed 
during topic-sharing interaction tasks at three time-points. This involved a 2-minute 
observation with an activity board toy at early infancy (6 months), a 2-minute observation 
with a wooden teddy bear puzzle at toddlerhood (21 months); and a 5-minute observation 
with an Etch-a-Sketch toy at middle childhood (7 years) (see Figure 6.3). These observations 
were transcribed into 5-second segments of speech (see Appendix IV). Of the 269 children in 
the younger sibling study sample, 242 (90.0%) had mother-child interaction data available at 
the early infancy assessment, 205 (76.2%) at the toddlerhood assessment and 198 (73.6%) at 
the middle childhood assessment. Full details of the mother-child interaction tasks at each 
wave of assessment are described in Chapter 4, from page 98.  
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Figure 6.3 Topic-sharing tasks used in mother-child interaction tasks (left to right: Early 
infancy activity board, toddlerhood teddy bear puzzle and middle childhood Etch-a-Sketch). 
 
6.2.2.4.1 Mothers’ talkativeness. Talkativeness was computed by dividing number of 
5-second segments of speech by total number of 5-second segments in each task, yielding 
proportional scores of mothers’ talkativeness ranging from 0 to 1 (see Chapter 4, page 110 for 
full details). 
6.2.2.4.2 Mothers’ references to internal states. Each 5-second segment of speech 
was coded for mothers’ attributions made about the mind. The revised coding scheme was an 
expanded version of that used by Roberts and colleagues (2013) (see Table 4.4 in Chapter 4, 
page 102). Internal state language was divided into seven categories: Perception, physiology, 
preference, intention, desire, emotion and cognition, and included references to firstborns’ 
and mothers’ own internal states. Inter-rater reliability for this scheme was excellent (median 
α = 1.00 across all tasks). References to internal states were examined by referent, frequency 
and variety (see Chapter 4 for full details of coding scheme and Appendix V for complete 
lists of internal state language terms that were coded). 
6.2.3 Data analysis 
For each topic sharing task, all talkativeness and internal state codes for interactions 
that were shorter than the assigned time for the task were prorated up to 24 segments of 
speech (2 minutes) for the activity board (0.07%) and the teddy bear puzzle (24.9%) tasks. 
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For the Etch-a-Sketch task, the majority of mother-child interactions were under 5 minutes in 
length; therefore, to limit prorating as much as possible, coding was limited to 3 minutes and 
shorter sessions (37.4%) were prorated up to 36 segments of speech. Each coding category 
was divided by number of minutes of task length to yield a rate-per-minute of each code. The 
purpose of this mother-child interaction study was to investigate mothers’ use of internal state 
language within the small subsample of the early arrival sibling group.  
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Sociodemographic and psychological antecedents of early sibling arrival 
 Associations between all variables of interest are presented in Table 6.1. Sibling 
presence, number and timing were all highly correlated with the early arrival sibling variable. 
Therefore, sociodemographic and psychological predictors of all sibling arrival variables 
were explored to establish that predictors of early sibling arrival were not simply predictors 
of sibling arrival in general. 
6.3.1.1 Maternal age at first birth and sibling arrival. As a continuous variable, 
maternal age was negatively associated with number of siblings in the home; mothers who 
were younger at the time of their first birth had more subsequent childbirths. As research 
suggests that the relationship between maternal age at first birth and pace of childbearing is 
non-linear, three groups were investigated: (a) adolescent mothers (≤ 19 years, mean age 
18.44, SD = .86); (b) 20s mothers (20-29 years, mean age 25.85, SD = 2.89); and (c) over 30s 
mothers (≥ 30 years, mean age 33.93, SD = 2.72). The only difference detected was between 
groups in the number of subsequent childbirths F(2,268) = 5.16, p < .01 where over 30s 
mothers had significantly fewer subsequent childbirths than the 20s mothers (p < .01), see 
Table 6.2.  
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Table 6.1  
Intercorrelations among all variables of interest. 
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
Si
b
lin
g 
va
ri
ab
le
s 
1. Presence of a younger sibling in 
the home 
-            
2. Number of younger siblings in 
the home 
.79** 
(269) 
-           
3. Timing of younger sibling arrival .a 
(195) 
-.31** 
(195) 
-          
4. Early arrival younger sibling .16** 
(268) 
.39** 
(268) 
-.59** 
(195) 
-         
So
ci
o
d
em
o
gr
ap
h
ic
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
5. Mothers’ age at first birth 
 
-.07 
(269) 
-.14* 
(269) 
-.11 
(195) 
-.04 
(268) 
-        
6. Mothers’ education 
 
.05 
(269) 
.01 
(269) 
-.03 
(195) 
-.03 
(268) 
.50** 
(269) 
-       
7. Mother’s social class 
 
.04 
(269) 
-.05 
(269) 
.23** 
(195) 
-.03* 
(268) 
-.56** 
(269) 
.15** 
(269) 
-      
8. Mothers’ marital status 
 
.12* 
(269) 
-.10 
(269) 
.09 
(195) 
.01 
(268) 
-.53** 
(269) 
.32** 
(269) 
.14** 
(269) 
-     
9. Mothers’ stable relationship .14* 
(269) 
.06 
(269) 
.03 
(195) 
.00 
(268) 
.37** 
(269) 
.29** 
(269) 
.07** 
(269) 
.24** 
(269) 
-    
10. Sociodemographic adversity -.14* 
(269) 
-.05 
(269) 
.12 
(195) 
-.03 
(268) 
-.73** 
(269) 
-.74** 
(269) 
.69** 
(269) 
.66** 
(269) 
-.65** 
(269) 
-   
 11. Mothers’ retrospective conduct 
problems 
.01 
(269) 
.03 
(269) 
.07 
(195) 
.09 
(268) 
-.46** 
(269) 
-.46** 
(269) 
.33** 
(269) 
.32** 
(269) 
-.27** 
(269) 
.53** 
(269) 
-  
 12. Mothers’ depressive disorder 
first six months postpartum 
.01 
(237) 
.01 
(237) 
.05 
(177) 
-.01 
(236) 
-.15 
(.02) 
-.06 
(237) 
-01 
(237) 
-.05 
(237) 
.a .18** 
(237) 
.21** 
(237) 
- 
 Mean .73 .91 35.25 .19 28.41 4.25 1.46 1.95 .90 -.06 2.06 .09 
 SD .45 .70 16.23 .39 6.21 1.61 .50 1.73 .30 1.02 2.23 .29 
 (N) (269) (269) (195) (268) (269) (269) (269) (269) (269) (269) (269) (237) 
Note. Associations between dichotomous variables were tested by Kappa coefficients. Sample sizes are presented in brackets below coefficients. 
*p <.05. **p <.001, acorrelation not computed as one variable is constant.
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Table 6.2  
Sibling status by the childhood assessment (presence, number, timing and early arrival) 
according to maternal age at first birth groups. 
 Adolescent mothers (≤ 
19 years) n = 41 
20s mothers (20-29 
years) n = 105 
Over 30s mothers (≥ 30 
years) n = 123 
Younger sibling present in the 
home (%) 
68% 80% 68.3% 
Number of younger siblings in 
the home (mean, SD) 
.95 (.86) 1.06 (.72) .76 (.60) 
Timing of younger sibling 
arrival (mean, SD) 
38.04 (20.61) 35.14 (16.62) 34.46 (14.26) 
Younger sibling present in the 
home an early arrival sibling 
(%) 
20% 21.9% 15.4% 
 
6.3.1.2 Other sociodemographic risk factors and sibling arrival. Associations 
between sibling status and sociodemographic variables indicated that couples who were 
married in pregnancy (Wave 1) were more likely to have a second child. Social class was 
associated with the timing of the second child, where middle/upper class mothers had larger 
birth intervals between their first- and second-born children, while lower class mothers were 
associated with having an early arriving second child. Given the high intercorrelations 
between measures of family environment, these variables may contribute towards the timing 
and arrival of second children as part of an overall sociodemographic risk factor; therefore 
subsequent models explored associations using the sociodemographic adversity score.  
6.3.1.3 Psychological predictors of sibling arrival. Descriptive statistics for 
mothers’ postnatal depressive disorder and retrospective conduct symptoms are presented in 
Table 6.1. Of the 237 (88.1%) women in the sibling sample that were assessed with the 
SCAN interview, 22 (9.3%) met the DSM-IV criteria for postnatal depression. Though the 
prevalence of mothers’ postnatal depressive disorder was lower than rates reported in the full 
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sample (11.1%, Perra et al., 2015) this was not significantly different and remained in line 
with estimated prevalence rates of 10-13% (O’Hara & Swain, 1996). Mothers who 
experienced postnatal depression also experienced higher rates of adversity (Mean .15, SD = 
.97) compared to those who did not (Mean -.34, SD = .74), t(23.57) = 2.28, p <.04. They also 
reported higher rates of retrospective symptoms of conduct disorder (Mean 3.23, SD = 2.45) 
than the mothers who did not meet diagnosis for postnatal depression (Mean 1.70, SD = 
1.99), t(235) = 3.34, p <.001. 
 Intercorrelations between all variables did not suggest associations between maternal 
psychological factors of interest and sibling status variables. However, in view of the shared 
variance between maternal postnatal depressive disorder, conduct problems and 
sociodemographic adversity in addition to prior evidence for associations with early sibling 
arrival, a logistic regression analysis was conducted to assess the combined contribution of 
the predictors. Examination of the correlation matrix (Table 6.1) and of collinearity statistics 
established no issues with collinearity amongst predictor variables (VIF < 10, Tolerance > 
.20) (Menard, 1995; Myers, 1990). When sociodemographic adversity was entered at the first 
step and mothers’ postnatal depressive disorder at the second step, mothers’ retrospective 
conduct symptoms were revealed to be a significant third step in the model χ2 (3) = 4.07, p 
<.05, Nagelkerke R2 = .03. Mothers who reported more symptoms of conduct disorder in 
their youth were more likely to have a short birth interval between their first- and second-
born child, resulting in an early arrival younger sibling, Wald statistic = 3.86, p <.05, OR = 
1.19, 95% CI(1.00-1.41) (see Table 6.3).  
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Table 6.3  
Logistic regression of socioeconomic adversity, mothers’ postnatal depressive disorder and 
mothers’ retrospective conduct problems as predictors of early sibling arrival. 
Variable Value R2 B SE Wald χ2 eβ 
95% CI for 
OR 
        
Step 1  .00      
   Socioeconomic adversity   -.36 .27 1.85 .90 .41 – 1.17 
Step 2  .00      
   Mothers’ postnatal depressive 
disorder 
No (Reference)  - - - - - 
Yes  -.15 .60 .06 .86 .27 – 2.79 
Step 3  .03*      
   Mothers’ retrospective 
conduct symptoms 
 
 .17* .09 3.86 1.19 1.00 – 1.41 
Note. The table presents coefficients obtained at the final step of the model.  N = 236, Ɨp <.10. 
*p < .05. **p <.01. ***p <.001. 
 
6.3.2 Consequences of early sibling arrival for mother-child interaction 
Of the 50 families in the early arrival sibling sample, 43 of these were seen at the 
toddlerhood assessment. For the purpose of examining mother-child interaction following the 
birth of the younger sibling at this time-point, mothers who had not yet given birth to the 
early arrival sibling were excluded from the early arrival sibling group, yielding a sample of 
24 mother-child dyads who had an early arrival sibling present at toddlerhood assessment. 
Twenty-two of these had mother-child interaction data available. The mean age of the early 
arrival younger siblings in this group was 3.60 months (SD = 3.63) at the time of the toddler 
assessment. 
6.3.2.1 Mother talkativeness. No differences were detected in mothers’ talkativeness 
at the early infancy interaction and the middle childhood interaction between the sibling 
groups. However, mothers who had an early arrival sibling born by the time of the 
toddlerhood interaction spoke to their firstborn significantly less (Mean .62, SD = .27) than 
mothers who did not (Mean .77, SD = .20) t(23.79) = -2.64, p <.05 (see Figure 6.4).  
163 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Mothers’ talkativeness scores at the infancy, toddlerhood and middle childhood 
assessments according to whether a sibling was present at the toddlerhood assessment, error 
bars are ± standard error of the mean, *p <.05. 
 
6.3.2.2 Mother references to internal states. No differences were detected between 
the early sibling arrival group and the no sibling group at the infancy and middle childhood 
assessment in mothers’ frequency and variety of internal state language. However, mothers’ 
who had a second child present by the toddlerhood assessment referred to internal states 
fewer times than those without t(34.92) = -2.75, p < .01. When frequency of references to 
internal states was separated according to referent, it was revealed that mothers referred to the 
child’s internal states less at the toddlerhood assessment if an early arrival sibling was present 
t(30.89) = -2.22, p < .05 (Figure 6.5).  
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Infancy Toddlerhood Middle childhood
M
o
th
er
s'
 t
al
ka
ti
ve
n
es
s
Early arrival sibling present at toddler assessment
No sibling present at toddler assessment
* 
164 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Mothers’ references to the child’s and her own internal states (rate per minute) at 
the infancy, toddlerhood and middle childhood assessments according to whether a sibling 
was present at the toddlerhood assessment, error bars are ± standard error of the mean, *p 
<.05. 
 
 Table 6.4 shows the breakdown of internal state language categories used by mothers 
at the early infancy assessment, according to whether there was an early arrival sibling 
present. The only difference in internal state language between the early arrival sibling group 
and no sibling present group at the toddler interaction was mothers’ references to child 
cognitive states. Where an early arrival sibling was present at the toddlerhood assessment, 
mothers referred to the firstborns’ cognitive states significantly fewer times t(45.01) = -2.29,  
p <.05 (see also Figure 6.6). 
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Table 6.4   
Means and standard deviations for maternal use of internal state language (rate per minute) at the toddlerhood assessment according to early 
arrival sibling presence group (n = 22) and the no sibling group (n = 178). 
Note. Early arrival sibling present at toddlerhood assessment n = 22, no sibling present at toddlerhood assessment n = 178.
Mothers’ references 
to child’s internal 
states 
Sibling presence groups 
Mothers’ references 
to own internal states 
Sibling presence groups 
Early arrival sibling 
present 
No sibling 
present 
Early arrival sibling 
present 
No sibling 
present 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Perception 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.06 
.06 
 
.21 
.21 
 
.15 
.10 
 
.35 
.22 
Perception 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.02 
.02 
 
.11 
.11 
 
.02 
.02 
 
.12 
.10 
Physiology 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.05 
.02 
 
.21 
.11 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.04 
.04 
Physiology 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
Preference 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.03 
.03 
 
.13 
.13 
 
.08 
.07 
 
.26 
.20 
Preference 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.03 
.03 
 
.13 
.13 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.04 
.04 
Intention 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.30 
.19 
 
.46 
.25 
 
.31 
.21 
 
.49 
.30 
Intention 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.01 
.01 
 
.07 
.07 
Desire 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.19 
.15 
 
.38 
.30 
 
.39 
.23 
. 
.57 
.28 
Desire 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.01 
.01 
 
.06 
.06 
Emotion 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.04 
.04 
 
.20 
.20 
 
.03 
.03 
 
.16 
.14 
Emotion 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.00 
.00 
Cognition 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.11 
.08 
 
.29 
.23 
 
.28 
.19 
 
.58 
.33 
Cognition 
     Frequency 
     Variety 
 
.07 
.07 
 
.25 
.25 
 
.19 
.15 
 
.35 
.26 
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Figure 6.6 Mothers’ references to the firstborns’ internal state categories (rate per minute) at 
the toddlerhood interaction according to whether a sibling was present, error bars are ± 
standard error of the mean, *p <.05. 
 
6.4 Discussion 
 In Chapter 3 of this thesis, early arrival siblings did not foster firstborns’ 
understanding of second-order false belief. Therefore, the aim of the present chapter was to 
examine characteristics of this group that may begin to explain why early arrival siblings did 
not provide a similar advantage to later arriving siblings. In the present chapter, this was done 
by exploring maternal antecedents of early subsequent childbearing and by examining 
changes that occur within early mother-firstborn interactions after an early arrival sibling is 
born.  
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6.4.1 Antecedents of early sibling arrival 
Mothers’ retrospective symptoms of conduct disorder predicted rapid subsequent 
childbearing following the birth of their first child.  This finding builds on previous research 
suggesting that conduct disorder predicts reproductive behaviour in young mothers; in the 
present sample, mothers’ history of conduct symptoms predicted rapid multiple births 
regardless of age. This finding is notable given that the majority of work exploring maternal 
predictors of short birth intervals has heavily focused on adolescent mothers (Barnet et al., 
2008; Raneri & Wiemann, 2007). Given the homotypic continuity of conduct problems and 
ongoing related issues in adulthood, including substance abuse, engagement in crime, early 
home leaving, multiple and violent cohabitation partnerships (Bardone et al., 1996), it is 
essential to recognise that the risk of rapid childbearing is not one that is limited to adolescent 
mothers.  
 The finding that mothers’ postnatal depression was not associated with rapid 
subsequent childbearing corroborates previous work that also showed no link between 
depressive symptoms and unintended pregnancy within 1 year after a birth, when educational 
status and contraceptive use were controlled (Bennett et al., 2006). Although sexual 
behaviour may reduce during episodes of depression, this stands in contrast to studies linking 
depressive symptoms with risky sexual behaviour (Ramrakha et al., 2000). The present study 
does not provide a definitive conclusion: there was a relatively small cell size of the 
depressed group and no measure of sexual behaviour following childbirth. Therefore further 
exploration of associations between depressive disorder and rapid childbearing should use 
more measures within a high risk or clinical sample.  
Socioeconomic adversity did not predict early subsequent childbearing in the present 
sample, which stands in contrast to previous work showing low educational status doubles the 
risk of unintended repeat pregnancy within 1 year after a birth (Bennett et al., 2006). This 
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discrepancy may be due to a variety of reasons: One, is that the present investigation took 
place within a representative community sample rather than a high-risk sample. Another 
reason for this discrepancy may be that, given the high association between economic 
hardship and mothers’ conduct problems, the inclusion of conduct problems in the model in 
the present study may have explained variance that has not previously been captured in 
previous studies. 
6.4.2 Consequences of early sibling arrival for early mother-child interactions  
 The consequences of short birth intervals between children for the mother-firstborn 
relationship has been severely neglected in developmental literature thus far. In this study, 
mothers spoke differently to their firstborn child following the rapid arrival of a second child. 
Mothers in this group talked less to their firstborn generally, and referred to their firstborns’ 
cognitive states significantly less if they had a second child at the time of the toddlerhood 
mother-child interaction task. These differences, however, were not apparent at the baseline 
(infancy) mother-child interaction task, nor at the middle childhood mother-child interaction 
task when firstborns were 7 years of age. This suggests that mothers of early arrival siblings 
did not have an overall propensity to speak differently to their firstborn children, but rather 
their capacity to engage in conversations with their firstborn shortly after early sibling arrival 
may alter as a result of caring for multiple children under 2 years of age.  
 Nevertheless, it is possible that mothers’ reduction in conversation and references to 
internal states in the early arrival sibling group in early mother-firstborn interactions may be 
exacerbated by factors other than the stress of caring for multiple children. This group scored 
significantly higher on symptoms of conduct disorder, which may additionally hinder their 
ability to engage in conversations with their firstborn child. Mothers with conduct disorder 
show a lack of emotional and verbal responsiveness to their young children in addition to less 
provision of appropriate play materials. These suboptimal parenting behaviours are linked to 
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children’s later developmental delays (Serbin, Peters, McAffer, & Schwartzman, 1991). 
Given that short birth intervals are associated with postpartum low mood (Gürel & Gürel, 
2000), it may be that the mothers’ of early arrival siblings were more likely to be depressed at 
the time of the assessment. This may explain the reduction in references to internal states, 
given that maternal depression is associated with differences in mothers’ frequency of 
references to inner states, and ability to comment appropriately on the minds of their infants 
(Pawlby et al., 2010). Although not possible within the confines of the present investigation, 
these possibilities must be further studied within larger studies of early mother-child 
interaction following the early arrival of a second child.  
6.4.3 Limitations 
 This study has limitations. The antecedents explored in this study predicted towards 
families experiencing the birth of an early arrival younger sibling, and did not include rapid 
subsequent pregnancies that resulted in terminations or losses. Therefore, this study 
undoubtedly underestimated the number of rapid repeat pregnancies that occurred within this 
sample. Future work must examine the antecedents of rapid repeat pregnancy in community 
samples by examining information on miscarriages and terminations, in addition to reports of 
sexual behaviour following the birth of the firstborn child. However, the measure of rapid 
birth of a second child in this study may have been more precise, given that a number of 
unintended pregnancies that end in termination are typically underreported (over 40% in the 
National Survey of Family Growth; NSFG) in surveys of the general population (Fu, 
Darroch, Haas, & Ranjit, 1999).  
 Secondly, it must be acknowledged that the cell size of families that had an early 
arrival sibling present at the toddler mother-child interaction was small. Given that the CCDS 
is a prospective longitudinal study of child development, and not one of family planning 
outcomes, this investigation was only possible by taking advantage of the data available. That 
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being said, the longitudinal nature of the study provided a unique opportunity to compare the 
mother-firstborn conversational climate upon arrival of an early sibling to the climate prior to 
sibling arrival when the firstborn was 6 months old and later in development when they 
reached 7 years of age. While the results in this exploratory study must be taken as 
preliminary, this study has highlighted the need for more research into the effect that early 
sibling arrival has on mother-child interactions. 
6.4.4 Summary 
 In this chapter, it was first identified that mothers’ retrospective symptoms of conduct 
disorder predict the timing of family formation, in that mothers with conduct symptoms were 
more likely to have a short birth interval between her first- and second-born children. 
Secondly, mother-firstborn interactions that followed the birth of an early arrival sibling were 
found to differ from mother-child interactions where no sibling was present. Mothers of two 
young children by the time that the firstborn was a toddler were less talkative and referred to 
their firstborns’ cognitive states less. Interestingly, short birth intervals affect features of 
mother-firstborn conversations that are considered most relevant for promoting children’s 
developing understanding of minds. This, as pointed out in Chapter 3, may have long term 
consequences for child development. Although findings related to the mother-firstborn 
interactions at the toddlerhood assessment must be taken as somewhat preliminary, this 
chapter has highlighted the importance of examining how short birth intervals between 
children affect mother-child interactions. 
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CHAPTER 7 
General Discussion 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The overarching aim of this thesis was to examine the influence of children’s close 
relationships on their understanding of minds in middle childhood. Past research has focused 
on investigating the link between children’s close relationships and their developing theories 
of mind in the preschool years, neglecting that children’s theory of mind continues to develop 
beyond the 5th year of life. Studies of family influence on children’s mind-understanding 
have also focused on children’s individual relationships with family members, rather than 
considering the connections between them. Therefore, in this thesis I examined the influence 
of younger siblings on children’s higher-order understanding of minds in middle childhood. I 
explored how siblings influence mind-understanding by investigating how the arrival of a 
sibling changes the dynamic of the mother-firstborn relationship. This investigation took 
place within a prospective longitudinal study of firstborn children and their families who 
were followed from pregnancy to 7 years postpartum. In this chapter, I will synthesise the 
key empirical findings of this thesis. To support this, a summary of these empirical findings 
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Figure 7.1 Summary of associations between the variables of interest in the thesis. Plus symbols indicate positive associations, minus symbols 
indicate negative associations.
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is presented in Figure 7.1. Following this, the limitations and implications for theory and 
future research will be discussed. 
7.2 Summary of Findings 
7.2.1 Average to late, but not early, arriving younger siblings foster second-order false 
belief understanding 
 In Chapter 1, I reviewed the literature regarding the influence of siblings on children’s 
understanding of minds. In doing so, I highlighted that the link between having siblings and 
children’s performance on measures of theory of mind is dependent on sibling constellation 
factors (Buhrmester, 1992), such as birth-order, age-spacing and gender composition. Of 
these constellation factors, previous findings were mostly mixed regarding the influence of 
younger siblings on children’s understanding of minds (e.g., Peterson, 2000, Farhadian et al., 
2010, Ruffman et al., 1998; Wright & Mahford, 2012). This is possibly due to the focus on 
children’s mind-understanding in the preschool years, the use of small samples and lack of 
control regarding known correlates of theory of mind (Chapter 3).  
 Therefore in Chapter 3, I set out to investigate the influence of younger siblings on 
firstborns’ higher-order understanding of minds at age 7. I examined various sibling 
constellation factors, including sibling presence, birth interval and gender composition on an 
established measure of higher-order theory of mind: the second-order false belief task. I 
found that when other child correlates of second-order false belief were controlled, presence 
of a sibling resulted in a two-fold advantage on firstborns’ passing of the second-order false 
belief task with full comprehension. However, this was only true for children who 
experienced the birth of sibling after their second birthday.  
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7.2.2 Explaining the influence of younger siblings on second-order false belief 
understanding  
 In Chapter 1 of this thesis, I described the ways in which siblings may foster 
understanding of minds in childhood. One way siblings may foster children’s theory of mind 
is by triggering changes within the mother-firstborn relationship, namely, in mothers’ 
propensity to refer to their firstborn as one with a mind in her use of internal state language. 
Through the use of this prospective longitudinal design, with mother-child interaction data 
available before and after the arrival of siblings, this study presented an opportunity to test 
this hypothesis.  
 Therefore, in Chapter 4, I reviewed the literature regarding the relationship between 
mothers’ references to internal states and children’s theory of mind understanding. Though 
the positive association between mothers’ internal state language and children’s 
understanding false belief in the preschool years was well-evidenced, few studies had 
explored this relationship at age 7. Additionally, little was known about maternal correlates 
of mothers’ propensity to discuss internal states with her child. As such, I expanded the 
internal state language coding scheme previously used on the Cardiff Child Development 
Study (Roberts et al., 2013), to one more appropriate for coding mother’s speech to her child 
across different ages. I applied this to mothers’ speech during interactions with their firstborn 
child during infancy, toddlerhood and in middle childhood.  
 I established excellent reliability using the expanded internal state language coding 
scheme, and the patterns of internal state language categories reflected those reported in 
previous studies. I discovered that mothers with a history of behavioural problems used less 
internal state language. When controlling for mothers’ behavioural problems, mothers’ 
frequency and variety of references to the child’s, and her own, cognitive states at the middle 
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childhood interaction predicted an advantage on firstborns’ performance on the second-order 
false belief task.  
 In Chapter 5, I brought the two findings from Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 together, by 
testing the hypothesis that siblings foster firstborns’ understanding of minds in middle 
childhood by triggering changes to the mothers’ references to internal states. First, I 
examined whether mothers’ references to internal states changed upon arrival of a sibling. I 
compared mothers’ references to internal states prior to sibling arrival in early infancy, to 
mothers’ references in middle childhood according to whether children had a sibling at 
middle childhood or whether they were only children. There was no difference in mothers’ 
use of internal state language between sibling presence groups at the early infancy 
interaction. However, at the mother-child interaction in middle childhood, mothers who had a 
second child referred to their firstborns’ cognitive states more frequently and in a more varied 
way than those who did not.  
 Having established positive associations between sibling presence, mothers’ 
references to firstborn cognitive states and firstborns’ second-order false belief 
understanding, I tested the extent to which mothers’ cognitive references mediated the link 
between sibling presence and firstborns’ understanding of minds. I found that the relationship 
between presence of a sibling and firstborns’ understanding of second-order false belief was 
explained in part, by mothers’ variety of references to cognitive states.  
7.2.3 Timing matters: An investigation of antecedents and consequences of early arrival 
siblings 
 In Chapter 3, I found that the younger sibling effect on firstborns’ understanding of 
second-order false belief was only the case for children who did not experience an early 
arriving younger sibling. Therefore, in Chapter 6 I focused on exploring factors that may 
begin to reveal why this was the case. I reviewed and examined maternal antecedents of early 
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sibling arrival, finding that mothers’ symptoms of conduct disorder predicted having a short 
birth interval between the first and second child.  
I also investigated the consequences of having an early arrival sibling on early 
mother-firstborn interactions. Mothers who had a second child by the time of the toddlerhood 
assessment (21 months) spoke less within mother-firstborn interactions, and referred to 
cognitive states less than mothers who did not have a second child at the same time-point. 
Given that there was no difference in mothers’ speech between the no sibling, early arrival 
sibling and average/later arrival sibling groups at the early infancy or middle childhood 
assessments (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6), this suggests that early arriving siblings only affect 
mothers’ speech shortly after their arrival. This finding, together with the lack of sibling 
effect for early arriving siblings reported in Chapter 3, could suggest that the negative impact 
early arrival siblings have on mothers’ speech in early interactions may have long term 
consequences for firstborns’ understanding of minds.  
7.2.4 Overall summary of findings 
 This thesis highlights processes by which younger siblings may or may not foster 
firstborns’ understanding of minds in middle childhood. The findings presented in this thesis 
suggest that the arrival of a sibling triggers a change in the conversational climate of mother-
child dyadic interaction. The collective findings presented in this thesis serve as a reminder of 
the complexities of studying the relationship between siblings and children’s understanding 
of minds. The influence of younger siblings does not occur in isolation of other relationships. 
Rather, the sibling effect on theory of mind must be understood by examining how the birth 
of the second child affects children’s other close relationships. The effect the arrival of the 
sibling has on these relationships may well differ according to maternal antecedents of 
childbearing and sibling constellation factors. 
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Investigating the influence of siblings within the context of the Cardiff Child 
Development Study provided several advantages in conducting this complex investigation. 
The study sample was large and diverse enough to examine various sibling constellation 
factors, such as birth interval and gender composition, and the relation to firstborns’ 
understanding of minds. Additionally, this representative sample included firstborns who had 
experienced the birth of a sibling in addition to those who did not. This enabled the 
investigation to move beyond smaller sibling studies that were unable to separate normative 
development from changes related to sibling arrival. The use of a prospective longitudinal 
study from pregnancy to 7 years postpartum gave a unique opportunity to examine the 
changes in mother-child interaction before the birth of the second child, and at several time-
points after. This enabled the investigation of how the dynamics of the mother-child 
relationship change as family formation changes over time.  
7.3 Limitations 
The studies presented in this thesis have limitations. The first limitation that must be 
acknowledged is the single second-order false belief task that was used as the main dependent 
variable in this thesis. This task was part of a large battery of social, emotional and cognitive 
assessments that were administered at the middle childhood home visit. As such, the number 
of assessments possible within the time-constraints of home visits inevitably resulted in a 
trade-off with the number of trials possible in each assessment. That being said, I used 
stringent criteria for passing second-order false belief; all analyses in this thesis focused on 
children’s passing of second-order false belief with full comprehension. Additionally, the 
second-order false belief story used in present thesis closely resembled the simplified story 
used by Coull and colleagues (2006), as did the second-order, justification and 
comprehension questions used to assess task performance (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2, and also 
Appendix I). In their study, the story was acted out using Lego models of locations and dolls 
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to represent the characters in the story, which closely resembles the Playmobil set used in the 
CCDS. 
In addition to the task closely resembling previous work as much as possible, it is also 
notable that test-retest reliability of other simple second-order tasks, such as that used by 
Sullivan, Zaitchik and Tager-Flusberg (1994) have been reported as acceptable (.72, Hughes, 
Adlam, Happé, Jackson, Taylor, & Caspi, 2000). In light of this, the use of a single task to 
assess children’s understanding of minds has been defended. Indeed, Hughes and colleagues 
(2000) stated that “Many studies seek to establish whether or not a child has a theory of mind 
on the basis of his or her responses to a handful of questions on a single task. Our results 
suggest that this procedure will yield moderately reliable data that are acceptable for research 
purposes.” (p. 488).  
 
Table 7.1  
Coull and colleagues’ (2006) second-order false belief story format. 
It is Paul’s birthday. Paul and Sally are in his play room. He is showing Sally his favourite new present—a robot. 
Paul puts the robot back in the box with the lid on and then has to go outside. While Paul is away, Sally 
decides to play a trick on Paul and move the robot from its box and hide it away in the cupboard. While Sally is 
hiding the robot in the cupboard, Paul passes by the window and sees Sally hiding the robot in the cupboard. 
But Sally doesn’t see Paul watching her hide the robot in the cupboard. She doesn’t see him! Paul then 
returns to the toy room. 
Story questions and example answers 
Second-order false-belief 
question 
Where does Sally think Paul will look for 
the robot? 
Box. 
Justification question Why does Sally think Paul will look for 
the robot in the _______? 
Because she doesn’t know that Paul 
knows the robot is in the cupboard. 
Probe question 1 Does Paul know that the robot is in the 
cupboard? 
Yes 
Probe question 2 Does Sally know that Paul saw her hide 
the robot? 
No. 
Probe question 3 Where will Paul look for the robot? In the cupboard. 
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Table 7.2  
Second-order false belief story format used in the Cardiff Child Development Study. 
It is almost bedtime.  Nick has had his special teddy for a very long time. He likes to have it nearby when he 
goes to sleep. Nick puts the teddy under the duvet on the bed. Mum doll comes in and asks Nick to come 
brush his teeth.  Alex sees Nick leave and runs to get the teddy to hide it in the cupboard. But Nick comes 
back, stands in the doorway and sees Alex hide the teddy in the cupboard.  She goes away again.  Alex goes 
back to playing. Nick comes back in. “I want my teddy,” he says. 
Story questions and example answers 
Second-order false-belief 
question 
Where does Alex think Nick will look for 
the teddy? 
Bed. 
Justification question Why does Alex think Nick will look for the 
teddy in the _______? 
Because she doesn’t know 
that Nick knows the teddy is 
in the cupboard. 
Comprehension question 1 Does Nick know that the teddy is in the 
cupboard? 
Yes 
Comprehension question 2 Does Alex know that Nick saw her hide 
the teddy? 
No. 
Comprehension question 3 Where will Nick look for the teddy? In the cupboard. 
 
 Nevertheless, more research must be conducted to corroborate the findings reported in 
this thesis. Given that an aggregate of children’s performance on multiple false-belief tasks 
would yield a more reliable index of children’s understanding of minds (Hughes et al., 2000), 
it is recommended that future studies attempt to replicate these findings using a battery of 
false belief tasks. The inclusion of simpler second-order stories in such a battery that include 
second-order ignorance questions or memory aids, for example (Coull et al., 2006), would 
prevent underestimating children’s ability to engage in second-order reasoning (see Hogrefe, 
Wimmer, & Perner, 1986).  
Research may also move beyond false belief tasks in the future. Although the use of 
the second-order false belief task resulted in comparability with other work within the 
literature concerning higher-order theory of mind, this task represents just one domain of 
social understanding. More could be understood about the sources of individual difference in 
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children’s theory of mind in middle childhood by assessing other dimensions of children’s 
mind-understanding (Astington, 2001). These could include the strange stories task (Happé, 
1994), the triangles task (Castelli, Happé, Frith & Frith, 2000) or the silent film task (Devine 
& Hughes, 2013). 
 Another limitation that must be acknowledged is the issue of missing mother-child 
interaction data at different assessment points. In this thesis, I focused on how mother-child 
interactions change following the arrival of a sibling. Due to the focus on this relationship, 
instances where children were seen interacting with another caregiver in the home were not 
included in this investigation. However, where appropriate, I imputed missing data from 
earlier time-points where mother-child interaction data were available. This has its 
limitations, in that it assumes a linear relationship in features of mother’s language over 
different time-points, however this is recommended practice in longitudinal research 
(Newman, 2003). All analyses were conducted with and without imputed data prior to what 
was reported in this thesis: no different results were found in the analyses of the raw data.  
7.4 Future Directions 
 The benefit of studying sibling influences within this longitudinal study enabled the 
examination of antecedents and consequences of sibling arrival and how these may be related 
to children’s understanding of minds. The approach I have taken in this thesis reflects Baydar 
and colleagues’ (1997) model of the effects of the birth of a sibling shown in Figure 7.2. 
Highlighted in this figure are pathways that have been explored in this thesis. Path A 
represents the association between sibling presence and firstborns’ understanding of minds 
(Chapter 3) and path B represents the relationship between mothers’ internal state language 
and firstborns mind-understanding (Chapter 4). Path C was investigated in both Chapters 5 
and 6, in the study of how sibling presence and early arrival affects mother-child interactions. 
181 
 
Finally, pathway D represents the investigation in Chapter 6, where the maternal antecedents 
of short birth intervals were identified.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Baydar and colleagues’ (1997) model of the effects of the birth of a sibling. 
Shaded are the factors that were investigated in this thesis. 
 
 Placing the findings within the context of Baydar and colleagues’ (1997) model 
highlights how future work should build on the findings presented in this thesis, by 
examining the changes in socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the firstborn and 
family upon sibling arrival. Sibling arrival is associated with decreases in mothers’ time at 
work, where in contrast, mothers without a second child increase their work hours. The 
decrease in maternal earnings and increase in resources needed to care for multiple children 
results in more socioeconomic hardship. Additionally, firstborns who experience the arrival 
of a sibling spend less time in day care than those who do not, presumably because mothers 
are available in the home following the arrival of the new baby (Baydar et al., 1997). These 
factors may explain some of the changes in mother-child interaction reported in this thesis. 
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Though it was not feasible to investigate these outcomes within this thesis, it is recommended 
that future research takes these socioeconomic and demographic characteristics into account. 
 The relationships explored in this thesis should also be investigated further in studies 
that include a preschool-age assessment. In Chapter 4 of this thesis, I reported that mothers’ 
references to internal states during the early infancy and toddlerhood mother-child 
interactions were not related to children’s later understanding of minds. However, this stands 
in contrast to other research suggesting that mothers’ references to cognitive states earlier in 
development may help children to better understand and engage with the minds of others 
(Adrian et al., 2007). Therefore, it is possible that the relationship between maternal internal 
state language and children’s second-order false belief understanding in this study may 
represent residual effects of mother-child interactions from earlier years. Although no 
relationship with maternal references to internal states was found at the early infancy and 
toddlerhood interactions, this seems appropriate given that complex internal state references 
most relevant for false belief understanding would not be in the range of the infants’ Zone of 
Proximal Development. Further longitudinal research is required to examine the influence of 
maternal speech from the preschool years to middle childhood on children’s understanding of 
second-order false beliefs. Ideally, this would also give the opportunity to track the effect of 
younger siblings earlier in development using standard first-order false belief tasks. 
 The findings presented in this thesis have contributed to our understanding of the 
processes by which younger siblings influence firstborns’ theory of mind. Future work must 
now continue to explore the other processes by which younger siblings influence firstborns’ 
understanding of minds, by examining other relationships within the family system. This 
should include further work examining the influence of fathers’ speech (LaBounty et al., 
2008) and the dynamics of sibling interactions associated with children’s social 
understanding (Dunn, 1994). One avenue that has received little attention thus far, is how 
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siblings foster children’s understanding of minds through shared humour (Hoicka & Akhtar, 
2012). Future research must continue to investigate the processes by which siblings influence 
theory of mind in the same spirit of this thesis; not by examining children’s relationships in 
isolation, but by considering how relationships change and how one relationship may 
influence others (Dunn, 1993).  
7.5 Implications of the Findings 
 The findings presented in this thesis speak to the importance of children’s social 
worlds in the development of theory of mind. All prominent individualistic theories of theory 
of mind development accommodate the influence of social interaction in some way. In 
modular accounts of theory of mind (Leslie, 1994), social interaction is thought to trigger 
maturation of hardwired theory of mind mechanisms. In the theory-theory approach to the 
development of theory of mind (Wellman, 1990), it is thought that children’s social and 
mental knowledge is acquired through theory formation and revision. ‘Theory theorists’ 
suggest that during development there are fundamental theory shifts in children’s mind-
understanding, in which children’s social experiences play an important role. Finally, 
simulation theory (Harris, 1991) emphasises the use of imagination and pretence to simulate 
what another might be thinking, based on what mental states the individual has experienced 
themselves already. In this view, children’s social interactions that foster their imaginative 
capacity for pretence fosters theory of mind development (Hughes & Leekam, 2004). 
Carpendale and Lewis’s (2004) social constructivist account is a recent alternative to existing 
theories, which have been criticised for underemphasising the importance of children’s 
external, social worlds and focusing too heavily on individual development. In this view, 
children’s understanding of minds is thought to be the essential foundation in which 
children’s understanding of minds develops. Although the extent to which theory of mind 
develops within the context of social interactions is still up for debate, this thesis 
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demonstrates the ongoing importance of children’s close family relationships in children’s 
continuing developing understanding of minds beyond the preschool years.   
Carpendale and Lewis’s view (2004) called for more research concerning how social 
experience influences children’s developing understanding of minds (Bartsch & Estes, 2004). 
The present thesis has provided some insights by highlighting that the effect of siblings on 
firstborns’ second-order false belief understanding can be explained in part, by changes in 
mothers’ references to cognitive states. This work highlights that future study concerning 
sibling influence on theory of mind must move beyond merely examining the relationship 
between the quantity of siblings and children’s understanding of mind. Rather, entry into 
siblinghood must be regarded as a proxy for changes in children’s social experiences within 
the family. In this thesis, I have demonstrated that these changes are not limited to children’s 
interactions with their siblings, but that siblings trigger changes throughout the family 
system. Future research must continue in this vein to examine changes in children’s 
conversational environment beyond the mother-child dyad. 
  One recurring finding in this thesis was the importance of mothers’ behavioural 
problems, which was associated with mothers’ propensity to refer to internal states at all 
mother-child interaction tasks (Chapter 4) and was also associated with early sibling arrival 
(Chapter 6). These findings highlight the importance of controlling for mothers’ behavioural 
problems in future research, both as a predictor of mother-child conversational environments 
and as a predictor of timing of sibling arrival. These findings also have implications for 
clinical practice. Mothers’ symptoms of conduct disorder, but not age, predicted a short birth 
interval between the first- and second- child. Given the host of issues associated with rapid 
subsequent childbearing (Conde-Agudelo et al., 2007, 2012) and the consequences maternal 
behavioural problems have for the provision of an optimal caregiving environment (Kim-
Cohen et al., 2006), this thesis has identified a risk group that warrants further research and 
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clinical intervention. Programmes such as The Family Nurse Partnership (Robling et al., 
2016) which offer intensive home visiting from a specialist nurse for first-time adolescent 
mothers could also be of benefit for mothers with behavioural problems. Such programmes 
are effective in reducing closely-spaced pregnancies, and may be an avenue where mothers 
can receive support and encouragement to talk to their babies in ways that promote the 
development of theory of mind.  
7.6 Final Conclusions 
 Studying the connections between children’s close relationships can reveal a great 
deal about the social influences on children’s developing understanding of minds. In this 
thesis, I have identified that younger siblings provide firstborns with an advantage on 
measure of higher-order theory of mind. This advantage can be explained in part, by an 
increase in mothers’ references to cognitive states upon arrival of a second child. However, I 
have highlighted that this process whereby siblings foster firstborns’ mind-understanding is 
only the case for children who do not experience an early arriving younger sibling. Firstborns 
with a closely spaced younger sibling performed similarly to children who did not have a 
younger sibling. By investigating early mother-child interactions of dyads who experienced 
early sibling arrival, it was revealed that mothers spoke less in general, and referred to 
cognitive states less often following rapid sibling birth. This thesis has highlighted how 
changes in family structure affect the dynamics of children’s close relationships, and has 
made a new contribution to our understanding of how these close relationships foster 
children’s developing understanding of minds.
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APPENDIX I 
Second-order false belief supplementary material 
Table 1. 
Second-order false belief coding and frequencies of appropriate and inappropriate justifications. 
 Note. These verbatim examples followed the justification question that followed the second-order false belief story: Why does Alex think 
Nick will look for the teddy in the _______?
 
Frequency of 
response (n) 
Appropriate justifications 95 
Code 1 
Embedding of mental state: 
Child explicitly embeds a mental state within 
another character’s mental state. 
“Because she thinks Nick has no idea that she’s put the teddy in the cupboard.” 
3 
Code 2 
Nesting of crucial information within another’s 
belief: 
Information regarding what character has found 
out is contained in a mental state. 
“Because she hid it under the duvet, and then, and she thinks Kate didn’t see her. 
Eee! She won’t find out about this!” 
27 
Code 3 
Location: 
Original location of the object is mentioned. 
“’Cause he, that’s where he hided it.” 
65 
Inappropriate justifications 44 
Code 1 
First-order reasoning: 
Child mentions irrelevant knowledge of one of 
the characters. 
“Because he… he… didn’t see like him… and he thought no one had taken it out of 
his bed so he would think it’s in his bed.” 
6 
Code 2 
Zero-order reasoning: 
Unnecessary focus on the location of the teddy. 
“Because normally his teddy is there.” 
3 
Code 3 Irrelevant information. “Because she was out with mum.” 
7 
Code 4 Nonsensical information. “Because that’s the, that’s the spot to find things.” 
28 
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Table 2.  
Contingency table of frequency of correct responses to comprehension questions 
according to appropriate or inappropriate justification. 
 Frequency of correct responses to comprehension questions 
Justification Comprehension 
question 3 
Comprehension 
question 4 
Comprehension 
question 5 
Appropriate (n= 95) 23 (54.8%) 36 (85.7%) 78 (83.0%) 
Inappropriate (n= 44) 71 (78.0%) 87 (91.6%) 30 (69.8%) 
Note. Appropriate/inappropriate responses are described on p. 215. Comprehension 
questions refer to questions 3, 4 and 5 (see Table 3.4, p 61). 
 
Table 3. 
Contingency table of frequency of correct responses to comprehension questions 
according to appropriate justification codes. 
 Frequency of correct responses to comprehension questions 
Appropriate 
Justification 
Comprehension 
question 3 
Comprehension 
question 4 
Comprehension 
question 5 
Code 1 3 (100.0%) 3 (100.0%) 3 (100.0%) 
Code 2 27 (100.0%) 27 (100.0%) 25 (96.2%) 
Code 3 41 (67.2%) 57 (87.7%) 50 (76.9%) 
Note. Appropriate/inappropriate responses are described on p. 215. Comprehension 
questions refer to questions 3, 4 and 5 (see Table 3.4, p 61). 
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Table 4. 
Contingency table of frequency of correct responses to comprehension questions 
according to inappropriate justification codes. 
 Frequency of correct responses to comprehension questions 
Inappropriate 
Justification 
Comprehension 
question 3 
Comprehension 
question 4 
Comprehension 
question 5 
Code 1 3 (50.0%) 5 (83.3%) 4 (66.7%) 
Code 2 3 (100.0%) 3 (100.0%) 3 (100.0%) 
Code 3 5 (83.3%) 6 (100.0%) 4 (57.1%) 
Code 4 12 (44.4%) 22 (81.5%) 19 (70.4%) 
Note. Appropriate/inappropriate responses are described on p. 215. Comprehension 
questions refer to questions 3, 4 and 5 (see Table 3.4, p 61). 
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APPENDIX II 
 
Excerpts of executive function tasks from the Cardiff Child Development Study 
Amsterdam Neuropsychological Tasks Manual 
 
 
 
Cardiff Child Development Study 
Amsterdam Neuropsychological Tasks 
Manual 
 
Leo M. J. de Sonneville 
Dale F. Hay 
Stephanie van Goozen 
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The Cardiff Child Development Study ANT Manual 
This manual has been compiled by Amy Paine and Salim Hashmi for the Cardiff Child Development 
Study (CCDS) team. This manual includes a compilation of instructions and descriptions from Dr de 
Sonneville’s ANT manuals, as well as advice and figures created by the CCDS team. This manual 
should be used in conjunction with official ANT manuals. This manual is specific to the tasks created 
for the purpose of the CCDS data collection, and the details of SPSS files are specifically those 
created with CCDS data. The advice for analysis of this data has been compiled from our 
examination of recommendations in the literature.5 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Chapter ANT Task Psychological Construct Page Number 
Chapter 1 Baseline Speed Reaction times 2 
Chapter 2 Response 
Organisation Objects 
Cognitive flexibility 
Response Inhibition 
5 
Chapter 3 Delay Frustration Frustration/stress ‘hot’ 
executive function 
10 
Chapter 4 Visuospatial 
Sequencing 
Visuospatial and visuotemporal 
working memory 
Cognitive control 
12 
Chapter 5 Pursuit Visuomotor coordination 
Sustained attention 
16 
Chapter 6 Identification of 
Facial Emotions 
Emotion recognition 21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Appendix II only includes the sections of the manual relevant to the executive function tasks that were used in 
this thesis. These sections are highlighted in grey in the contents table. 
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Response Organisation Objects (ROO) 
 
Overview of ROO 
In the ROO game, which consists of three parts, children were instructed to place an index finger of 
each hand on the corresponding sides of the mouse. For each part, children were given instructions 
by the experimenter, with examples. They were given a practice run of every part before starting the 
test trials. There were three tasks: 
1) Fixed Compatible 1: In this part children were presented with a fixation cross on a black screen. 
They were asked to respond to red balls that would appear at random on either side of the fixation 
cross, by clicking on the corresponding side of the mouse. If the red ball appeared on the left of the 
cross, they click the left side, if it appeared to the right side, they click the right side. 
 
 
2) Fixed Incompatible 2: In this part children were presented with the same fixation cross on the 
screen. They were asked to respond to white balls that would appear randomly on either side of the 
fixation cross, by clicking the opposite side of the mouse. If a white ball appeared to the left of the 
fixation cross, they click the right side, if it appeared to the right of the cross, they click the left side. 
 
 
3) Random Mix Compatible and incompatible 3: In this part children were presented with the 
fixation cross. They were presented either the red or the white balls, and were asked to respond 
appropriately to the balls by clicking the side of the mouse they were trained in during the previous 
two parts. 
 
 
Variables labels in SPSS 
Data for responses to the left side and the right side were merged to give overall scores for each 
part, based on the recommendation that they are never analysed separately. The following variables 
were provided in the SPSS file. In order to clarify the variable labels in the SPSS file, we have included 
definitions of the labels for our understanding. Table 2 simply lists the variables within the SPSS file. 
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Table 1. Definitions of labels used to describe variables in the ROO SPSS file 
Variable Label Definition 
W6 CT ROO Mean RT Mean reaction time to stimuli in milliseconds 
W6 CT ROO Z-Score RT Reaction time adjusted into z score as a function of child age 
W6 CT ROO Z-Score N errors Number of errors adjusted into z score as a function of child age 
W6 CT ROO Percentage Error Percent of errors 
W6 CT ROO Median Median reaction time to stimuli in milliseconds 
W6 CT ROO SD RT Standard deviation of reaction time to stimuli in milliseconds 
W6 CT ROO Mean RT Error Mean reaction time to erroneous responses in milliseconds 
Note. To prevent repetition (there are many more variables than this in the final file – see Table 
2), we have defined the main element of the label, but this will apply for every part of the ROO. 
The psychological constructs are not defined here as this is clarified in the next section. 
 
Table 2. Variable names and labels in the ROO SPSS file 
Variable Name Variable Label 
Tc1_ol W6 CT ROO Mean RT Compatible 1 
Zc1_ol W6 CT ROO Z-Score RT Compatible 1 
Zec1_ol W6 CT ROO Z-Score N errors Compatible 1 
Ti2_ol W6 CT ROO Mean RT Incompatible 2 
Zi2_ol W6 CT ROO Z-Score RT Incompatible 2 
Zei2_ol W6 CT ROO Z-Score N errors Incompatible 2 
Tc3_ol W6 CT ROO Mean RT Compatible 3 
Zc3_ol W6 CT ROO Z-Score RT Compatible 3 
Ti3_ol W6 CT ROO Z-Score N errors Compatible 3 
Zi3_ol W6 CT ROO Mean RT Incompatible 3 
Zec3_ol W6 CT ROO Z-Score RT Incompatible 3 
Zei3_ol W6 CT ROO Z-Score N errors Incompatible 3 
Pec1_ol W6 CT ROO Percentage Error Compatible 1 
Pei2_ol W6 CT ROO Percentage Error Incompatible 2 
Pec3_ol W6 CT ROO Percentage Error Compatible 3 
Pei3_ol W6 CT ROO Percentage Error Incompatible 3 
Pe3_ol W6 CT ROO Percentage Error Overall 3 
Mc1_ol W6 CT ROO Median RT Compatible 1 
Mi2_ol W6 CT ROO Median RT Incompatible 2 
Mc3_ol W6 CT ROO Median RT Compatible 3 
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Mi3_ol W6 CT ROO Median RT Incompatible 3 
Sc1_ol W6 CT ROO SD RT Compatible 1 
Si2_ol W6 CT ROO SD RT Incompatible 2 
Sc3_ol W6 CT ROO SD RT Compatible 3 
Si3_ol W6 CT ROO SD RT Incompatible 3 
Tec1_ol W6 CT ROO Mean RT Error Compatible 1 
Tei2_ol W6 CT ROO Mean RT Error Incompatible 2 
Tec3_ol W6 CT ROO Mean RT Error Compatible 3 
Tei3_ol W6 CT ROO Mean RT Error Incompatible 3 
ResponseInhibitionRT W6 CT ROO Response Inhibition Reaction Times 
(Mean Latency) 
ResponseInhibitionSD W6 CT ROO Response Inhibition Standard 
Deviation (Fluctuation in Speed) 
ResponseInhibitionPercentError W6 CT ROO Response Inhibition Percentage of 
Errors (Accuracy) 
CogFlexRT W6 CT ROO Cognitive Flexibility Reaction Times 
(Mean Latency) 
CogFlexSD W6 CT ROO Cognitive Flexibility Standard 
Deviation (Fluctuation in Speed) 
CogFlexPercentError W6 CT ROO Cognitive Flexibility Percentage of 
Errors (Accuracy) 
Details of Specific Cases 
Age. Note that child ages in the SPSS file are based on the date of birth provided by the 
experimenter during the child testing and the date of testing, therefore they would be adjusted to 
session 1 or session 2. However, as these DOBs have been entered in the sessions, there may be 
errors in the ages. When LdS, SH, RF created the z-scores, these z-scores were created based on 
these ages. Although obvious errors were corrected, there is no guarantee that these ages are all 
completely correct (so be aware of this if using z-scores). If an accurate age variable is needed, these 
have been computed separately (by AP). 
Depending on the type of hypotheses/analyses, sometimes z-scores are preferred, and sometimes 
the raw scores. In many cases raw scores are more sensitive, in particular, when focusing on task 
manipulation effects (that represent a psychological construct such as inhibition or memory load) 
(de Sonneville, personal communication, 2015). Added note from Leo regarding this: “It simply has 
to do with the formula for the z-score and the commonly known fact that more difficult responses 
(with a larger RT) are accompanied by larger SDs. So, as the SD value is the denominator, the z-scores 
of more difficult responses tend to be ‘attenuated’. So, it may happen that there is a perfect 
interaction effect shown in raw scores (group x task condition) while the z-
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score of the two task conditions are practically equal.” (de Sonneville, personal communication, 
2016). 
Corrected cases. Although it is worth double checking the ages in these files, when data was handled 
by Leo, Rhiannon and Salim in Summer 2015, any obvious cases where age was clearly incorrect (e.g., 
2013 instead of 2003, or if the incorrect ID was clearly selected during testing) the correct DOB was 
provided and this was corrected for Leo’s z scores. All of these corrected scores are within a 
document located: S:\Research\DHPVG\ANT tasks\ANT data archive\ANT data July 2015\ANT 
corrections 20.7.15. 
1217. There was a mix up with this ID and another ID, which is why this ID does not currently have a z 
–score (contact Leo if z-scores are needed for this case). 
Case Exclusions. Within the W6 ANT data audit, there is a full list of cases that were available and 
reasons for their absence (i.e., technical error/child refusal etc). This can be found in this location: 
S:\Research\DHPVG\ANT tasks\W6 ANT data audit. Amongst the reasons for why cases are missing, 
there is a ‘case excluded’ label. Cases were excluded when Leo highlighted the data as anomalous, 
and child testing notes suggested this was due to factors in the testing environment (for example, 
child not concentrating/particularly noisy environment/child walks away). 
Computing Psychological Constructs 
“The ROO task measures inhibition of prepotent responses and attentional flexibility (set shifting).” 
(de Sonneville, p. 2 of ANT manual). S:\Research\DHPVG\ANT tasks\ANT setup 
documents\ANTtaskdescriptions. 
Response Inhibition. Creation of the response inhibition variable is based on previous research. 
Creation of the inhibition score is fundamentally based upon differences in performance between 
part 2 fixed incompatible and part fixed compatible. These variables have been created in the ROO 
SPSS file according to these instructions, and are based on Barneveld, de Sonneville, van Rijn, van 
Engeland, & Swaab, 2013, Oerlemans et al., 2014 and Van der Meer, 2014, who computed these 
scores using a near-identical task to the ROO (and was recommended for use by Leo). The following 
methods have been used to compute response inhibition scores: 
Response Inhibition: Reaction times. Mean latency has been assessed by calculating the difference 
between children’s mean reaction speed times between incompatible (part 2) and compatible (part 
1): 
Ti2_ol - Tc1_ol = ResponseInhibitionRT 
This will (almost always) yield a positive number. When this positive value is larger, the impact of the 
task manipulation is larger, consequently, the task effect is larger and the child’s response inhibition 
is poorer. The smaller the number, the better the inhibition as the task effect in this child is smaller. 
In this manual (and in ANT tasks generally, when relevant) subtract the result of the easy condition 
from the more difficult condition. Essentially following this calculation, the smaller the number, the 
better the child’s response inhibition. 
Response Inhibition: Standard deviation. Fluctuation in speed has been assessed by calculating the 
difference between children’s standard deviations between incompatible (part 2) and compatible 
(part 1): 
Si2_ol - Sc1_ol = ResponseInhibitionSD 
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Response Inhibition: Percentage of errors: Accuracy has been assessed by calculating the difference 
between children’s percentage of errors between incompatible (part 2) and compatible (part 1): 
Pei2_ol - Pec1_ol = ResponseInhibitionPercentError 
 
 
Cognitive Flexibility. Creation of the cognitive flexibility scores is fundamentally based upon 
differences in performance between the only the compatible stimuli from part 3 random mixed 
compatible and incompatible and part 1 fixed compatible. These variables have been created in the 
ROO SPSS file according to these instructions, and are based on Barneveld, de Sonneville, van Rijn, 
van Engeland, & Swaab, 2013, who computed these scores using a near-identical task to the ROO 
(and was recommended for use by Leo). The following methods have been used to compute 
cognitive flexibility scores: 
Cognitive Flexibility: Reaction times: Mean latency has been assessed by calculating the difference 
between children’s mean reaction speed times between compatible from random mixed compatible 
and incompatible (part 3) and fixed compatible (part 1). 
Tc3_ol - Tc1_ol = CogFlexRT 
Cognitive Flexibility: Standard deviation: Fluctuation in speed has been assessed by calculating the 
difference between children’s standard deviations between compatible from random mixed 
compatible and incompatible (part 3) and fixed compatible (part 1). 
Sc3_ol - Sc1_ol = CogFlexSD 
Cognitive Flexibility: Percentage of errors: Accuracy has been assessed by calculating the difference 
between children’s percentage of errors between compatible from random mixed compatible and 
incompatible (part 3) and fixed compatible (part 1). 
Pec3_ol - Pec1_ol = CogFlexPercentError 
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Visuospatial Sequencing (VSS) 
Overview of Visuospatial Sequencing 
In VSS, the child was presented with a grey square with 9 circles placed in a 3x3 matrix. After a beep 
signal, a hand would appear and signal a pattern, i.e. by clicking on a specific number of circles 
(targets) resulting in a specific temporal-spatial pattern. This pattern would start with few circles, 
and progress to longer and more complicated patterns (3 targets, increasing to 7). 
 
  
After the display of the pattern, the child would gain control of the mouse, and was asked to 
recreate the pattern they had been shown; the same circles, in the same order that was presented. 
 
 
 
 
Variables labels in SPSS 
Leo provided the following variables in the SPSS file. In order to clarify the variable labels in the SPSS 
file, we have included definitions of the labels for our understanding. Table 2 simply lists the 
variables within the SPSS file.
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Table 1. Definitions of labels used to describe variables in the VSS SPSS file 
 
Variable Label Definition 
W6 CT VSS Number of Correct Trials Number of trials fully correct, i.e. perfect replication 
of the temporal-spatial target sequence 
W6 CT VSS Number of Identified Targets Number of correctly identified targets 
W6 CT VSS Number of Identified Targets in 
Correct Order 
Number of correctly identified targets in the correct 
temporal order 
W6 CT VSS Number of False Alarms Number of targets selected that were not presented 
in the pattern 
W6 CT VSS Number of Misses Number of targets missed from presented pattern 
W6 CT VSS Mean Pointing Interval Time between clicks (in ms) (time it takes to move 
from one target to another). NB: not really relevant 
(see Tint_vs) 
W6 CT VSS Z-Score of Number of Correct 
Trials 
Number of trials fully correct adjusted into z score 
as a function of child age 
W6 CT VSS Z-Score of Number of Identified 
Targets 
Number of correctly identified targets adjusted into 
z score as a function of child age 
W6 CT VSS Z-Score of Number of Identified 
Targets in Correct Order 
Number of correctly identified targets in the correct 
sequence adjusted into z score as a function of child 
age 
W6 CT VSS Z-Score of Number of False 
Alarms 
Number of targets selected that were not presented 
in the pattern adjusted into z score as a function of 
child age 
W6 CT VSS Z-Score of Number of Misses Number of targets missed from presented pattern 
adjusted into z score as a function of child age 
W6 CT VSS Cognitive Control The difference between number of correctly 
identified targets and number of correctly identified 
targets in the correct sequence 
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Table 2. Variable names and labels in the VSS SPSS file 
 
Variable Name Variable Label 
Nct_vs W6 CT VSS Number of Correct Trials 
Nit_vs W6 CT VSS Number of Identified Targets 
Nitco_vs W6 CT VSS Number of Identified Targets in 
Correct Order 
Nf_vs W6 CT VSS Number of False Alarms 
Nm_vs W6 CT VSS Number of Misses 
Tint_vs W6 CT VSS Mean Pointing Interval 
Zct_vs W6 CT VSS Z-Score of Number of Correct Trials 
Zit_vs W6 CT VSS Z-Score of Number of Identified 
Targets 
Zitco_vs W6 CT VSS Z-Score of Number of Identified 
Targets in Correct Order 
Zf_vs W6 CT VSS Z-Score of Number of False Alarms 
Zm_vs W6 CT VSS Z-Score of Number of Misses 
CogControl W6 CT VSS Cognitive Control 
 
Details of Specific Cases 
Age. Note that child ages in the SPSS file are based on the date of birth provided by the 
experimenter during the child testing and the date of testing, therefore they would be adjusted to 
session 1 or session 2. However, as these DOBs have been entered in the sessions, there may be 
errors in the ages. When LdS, SH, RF created the z-scores, these z-scores were created based on 
these ages. Although obvious errors were corrected, there is no guarantee that these ages are all 
completely correct (so be aware of this if using z-scores). If you need an accurate age variable these 
have been computed separately (by AP). 
Depending on the type of hypotheses/analyses, sometimes z-scores are preferred, and sometimes 
the raw scores. In many cases raw scores are more sensitive, in particular, when focussing on task 
manipulation effects (that represent a psychological construct such as inhibition or memory load) 
(de Sonneville, personal communication, 2015). Added note from Leo regarding this: “It simply has 
to do with the formula for the z-score and the commonly known fact that more difficult responses 
(with a larger RT) are accompanied by larger SDs. So, as the SD value is the denominator, the z-scores 
of more difficult responses tend to be ‘attenuated’. So, it may happen that there is a perfect 
interaction effect shown in raw scores (group x task condition) while the z- score of the two task 
conditions are practically equal.” (de Sonneville, personal communication, 2016). 
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Corrected cases. Although it is worth double checking the ages in these files, when data was handled 
by Leo, Rhiannon and Salim in Summer 2015, any obvious cases where age was clearly incorrect (e.g., 
2013 instead of 2003, or if the incorrect ID was clearly selected during testing) the correct DOB was 
provided and this was corrected for Leo’s z scores. All of these corrected scores are within a 
document located: S:\Research\DHPVG\ANT tasks\ANT data archive\ANT data July 2015\ANT 
corrections 20.7.15. 
Case Exclusions. Within the W6 ANT data audit, there is a full list of cases that were available and 
reasons for their absence (i.e., technical error/child refusal etc). This can be found in this location: 
S:\Research\DHPVG\ANT tasks\W6 ANT data audit. Amongst the reasons for why cases are missing, 
there is a ‘case excluded’ label. Cases were excluded when Leo highlighted the data as anomalous, 
and child testing notes suggested this was due to factors in the testing environment (for example, 
child not concentrating/particularly noisy environment/child walks away). 
Computing Psychological Constructs 
VSS measures “memory for visuospatial temporal patterns.” (de Sonneville, p. 2 of ANT manual). 
S:\Research\DHPVG\ANT tasks\ANT setup documents\ANTtaskdescriptions. Creation of the 
variables is based on previous research: 
Visuospatial working memory. Can be measured using the number of correctly identified locations 
in the right order (Nitco_vs - W6 CT VSS Number of Identified Targets in Correct Order) (Bloemsma 
et al., 2013). Also used in Schuitema et al., 2015. Nitco_vs is labelled as VisuospatialWM in the 
Psychological Constructs SPSS file. 
Cognitive control. Can be measured as the difference “…between number of locations identified 
correctly (visuospatial WM) and number of (correctly identified) locations in the right order 
(visuospatial WM + visuotemporal WM)” (Huijbregts et al., p. 741). 
Nit_vs - Nitco_vs = CogControl 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Bloemsma, J. M., Boer, F., Arnold, R., Banaschewski, T., Faraone, S. V., Buitelaar, J. K., Sergeant, J. A., 
Rommelse, N., & Oosterlaan, J. (2013). Comorbid anxiety and neurocognitive dysfunctions in 
children with ADHD. European Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 22(4), 225-234. 
 
De Sonneville, L. M. J. (2011). ANT Manual. 
 
Huijbregts, S., Swaab, H., & de Sonneville, L. (2010). Cognitive and motor control in 
neurofibromatosis type I: influence of maturation and hyperactivity-inattention. 
Developmental neuropsychology, 35(6), 737-751. 
Schuitema, I., de Sonneville, L., Kaspers, G., van der Pal, H., Uyttebroeck, A., van den Bos, C., & 
Veerman, A. (2015). Executive dysfunction 25 years after treatment with cranial radiotherapy 
for paediatric lymphoid malignancies. Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society, 
21, (1- 13).
230 
 
 
APPENDIX III 
 
Sample attrition from recruitment to early infancy, toddlerhood and middle childhood 
assessments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n= 6 (1.8%) 
withdrawn 
n= 8 (2.4%) not 
traced 
n= 8 (2.4%) 
contacted no 
data 
 
n= 16 (4.8%) 
withdrawn 
n= 18 (5.4%) not 
traced 
n= 19 (5.7%) 
contacted no 
data 
 
n= 21 (6.3%) 
withdrawn 
n= 3 (0.9%) not 
traced 
n= 21 (6.3%) 
contacted no 
data 
 
N= 310 (93.4%) families 
provided some data at the 
early infancy assessment 
N= 279 (84.0%) families 
provided some data at the 
toddlerhood assessment 
N= 287 (86.4%) families 
provided some data at the 
childhood assessment 
n= 17 (5.9%) interview and/or 
questionnaire only 
n= 4 (1.4%) started child 
assessments at home visit 
n=266 (92.7%) completed child 
assessments at home visit 
 
 
n= 9 (2.9%) interview and/or 
questionnaire only 
n= 301 (97.1%) home visit 
 
 
n= 9 (3.2%) interview and/or 
questionnaire only 
n= 65 (23.3%) home visit 
parent-child assessment only 
n= 205 (73.5%) full home visit  
 
 
Early infancy assessment 
 
N= 332 families recruited in pregnancy 
Middle childhood 
 
Toddlerhood 
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APPENDIX IV 
Example transcripts of mother-child interactions 
Example 1. Early infancy transcript with activity board 
Minutes Seconds Maternal speech and action Internal state language coding 
00 00 - 05 Let’s have a look. What’s this? [Gasps] What’s that? MC Perception imperative(pl) 
00 05 - 10 Look, there’s the farmyard. You lift up that page. MC Perception imperative(pl) 
00 10 - 15 Oh, ooh. Look at that. Look at that, there’s a cow there. MC Perception imperative(pl) 
00 15 - 20 Do you want to lift the pages yourself? There’s the jungle. MC Desire 
00 20 - 25 Yes. Let’s lift up the page.  
00 25 - 30 [Gasps] Look at that! MC Perception imperative(pl) 
00 30 - 35 Are we going to have a look? There’s the garden. MC Intention(pl) + MC Perception 
imperative(pl) 
00 35 - 40 Do you wanna lift? [Gasps] Look! It’s a little bird! MC Desire + MC Perception imperative(pl) 
00 40 - 45 Yeah. And there’s the underwater *inaudible* fish.  
00 45 - 50 And a dolphin [gasps] let’s lift up that one.  
00 50 - 55 [Gasps] Yes. Look at that. Look at the dolphins! MC Perception imperative(pl) 
00 55 - 60 Look! At all of them… MC Perception imperative(pl) 
01 00 - 05 Shall we see what else is under there? MC Perception imperative(pl) 
01 05 - 10 We’ve had a look at the cow haven’t we? [Gasps] look at that! MC Perception imperative(pl) 
01 10 - 15 It’s a hen. See all the chickens. Do you see the chickens? MC Perception imperative(pl) + MC 
Perception declarative 
01 15 - 20 Yeah. Clever boy. *inaudible* Do you see? MC Perception declarative 
01 20 - 25 I’ll show you this little one if you want. MC Desire 
01 25 - 30 Look at that! MC Perception imperative(pl) 
01 30 - 35 Look at that! MC Perception imperative(pl) 
01 35 - 40 You like the chicken at the moment don’t you? Yeah. MC Preference 
01 40 - 45 Right let’s lift up the little bird. [Gasps] Look at that! Look at the butterfly! MC Perception imperative(pl) 
01 45 - 50 What do you want to do? Carry on a bit? [Mother giggles]. MC Desire 
01 50 - 55 Do you want to open this page? See what’s underneath the dolphins? [Gasps] MC Desire + MC Perception imperative(pl) 
01 55 - 60 Look at that! Look at the fish! MC Perception imperative(pl) 
Note. Maternal speech is presented in normal font, maternal internal state language is presented in blue font. Child speech is presented italicised 
and bold. Action is presented in brackets.
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Example 2. Toddlerhood transcript with teddy bear puzzle 
Minutes Seconds Maternal speech and action Internal state language coding 
00 00 - 05 [Mother holds child when puzzle is out of reach] Restraint task: Internal state language not 
coded 00 05 - 10 [Puzzle is given to the child] 
00 10 - 15 Ok, do you want to touch it? MC Desire + MC Perception imperative 
00 15 - 20 Ohh.  
00 20 - 25 Look. Remember, you can just slightly move things. There. MC Perception imperative + MC Cognition 
00 25 - 30 [Gasps] That’s his foot. Just like Holly’s foot.  
00 30 - 35 -  
00 35 - 40 Do you want mummy to do it? You just do it exactly the way Kathryn did it, just move it a little bit. MC Desire 
00 40 - 45 This is his other foot, like Kathryn’s other foot.  
00 45 - 50 Well done.  
00 50 - 55 Yeah. This is tummy. This is his tummy like Kathryn’s tummy.  
00 55 - 60 Kathryn’s tummy, bear’s tummy.  
01 00 - 05 Mummy just move it ever so slightly.  
01 05 - 10 Take pressure off it.  
01 10 - 15 Try again. Ohh. Do you want me to show you? MC Desire 
01 15 - 20 There. What else have we got?”  
01 20 - 25 Ears, like Kathryn’s ears, and you got…  
01 25 - 30 a nose and mouth like Kathryn’s nose and mouth.  
01 30 - 35 and you got a hand like Kathryn’s hand.  
01 35 - 40 Kathryn try it with me then.  
01 40 - 45 Kathryn do it with mummy. No? Okay, let me show you then.  
01 45 - 50 There.  
01 50 - 55 Ahh thank you! Are you going to put it back in? Turn it around! MC Intention 
01 55 - 60 Turn it around.  
02 00 - 05 Thank you.  
02 05 - 10 What’s that, what have you seen, nosy parker? MC Perception declarative 
Note. Maternal speech is presented in normal font, maternal internal state language is presented in blue font. Child speech is presented italicised 
and bold. Action is presented in brackets. Child’s name has been changed.  
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Example 3. Middle childhood transcript with Etch-a-Sketch 
Minutes Seconds Mother speech and action Internal state language coding 
00 00 - 05 Ok you’re in charge of that one [Mother points to child’s dial). I’m in charge of this one. Here we go. So 
what is it you want to draw? Any picture? 
Free play prior to start of cooperation task: 
Not coded 
00 05 - 10 Right what shall we draw?  A uhh…  
00 10 - 15 Keep going further. What is it going to be? 
00 15 - 20 Because I need to help you by doing this side. Uhh it is a… 
00 20 - 25 Well shall we do a house? If you start, look. Yeah a house.  
00 25 - 30 Look if I go this way. A house is easier because it’s like a square. MC Perception imperative 
00 30 - 35 So you need to go up now. [Mother points where on screen]. I think you’re in charge of that bit yeah. 
See? 
MC Obligation + MS Cognition + MC 
Perception imperative 
00 35 - 40 It might be. If we do it like a block of flats now we got a…  
00 40 - 45 Shall I go that way? Yeah. Because we didn’t have room to do the triangle.   
00 45 - 50 And I’ll go round. Oh, ooh ooh Shall we do it like a… could be like a roof?  
00 50 - 55 How are we going to do windows? I don’t know how you do the MC Intention + MS cognition 
00 55 - 60 Ok so now what shall we do with the windows? I don’t know if we can get a gap. MS Cognition 
01 00 - 05 Shall I just go back and kind of come down. Oooh hang on. Stop.   
01 05 - 10 Go across. Up.  
01 10 - 15 Stop.  
01 15 - 20 Ok, if I go across that way and you come down.  
01 20 - 25 Stop. Ooh.  
01 25 - 30 Up. Stop.  
01 30 - 35 If you go down a bit [Mother points]. Then we can make a window.  
01 35 - 40 There we go. Shall we go… No bit across by here [Child points to screen].  
01 40 - 45 You have to go down then. MC Obligation 
01 45 - 50 Right. Shall we try and do a door?  
01 50 - 55 You go down.  
01 55 - 60 *Child inaudible* Door. Up. [Child reaches over and twists mother’s dial]. Oi that’s my one! [Mother knocks 
child’s hand]. HA HA HA! 
 
02 00 - 05 Down. Are we doing a door? Yeah.  
02 05 - 10 Go that way then. [Mother points direction]. Oh no you can’t! [Mother laughs].  
02 10 - 15 You go back up then.  
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Note. Maternal speech is presented in normal font, maternal internal state language is presented in blue font. Child speech is presented italicised 
and bold. Action is presented in brackets.  
 
02 15 - 20 A little higher. Go back up. Up. Go across. Across! I know, but it’s a very short door.  MS Cognition 
02 20 - 25 If we go up to there. Stop.   
02 25 - 30 Then go down. Right shall we try and do a circle for a thing?  
02 30 - 35 I don’t even know how to do a circle. *Child inaudible* for a circle. Like a door handle? MS Cognition 
02 35 - 40 How do you do a circle? I don’t know. I’m guessing if you go up? MS Cognition 
02 40 - 45 And if I go that way. Then if you turn and I turn at the same time.   
02 45 - 50 Yay keep going the same way. [Mother and child laugh].  
02 50 - 55 Maybe that can be the pattern on the door. I’m gonna do it.  
02 55 - 60 -  
03 00 - 05 A little pattern on the door then. Or maybe it could be like, ooh, we could have like hedges.   
03 05 - 10 Yeah. Oh, hang on.  
03 10 - 15 Go down a bit. That’s going all the way up that can be like a tree.  
03 15 - 20 What shall I do I can’t turn it? Hang on you’re going over the house now.   
03 20 - 25 What are you doing? I’m trying to bring it down.  MS Intention 
03 25 - 30 Can you get it down? 
Over 3 minutes: Not coded 
03 30 - 35 I think this picture’s getting a bit messy. 
03 35 - 40 Can I use both knobs? [Child takes Etch-a-Sketch from mother]. No we’re not, that’s part of the thing. She 
said we’ve got to do one each and work together as a team. 
03 40 - 45 Can we swap then? Swap jobs. 
03 45 - 50 Hang on we’ve got to do this for the minute. Ahh can we do *child inaudible*. 
03 50 - 55 Let’s just bring it down. Then we can see… how about we do some curtains or something?  
03 55 - 60 Ok how do we do those then? Ok. I don’t know. 
04 00 - 05 Here we go. Ok. All the way down. Brilliant.  
04 05 - 10 Hang on. Go. 
04 10 - 15 It’s not the best curtain is it? [Child laughs] No. 
04 15 - 20 This game is like *child inaudible*. Ok where are we now?  
04 20 - 25 You’ve lost interest haven’t you? Do you have… [Child laughs]. Can we just start again?  
04 25 - 30 Shall we show the picture of our block of flats? [Experimenter takes Etch-a-Sketch and shows camera]. 
04 30 - 35 [Child runs up and takes it off Experimenter and holds it in front of the camera]. 
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APPENDIX V 
 
All internal state language terms used within each category at each wave of assessment 
 
Internal state language used at early infancy assessment 
 
Perception Physiology Preference Intention Desire Emotion Cognition 
See 
Look 
Watch 
Feel 
Touch 
Taste/tasty  
 
Tired 
Sick 
Hungry 
Like/not like 
Love 
Favourite 
Impressed 
Interested 
Fun (as in ‘having’) 
Fascinated 
Don’t care (lack of 
preference) 
Fond of 
Had enough 
Going to 
Gonna 
Trying 
Attempt 
Want/ wanna 
Would you like to? 
Rather 
Fancy 
Hope 
Agitated 
Worry 
Fed up 
Bored 
Worry 
What is the matter? 
Grouchy 
Think 
Know/don’t 
know/dunno 
Bet 
Recognise 
Got it 
Remember 
Forget 
 
Realise 
See (as in 
‘find out’) 
Expect 
Believe 
Wonder 
Find out 
Sure 
 
 
Internal state language used at toddlerhood assessment 
 
Perception Physiology Preference Intention Desire Emotion Cognition 
See 
Hear 
Look 
Listen 
Watch 
Touch 
Hurt 
Fart 
Interested 
Like/not like 
Bugging (you) 
Love 
Not bothered 
Keen on 
Going to 
Gonna 
Trying 
Meant to 
Want/wanna 
Would you like to? 
Fancy 
Hope 
Rather 
Dying to 
Need (as in want) 
Upset 
Worry 
Excited 
What is the matter? 
Bored 
Happy 
Realised 
Think/thought 
Know 
Wonder 
Work out 
Forgot 
Believe 
Expect 
Remember 
Sure 
Idea 
Confused 
Bet 
Check 
Understand 
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Internal state language used at middle childhood assessment 
 
Perception Physiology Preference Intention Desire Emotion Cognition 
See  
Look 
Listen 
Tired 
Cold 
Hurt 
Like/not like 
Love 
Prefer 
Interested 
 
Going to 
Gonna 
Trying 
Have a go 
 
Want/wanna 
Would you like to? 
Hope 
Need (as in want) 
 
 
Happy 
Angry 
Worry 
 
Think/thought 
Know 
See (as in 
‘find out’) 
Reckon 
Mean 
Forget 
Get it 
Understand 
Figure out 
Pretend 
Remember 
Guess 
Work out 
Suppose 
Sure 
Idea 
Decide 
Wonder 
Dream 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
237 
 
APPENDIX VI 
Supplementary descriptive data for measures of mothers’ history of behavioural 
problems 
 
Table 1. 
Mean, range and standard deviation of mothers’ history of behavioural problems (conduct + 
ADHD problems). 
 Minimum Maximum Range Mean SD 
Mothers’ history of 
behavioural problems 
0 20 20 5.43 4.04 
Note. N=276. This variable was used in Chapters 4 and 5, see p. 110 and p. 135. 
 
Table 2. 
Mean, range and standard deviation of mothers’ history of conduct problems. 
 Minimum Maximum Range Mean SD 
Mothers’ history of 
conduct problems 
0 12 12 2.06 2.23 
Note. N=269. This variable was used in Chapter 6, see p. 155. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
